James v. City of Houston TX, et al

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
_______________
m 01-20979
_______________
ANDREW B. JAMES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VERSUS
CITY OF HOUSTON, TEXAS; LEE P. BROWN, MAYOR;
MARY DESVIGNES-KENDRICK,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
(00-CV-2594)
_________________________
September 12, 2002
Before SMITH and BENAVIDES, Circuit
Judges, and FITZWATER, District Judge.*
JERRY E. SMITH, Circuit Judge:**
The district court held that Andrew James
had failed to provide summary judgment proof
that the defendants (1) fired him for his consti-
tutionally protected speech or (2) deprived him
of due process. We affirm on the first claim
because the defendants inevitably would have
terminated James regardless of the content of * District judge of the Northern District of
Texas, sitting by designation.
** Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has
determined that this opinion should not be pub-
(continued...)
**(...continued)
lished and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

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2
his speech. We affirm on the second for sub-
stantially the same reasons given by the district
court.
I.
We consider the summary judgment record
in the light most favorable to James.1 The City
of Houston employed him as assistant director
of the Administrative Support Division of the
Department of Health and Human Services
(“DHHS”). He coordinated the city’s ac-
quisition, development, and operation of
Multi-Service Centers (“MSC’s”), which the
complaint describes as “community facilities at
which citizens can receive information and
services.”
In November 1996, James purchased resi-
dential property in the Third Ward, at 3024
Holman. The owners signed quitclaim deeds
transferring their total interest to James, who
recorded the deeds in Harris County. The
original owners and James contracted to give
the three original owners 82% of the sales pro-
ceeds if James sold the property within ten
years. The contract terminates by its own
terms in November 2006, presumably leaving
James with ownership of the real property and
no further obligations to the original owners.
As an assistant director, James was required to
report all personal financial holdings, but he
failed to report 3024 Holman on his financial
disclosure statement filed in October 1997.
At work, James concentrated on planning
the development of an MSC for the Third
Ward. Construction was scheduled to begin in
late spring or summer of 1998. During early
1998, James Douglas, then president of Texas
Southern University (“TSU”), began discus-
sions with the Third Ward Redevelopment
Council and the Houston Independent School
District about joining with Houston to build a
baseball complex next to the planned Third
Ward MSC. The city held a town hall meeting
on May 9, 1998, during which a Third Ward
community leader proposed to Mayor Brown
that the Third Ward MSC be expanded to
include the proposed joint-use baseball com-
plex. The expansion would require moving the
MSC building approximately 155 feet.
James opposed the expansion. According
to his testimony, he thought expansion would
further delay the completion of the Third Ward
MSC. James voiced his opposition at various
community and department meetings. He
could not identify precisely the various oc-
casions at which he expressed opposition, but
he specifically recalls sharing his concerns with
Mary desVignes-Kendrick, the director of
DHHS, Earl Travis, James’s immediate su-
pervisor, and at various community meetings.
As a follow-up to the town hall meeting, a
community gathering was organized to discuss
the topic on June 11, 1998. The next day,
James and other city employees physically
walked the land encompassed by the proposed
expansion. According to the defendants,
James “even then, failed to disclose his owner-
ship of the very property they walked on.”
James did not disclose his ownership interest
until early July 1998. According to des-
Vignes-Kendrick, she immediately instructed
James to recuse himself from the development
of the Third Ward MSC.
Brown then postponed construction and
1 We lift our statement of the facts from the
district court’s thorough memorandum and opinion.
James himself incorporated these facts into his
brief, so we can safely assume that the court
successfully recited them in the light most favor-
able to James.

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3
authorized a feasibility study of the proposed
expansion. James contends that Brown decid-
ed in July or August 1998 that changes would
be made to the plans for construction of the
Third Ward MSC. The defendants claim that,
after being asked to divorce himself entirely
from the Third Ward MSC project, James at-
tended at least one community meeting and
obtained a copy of the confidential report on
the project’s feasibility.
Once James realized the city was abandon-
ing the original plans in favor of expansion, he
hired an attorney to represent him in the con-
demnation proceedings. Houston appraised
James’s property at $117,899 and offered him
that sum in December 1998. The summary
judgment evidence showed that James never
accepted the offer but does not reveal why.
