Baker v. Gailliard Gin Inc

*Circuit Judge of the 6th Circuit, sitting by designation.
*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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No. 01-31394
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TERRANCE BAKER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CONTINENTAL EAGLE CORPORATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
Civil Docket 98-CV-2198
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November 7, 2002
Before JONES, SMITH and SILER,* Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
The court has carefully considered appellant’s position in
light of the excellent oral arguments, briefs and pertinent
portions of the record. Having done so we find no reversible error

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of fact or law and affirm for essentially the reasons stated by the
district court.
We review the district court’s decision to apply the doctrine
of issue preclusion de novo. Stripling v. Jordan Production Co.,
234 F.3d 863, 868 (5th Cir. 2000). We agree with the district
court that this court’s decision in Davis v. Commercial Union, Ins.
Co., 892 F.2d 378 (5th Cir. 1990), could not preclude Continental
from litigating whether Baker was engaged in a reasonably
anticipated use of the lint cleaner at the time of his injury. The
enactment of the Louisiana Product Liability Act changed the
standard of liability under Louisiana law. Thus, Davis cannot be
accorded issue preclusive effect.
Furthermore, viewing the evidence as a whole there was a
reasonable basis for the jury to conclude that Baker was not
engaged in a reasonably anticipated use of the lint cleaner at the
time of his injury. See Baltazar v. Holmes, 162 F.3d 368, 373 (5th
Cir. 1998) (in review of jury verdict we view all of the evidence
most favorable to the verdict). Additionally, the court did not
abuse its discretion in excluding inadmissible hearsay testimony
regarding certain previous accidents involving the lint cleaner or
the testimony of the expert witness regarding the accident at issue
in Davis.
The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.

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