Salomon v. Chase Bank of Texas

* District Judge of the Western District of Texas, sitting by
designation.
** Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
May 16, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-20881
JOUSSEF MEKDESSI SALOMON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CHASE BANK OF TEXAS, N.A.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(H-00-CV-0774)
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Before WIENER and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges, and FURGESON,*
District Judge.
PER CURIAM:**
Plaintiff-Appellant Joussef Mekdessi Salomon appeals from the
district court’s dismissal of his claims against Defendant-Appellee
Chase Bank of Texas, N.A. as time barred. We affirm.
The district court applied the 3-year statute of limitations
specified in § 4.111 of the Texas version of the Uniform Commercial
Code (“U.C.C.”) after finding the bank in legal bad faith and thus

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ineligible for the 1-year statute of limitations for claims arising
under § 4.401 of the U.C.C. Salomon maintained in the district
court, as he now does on appeal, that his claims are based on the
substantive law of Texas, such as breach of contract, so they are
not time barred until the four-year statute of limitation runs.
Relying on § 1.103 of the U.C.C., Salomon insists that his common
law causes of action are not “displaced” by provisions of the
U.C.C., particularly § 4.401, and that principles of law and equity
continue to supplement the provisions of the U.C.C. as adopted by
Texas.
Although Salomon is correct, he misses the mark: His claims
against the bank arise directly from banking transactions and the
bank’s misdealings with “items” covered by the applicable
provisions of the U.C.C. Thus, even though his causes of action
are not displaced, for claims like his that arise in the banking
context, the general 4-year statute of limitations is displaced by
the particular 3-year statute of limitations specified in § 4.111,
which expressly applies to claims based on allegations of banks’
breaches of duties and obligations owed to their customers. We
therefore affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing
Salomon’s claims as time barred.
AFFIRMED.

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