In February 1999, Brown initiated an in-
vestigation into whether James had acted il-
legally or improperly in connection with his
purchase of 3024 Holman or the expansion
proposal. DesVignes-Kendrick reassigned
James to work at home with full pay and
benefits pending the outcome of the investiga-
tion by the Office of the Inspector General
(“OIG”).
Concurrently, on August 18, 1999, a grand
jury considered evidence of James’s criminal
wrongdoing and declined to indict. Within a
couple of weeks, the OIG issued its report,
concluding that James had no knowledge of
expansion plains for the Third Wave MSC
when he acquired the nearby property and did
not use his influence to instigate the expansion.
The OIG found insufficient evidence to prove
or disprove the charges of perjury and misuse
of official information. The report did find
sufficient evidence to conclude that James
violated municipal ordinances by filing a false
financial disclosure statement.
Following the investigation, desVignes-
Kendrick recommended James’s demotion to
deputy assistant director. She notified James
that she had “complete[ly] lost trust and confi-
dence in [his] judgment in [his] current posi-
tion.” She listed, as supporting reasons,
James’s tardy disclosure of property owner-
ship and his failure to recuse himself when she
so requested. The letter also notified James
that he was scheduled for a meeting at which
he and his representative could discuss the al-
legations and recommendation. James and his
attorney attended the meeting on November 4,
1999.
Based on James’s response to the allega-
tions, at the meeting, desVignes-Kendrick de-
cided that the city should terminate, rather
than demote, him. She issued another notice
letter outlining her recommendation and
scheduling a meeting with him and his attor-
ney. The allegations included the additional
charge that James had abused his power as
supervisor by asking an employee to notarize
the quitclaim deeds outside the presence of the
signatories. She also cited concerns that sur-
faced during the meeting about his lack of
candor and judgment, including his continued
refusal or inability to perceive and recognize
the potential conflicts of interest. James ad-
mits attending the termination meeting on
March 30, 2000, with his attorney, but denies
that he had an opportunity to further explain
his actions.
Brown received desVignes-Kendrick’s rec-
ommendations and met with her to discuss
them. Both defendants deny discussing any of
James’s protected speech activities. Brown
agreed with her recommendation and issued a
letter formalizing James’s termination, iterat-

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4
ing the above allegations, and listed various
policies and ordinances violated by James’s
actions.
James appealed to the civil service commis-
sion, which held a hearing and permitted James
to present witnesses and exhibits. The com-
mission denied James’s appeal on June 23,
2000. James sued in state court, and the city
removed to federal court. James alleged
violations of his due process and free speech
rights, similar claims under the Texas Consti-
tution, and a state claim to review the civil
service commission’s decision.
By agreement, the case was assigned to the
magistrate judge (“the district court” or “the
court”). Defendants filed a motion for sum-
mary judgment, which the court granted on the
federal claims. The court remanded the state
claims to state court.
II.
We review a summary judgment de novo.
Int’l Shortstop, Inc. v. Rally’s, 939 F.2d 1257,
1263 (5th Cir. 1991). Summary judgment is
appropriate if the movant shows the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson
v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). The movant should do so by inform-
ing the court of the motion’s basis and identi-
fying portions of the record to highlight the
absence of a factual dispute. Id.. After the
movant identifies a deficiency in proof, the
nonmovant must present record evidence es-
tablishing each o f the challenged elements of
its case for which it will bear the burden of
proof at trial. Topalian v. Ehrman, 954 F.2d
1125, 1132 (5th Cir. 1992).
The nonmovant can point to depositions,
affidavits, or any other competent evidence.
