Coffman v. TDCJ-ID, et al

*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under
the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
For the Fifth Circuit
No. 01-41276
MARCIA R. COFFMAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
VERSUS
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, INSTITUTIONAL DIVISION, and
WAYNE SCOTT,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Texas
(01-CV-466)
November 19, 2002
Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
After reviewing the briefs and pertinent portions of the
record and hearing the arguments of counsel, we agree with the
magistrate judge that the doctrines of equitable tolling and
equitable estoppel do not save Coffman’s Title VII claims from

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1See Clark v. Resistoflex Co., 854 F.2d 762, 768 (5th Cir. 1988)
(ADEA case); see also Coke v. Gen. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 640
F.2d 584, 587, 594–95 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (finding Title VII
and ADEA cases to be interchangeable on the issues of timeliness of
an EEOC charge and equitable tolling).
2Tyler v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 304 F.3d 379, 391 (5th Cir.
2002).
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being time-barred.
In her deposition, Coffman testified that she learned about
what qualifies as sexual harassment in a correctional studies
course she took in 1994. She also learned in that course that
victims have rights in response to sexual harassment. In addition,
before the September 1996 incident, Coffman attended a mandatory
meeting at her unit on the topic of sexual harassment, and her
supervisors discussed the Department’s intolerance of sexual
harassment during staff meetings on at least two occasions.
Because the record reflects that Coffman had general knowledge of
her right not to be harassed on the basis of her sex, equitable
tolling does not apply in this case.1
Furthermore, for equitable estoppel to apply, the TDCJ must
have reasonably induced Coffman to refrain from exercising her
rights.2 But Coffman testified in her deposition that nobody at
the TDCJ led her to believe that the Department’s internal equal
employment opportunity division was the same entity as the federal
EEOC. And in response to the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment, Coffman did not go beyond the allegations in her
pleadings and designate specific facts showing that the Department

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intentionally delayed its investigation in this matter so that she
would miss the deadline for filing a charge of discrimination with
the EEOC. Finally, Coffman has not shown that there is a genuine
issue for trial concerning whether Investigator Cynthia Tilley’s
alleged representation that she would “take care of everything” was
broader in scope than the Department’s internal investigation of
Coffman’s complaint. Consequently, the defendants are not
equitably estopped from asserting the 300-day limitations period.
AFFIRMED.

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