Montross v. Untd Parcel Svc Amer, et al

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
September 4, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 02-11316
DALE MONTROSS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE OF AMERICA, INC.;
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., successor in
interest to and corporate holding company of United
Parcel Service of America, Inc.; LYN NORTH;
UNITED PARCEL (OHIO),
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas
(USDC No. 3:00-CV-785-L)
_______________________________________________________
Before REAVLEY, JONES and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Dale Montross claims that the district court erred in granting United Parcel

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Service’s motion for summary judgment, and in denying Montross’s subsequent motion
for new trial, because the district court did not afford him adequate opportunity to
complete discovery. We disagree and affirm the district court’s entry of judgment for
UPS.
The magistrate judge granted UPS’s motion for protective order, and in so doing
quashed Montross’s subpoenas of several UPS employees and denied further discovery.
The district court had previously granted Montross two additional periods for discovery.
Following the second extension, UPS offered to make its employees available for
deposition testimony on several dates within the time period requested by Montross.
However, Montross claimed that the proposed dates conflicted with Montross’s counsel’s
trial of another matter. Montross also cited counsel’s conflicts in obtaining the discovery
extensions. Montross then subpoenaed the employees for dates UPS said the employees
would be unavailable. The magistrate judge could rightly find that Montross’s failure to
depose the employees during the 18 months allotted by the district court, coupled with
Montross’s failure to work cooperatively with UPS to find mutually convenient
deposition dates, established the requisite good cause to issue the protective order. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
AFFIRMED.

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