Int’l Shortstop, 939 F.2d at 1263. Conclu-
sional allegations do not count as competent
evidence. Galindo v. Precision Am. Corp.,
754 F.2d 1212, 1216 (5th Cir. 1985). The
nonmovants must go beyond the allegations
contained in their pleadings and identify spe-
cific facts creating a genuine issue worthy of
trial. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49.2
Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows James to sue
for alleged violation of constitutional rights
and requires him to allege and prove (1) that
an individual acting under the color of state
law (2) violated one of his federal constitu-
tional or statutory rights. Doe v. Rains
County Indep. Sch. Dist., 66 F.3d 1402, 1406
(5th Cir. 1995). The individual defendants
have a qualified immunity defense to such
claims, Hope v. Peltzer, 122 S. Ct. 2508
(2002), while James must prove that the city’s
policy caused the violation of his constitutional
rights, Brown v. Bryan County, Okla., 219
F.3d 450, 457 (5th Cir. 2000).
Because we resolve this case by deciding
the scope of James’s constitutional rights, we
need not reach either the qualified immunity or
municipal policy issues. We first address
James’s claim that defendants discharged him
in retaliation for his exercise of the First
Amendment right to free speech.
2 Defendants argue that the district court has
discretion to resolve factual questions at summary
judgment in a nonjury case. We need not reach this
question, because we can affirm under FED. R.
CIV. P. 56’s more lenient standard. As we have
noted, our circuit precedent conflicts on whether
the court may apply a different standard at sum-
mary judgment in a nonjury case. Phillips Oil Co.
v. OKC Corp., 812 F.2d 265, 273 n.15 (5th Cir.
1987). Even the cases that permit the court to
apply a different standard diverge over which
standard it should apply. Id.

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5
III.
James must prove four elements to establish
a First Amendment claim: (1) speech touching
on a matter of public concern, (2) that his
interest in speaking outweighed the city’s
interest in efficiency, and (3) an adverse
employment action (4) in retaliation for his.
Kennedy v. Tangipahoa Parish Library Bd. of
Control, 224 F.3d 359, 366 (5th Cir. 2000). If
James establishes that his protected speech
was a substantial or motivating factor in the
adverse employment decision, the burden
shifts to the city, which may prove that it
discharged him for another reason. Mt. Heal-
thy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 287 (1977). In this appeal, the par-
ties dispute only the causation element.
James points to Branton v. City of Dallas,
272 F.3d 730, 739 (5th Cir. 2001), in which
we stated that “[i]t is for a jury to resolve any
remaining factual disputes as to whether
plaintiff’s protected speech was a substantial
or motivating factor in the adverse
employment decision.” Our statement in
Branton, however, was conditionalSSwhere
there is a genuine dispute over a material fact,
the jury should resolve it. The motion for
summary judgment tests whether such a
dispute exists by requiring the person who
bears the burden of proof to point to record
evidence supporting each element of his claim.
E.g., Topalian, 954 F.2d at 1131-32. In this
appeal, we must examine what summary
judgment proof our precedent requires to
establish a triable, First Amendment retaliation
claim.
We repeatedly have held that the plaintiff
must present direct or circumstantial evidence
showing that the supervisor who made the ad-
verse employment decision had knowledge of
the protected speech.3 The evidence may be
circumstantial: For example, where a school
teacher sent a letter to the superintendent,
published a letter to the editor in the local
paper reflecting the same views, and repeated
them yet again at a school board meeting, we
found she had created a fact question about
whether an intermediate supervisor knew of
her protected speech. Tompkins v. Vickers, 26
F.3d 603, 609 (5th Cir. 1994).
Propinquity between the protected speech
and the adverse employment action, however,
is not enough. Beattie, 254 F.3d at 605 &
n.18. The plaintiff must provide proof that the
supervisor was aware or likely to be aware of
the speech. Supra note 3. Absent any direct
or circumstantial proof of awareness, we have
considered the supervisor’s testimony of ig-
norance conclusive. Beattie, 254 F.2d at
603-04.
The district court held that James had not
presented sufficient evidence to show that
Brown had knowledge of James’s opposition
to expansion. James does not offer any real
evidence that Brown knew. James did,
3 E.g, Beattie v. Madison County Sch. Dist.,
254 F.3d 595, 604 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Without a
showing that the board had actual knowledge of the
alleged improper basis of Jones’s and Acton’s
recommendation, the board cannot be held liable
for the alleged retaliation.”); Fowler v. Smith, 68
F.3d 124, 127 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[D]irect evidence
in proving illegitimate intent is not required to
avoid summary judgment in unconstitutional re-
taliation claims; circumstantial evidence will suf-
fice.”) (citation omitted). See Price v. Brittain,
874 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he employee
bears the initial burden of demonstrating that his
speech was constitutionally protected and that it
was a ‘substantial’ or ‘motivating’ factor in the
termination decision.”).

