United States v. Glinsey

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-60809
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
CURTIS GLINSEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Mississippi
(2:98-CR-10-1-D)
January 8, 2003
Before BARKSDALE, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Curtis Glinsey, pro se (post-appeal and post-denial of § 2255
relief), appeals the denial of: a 28 U.S.C. § 455 recusal motion;
and a FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) motion seeking reconsideration of denial
of a motion for a copy of a sealed order connected to Glinsey’s
prosecution (pleaded guilty).
Glinsey’s speculative, unsupported allegations of bias are
insufficient grounds for recusal. See United States v. Miranne,

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2
688 F.2d 980, 985 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1109
(1983). Glinsey also asserts recusal is warranted because he may
call the district judge as a witness in other pending civil
actions. This issue was not presented to the district court and,
thus, is not properly before our court. See Varnado v. Lynaugh,
920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991).
Because Glinsey assigns no specific error to the district
court’s denial of his FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) motion, this issue is
waived. See Kansa Reinsurance Co., Ltd. v. Cong. Mortgage Corp.,
20 F.3d 1362, 1374 n.14 (5th Cir. 1994).
AFFIRMED

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