DeMoss v. Lopez, et al

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-50692
Summary Calendar
JAMES EDWARD DEMOSS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
RALPH LOPEZ, Sheriff; CHAUNCEY SPENCER; JOHN C. SPARKS,
Medical Doctor; G. MENDEZ; RAJA SAAD, Dr.; JOHN DOE 1-10;
JIM DOE 1-10; JOHN DOE, Dr., Texas Department of Criminal
Justice, Garza West Unit; DR. KELLEY; DR. VINGH; DR. HUFF;
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL
DIVISION; BEXAR COUNTY ADULT DETENTION CENTER,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. SA-99-CV-1416
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September 6, 2002
Before JONES, BARKSDALE, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
James Edward DeMoss, TDCJ-ID # 894554, appeals the district
court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants and
the dismissal of his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. DeMoss
suffered a back injury after slipping and falling on a wet stair
step; he alleges that the wet step and his resulting fall were a

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No. 01-50692
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result of a detention center policy requiring some inmates to
carry their meal trays upstairs to their cells.
We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Guillory v.
Domtar Indus., Inc., 95 F.3d 1320, 1326 (5th Cir. 1996).
DeMoss’s factual allegations do not show that the defendants
acted with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of
serious harm. See Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 352 (5th Cir.
1999). We conclude that, at most, DeMoss has alleged a claim of
negligence, which is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See
Marsh v. Jones, 53 F.3d 707, 711-12 (5th Cir. 1995).
DeMoss also alleges that the defendants acted with
deliberate indifference because his back injury was not treated
by a “qualified” physician while he was incarcerated at the Bexar
County Adult Detention Center. We conclude that DeMoss’s claim
represents a disagreement with the treatment he received, which
is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See Varnado v.
Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320, 321 (5th Cir. 1991).
Therefore, the district court’s grant of summary judgment
and dismissal of the complaint is AFFIRMED. All pending motions
are DENIED.

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