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6
however, offer some circumstantial evidence
that desVignes-Kendrick knew of his
opposition and recommended his termination.
He pointed to evidence that desVignes-
Kendrick supported expansion. She
contradicted that evidence in her affidavit, but
his impeachment might suffice to show
pretext. This is a close and difficult question
that we need not decide.
Under Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287, an
employer that would have reached the same
decision as to an employee’s discharge in the
absence of protected speech is not liable for
retaliating against the employee. Defendants
satisfied their burden of showing that the city
would have discharged James anyway.4 James
does not dispute that he failed to report the
real property on his financial disclosure forms.
The OIG report concluded that his failure to
report was material, false, misleading, and vio-
lated a municipal ordinance.
James argues that Brown himself failed to
disclose some financial dealings, but Brown,
because he is elected, is not subject to the nor-
mal procedures for the hiring and firing of oth-
er city employees. The failure to report,
standing alone, justifies James’s dismissal re-
gardless of the content of his speech. He fails
to point to sufficient summary judgment to
create a fact question that his protected
speech, independent of his failure to disclose
the conflict of interest, led to his discharge.
James argues that because he spoke out
against expansion, he did not have a conflict of
interest. This argument fundamentally mis-
understands the importance of disclosure. The
city has an interest in passing prophylactic
measures so that it at least has knowledge of
any personal financial holdings affected by
municipal decisions. The city has a legitimate
interest in avoiding both corruption and the
appearance of impropriety, and comprehensive
disclosure obligations are rationally related to
that interest.
James oversimplifies the potential conflict
of interest. His brief belabors the most
obvious conflict: Because he owned property
necessary for the expansion, he had an
incentive to push for expansion so the city
would buy his property. The conflict of
interest easily could cut in the other direction,
however.
For example, James may have intentionally
purchased property adjacent to the MSC to
speculate in the value that the MSC would add
to the property in the neighborhood. If he es-
timated that value as greater than the market
had estimated, then he could make a profit,
and the fair market value established in a con-
demnation proceeding would not reflect that
value. Thus, he would have recommended
against expansion, even if it was in the city’s
best interests.
4 To obtain summary judgment, “if the movant
bears the burden of proof on an issue, . . . he must
establish beyond peradventure all of the essential
elements of the claim or defense to warrant judg-
ment in his favor.” Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780
F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986). We have granted
summary judgment previously where the employer
has demonstrated that no material fact question
exists about whether the employer would have dis-
charged the employee for an unrelated reason.
Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369,
376 (5th Cir. 1998) (concluding that evidence in-
dicated that employee was given a medical dis-
charge as the result of “an independent psychiatric
evaluation”); Brady v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist.,
113 F.3d 1419, 1424-15 (5th Cir. 1997) (accepting
employer’s proof of employee’s deficient
performance).

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Alternatively, James stood to gain only
18% of the house’s sale proceeds if he sold
immediately in a condemnation proceeding. If
he could retain the property for ten years, he
would realize 100% of the sale price. The dif-
ference in his individual gain provides a pow-
erful incentive to avoid expansion. We
provide these illustrations not to demonstrate
that James had an actual conflict of interest,
but only to show that conflicts of interest are
complicated, and the city has a strong interest
in disclosure requirements to prevent actual
and apparent conflicts.
Disentangling James’s speech from the rea-
son for his discharge is difficult; the two are
interrelated. Regardless of his views on the
expansion, however, his financial interest was
so closely associated with the proposed
expansion that the city would have terminated
him regardless.
James has presented evidence that Brown
and possibly desVignes-Kendrick supported
expansion, but he has not presented a shred of
summary judgment evidence that they would
have terminated him for this reason;
defendants already had a persuasive reason to
end his employment. As explained in Mt.
