Hartfield v. Georgia Pacific, et al

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
m 01-60220
Summary Calendar
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JOHNNY W. HARTFIELD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
GEORGIA PACIFIC CORPORATION; LEAF RIVER FOREST PRODUCTS, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Mississippi
(2:99-CV-295)
_________________________
September 21, 2001
Before JONES, SMITH, and
EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judges.
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:*
Johnny Hartfield appeals a summary judg-
ment dismissing his personal injury action
against Georgia Pacific Corp. (“Georgia Paci-
fic”) and Leaf River Forest Products, Inc.
(“Leaf River”). The district court ruled that
Hartfield was a borrowed servant under
Mississippi law and therefore that the
defendants are sheltered from liability by the
provision of workers’ compensation benefits
by Manpower, Inc. (“Manpower”), the em-
ployer from whom Hartfield was borrowed.
The court also held that Georgia Pacific is not
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has
determined that this opinion should not be
published and is not precedent except under the
limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.
47.5.4.

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liable for negligence with regard to the forklift
that was the cause of Hartfield’s injury,
because Georgia Pacific introduced affidavits
showing that it did not own the forklift at the
time of injury, which evidence Hartfield did
not contradict. Finding no error, we affirm,
essentially for the reasons stated by the district
court in its comprehensive opinion of February
5, 2001.
I.
Hartfield was an employee of Manpower,
an employment placement agency, which had
a contract with Leaf River to supply
employees. Under this contract, Hartfield was
placed at Leaf River as a forklift operator and
reported to, and was under the direction of,
Leaf River’s supervisors, similarly to
employees hired directly by Leaf River, but he
was paid by Manpower, which maintained
workers’ compensation insurance coverage on
Hartfield.
Hartfield was injured on October 31, 1996,
when the fuel tank on the forklift he was oper-
ating exploded, allegedly from a defective
valve. Manpower’s workers’ compensation
policy provided payments to Hartfield, who
continued to work at Leaf River as a forklift
operator for seven months.
II.
Hartfield sued Georgia Pacific and Leaf
River, a wholly owned subsidiary. In
Mississippi, workers’ compensation is the
exclusive remedy against one’s employer for
on-the-job injuries. MISS. CODE ANN. 71-3-9.
Utilizing the appropriate test under Mississippi
law, the district court held that Hartfield was
a borrowed employee and therefore that Leaf
River is immune from suit, because
Manpower’s workers’ compensation insurance
covered Hartfield. The court closely followed
N. Elec. Co. v. Phillips, 660 So. 2d 1278
(Miss. 1995), which concluded that an
employer using workers from an employment
agency was immune from suit by virtue of
employment agency’s provision of workers’
compensation insurance.1 Where one is
employed by two employers in relation to the
same act , or in which the employee is a
“borrowed employee” of one employer from
the other, both employers are exempt from lia-
bility for workplace negligence actions, “al-
though only one of them has provided
workmen’s compensation insurance.” Honey
v. United Parcel Serv., 879 F. Supp. 615, 618
(S.D. Miss. 1995). Accordingly, there can be
no recovery from Leaf River.
III.
Hartfield also appeals the summary
judgment in favor of Georgia Pacific, arguing
that he should be allowed to go to trial on the
issues of (1) whether Georgia Pacific provided
Leaf River with a defective forklift and
(2) whether the forklift was owned by Georgia
Pacific. Citing cases from other jurisdictions,
Hartfield contends that any negligence of
Georgia Pacific, as corporate grandparent of
Leaf River, is not immunized by Manpower’s
provision of workers’ compensation insurance,
because Hartfield was borrowed by Leaf
River, not Georgia Pacific. Hartfield argues
that, therefore, if he can prove that Georgia
1 “Summary judgment is appropriate [under the
‘borrowed servant’ doctrine] where a temporary
employment agency assigns an employee to another
employer and the employee performs the normal
work of the second employer and is controlled and
supervised by that employer. In Mississippi, one
may be employed by more than one employer and
both employers gain immunity from common-law
negligence actions.” N. Elec., 660
So. 2d at 1282.

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Pacific’s negligence caused his injuries, he may
pursue a claim against it.
Hartfield seizes on the fact that the forklift
was purchased by Georgia Pacific. Because
Georgia Pacific was not involved in any of the
operations at the Leaf River facility, however,
Hartfield may pursue a claim against Georgia
Pacific for negligence in maintaining the fork-
lift only if Georgia Pacific owned the forklift
or had some duty to maintain it for Leaf River.
Recognizing this requirement, the district
court granted summary judgment for Georgia
Pacific because Georgia Pacific had provided
affidavits stating that the forklift had been
transferred to Leaf River before Hartfield’s in-
jury. Hartfield produced no evidence
disputing these affidavits but instead argues,
without reference to authority, that “[w]ithout
a bill of sale or any other document, the Court
should find the title to the forklift remained in
[Georgia Pacific].”
This argument is without merit.
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
included sworn affidavits stating that Leaf
River owned the forklift. Once defendants
presented this properly supported motion,
Hartfield was required to “bring forward
‘significant probative evidence’ demonstrating
the existence of a triable issue of fact.” In re
Mun. Bond Reporting Antitrust Litig., 672
F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 1982). Hartfield pro-
duced no evidence disputing the ownership of
the forklift, but only complained that the
defendants had not provided evidence of own-
ership in a form he preferred. This is not
sufficient to show a genuine issue of fact.
AFFIRMED.

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