Healthy, a misbehaving employee should not
be able to insulate his wrongful behavior by
engaging in protected speech. 429 U.S. at
286. The summary judgment evidence
sufficiently demonstrates that the city “would
have reached the same decision as to” James’s
discharge “in the absence of protected
speech.” Id. at 287. We now turn to James’
procedural due process claim.
IV.
To state a claim for deprivation of due pro-
cess, James must create a genuine issue of
material fact that (1) the defendants deprived
him of a constitutionally protected interest
(2) without adequate procedures. Cleveland
Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,
538, 541 (1985). James argues that additional
state procedures are constitutionalized as part
of the due process minimum; he also avers that
defendants provided him with process that fell
below the independent, constitutional
minimum. We dismiss each argument in turn.
A.
James argues that the district court erred by
ignoring a Texas Court of Appeals opinion
that requires the employer to bear the burden
of proof in a civil service proceeding. See
Dallas County Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Warren,
988 S.W.2d 864, 871 (Tex. App.SSSan
Antonio 1999, no pet.). He contends that
Fifth Circuit precedent requires the federal
court to incorporate these additional state
procedures into the federal, constitutional
minimum. His explanation misunderstands the
state court decision and the nature of the
federal system.
In Warren, id. at 870-71, the court held
that the federal Constitution’s Due Process
Clause required the employer to bear the
burden of proof in the civil service
commission’s post-termination hearing. The
court did not describe additional procedures
guaranteed by the state constitution, state
statute, state regulation, or even internal
employment policies. Id. Even if state law
could augment the procedures required by
federal due process, Warren does not
represent state law; it is a state court’s
interpretation of federal law that federal courts
have no obligation to follow. At most, it has
only persuasive force.
Courts sometimes look to state law when
defining the scope of protected liberty

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interests, but state law does not generally
establish the constitutionally required
procedures.5 James cites Ferguson v. Thomas,
430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1970), for the
proposition that “[w]hen published rules and
regulations establish a particular statutory
procedure for the termination of a teacher’s
employment, t hey may add to the
constitutional minimum.” Since Ferguson,
however, we have realized that we need not
look to state law to determine the
constitutionally-required procedures. 6 Warren
is not Texas law, and Texas law does not
define the scope of procedures guaranteed by
the federal Constitution.
B.
James argues that because the city afforded
him inadequate pre-termination process, shift-
ing the burden of proof to him in the civil ser-
vice commission’s post-termination hearing vi-
olated due process. We balance three factors
to determine wether a government has af-
forded constitutionally adequate procedures:
(1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of
erroneous deprivation from current and
proposed procedures; and (3) the
government’s interest. Matthews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Under the first prong, James had a
significant interest in continued employment.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 543 (“We have
frequently recognized the severity of depriving
a person of the means of livelihood.”). Under
the second prong, we find that the risk of
erroneous deprivation was minimal. In
Loudermill, the Court described the
constitutional requirements for state agencies’
decisions to terminate employees. Before
discharging an employee, public employers
must provide notice of the reason for
discharge and an opportunity to respond. 470
5 Drawing the line between state procedures
comprehensive or absolute enough to create a pro-
tectable liberty interest and those procedures that
do not give rise to such an interest is difficult
enough. The Supreme Court has struggled most
acutely with the question whether state regulations
create a protectable liberty interest in the prison
context. Compare Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,
471-72 (1983) (looking to state prison regulations
to determine that state law gave prisoner a
protectable liberty interest but then to federal
constitutional standards to determine minimum
procedures) with Sandin v. Connor, 515 U.S. 472,
481 (1995) (“[S]hifting the focus of the liberty
interest inquiry to one based on the language of a
particular regulation . . . encouraged prisoners to
comb regulations in search of mandatory language
on which to base entitlements to various state-
conferred privileges.”).
6 McDowell v. Texas, 465 F.2d 1342, 1345-46
(5th Cir. 1972) (en banc) (“[E]ven an invalid or
improper discharge from such an office,
unaccompanied by some more precise claim of
federal right than a general claim of lack of due
process, is not the sort of deprivation of a right,
privilege or immunity which is secured by the
Constitution of the United States . . . .”); Levitt v.
Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 759 F.2d 1224, 1230
(5th Cir. 1985) (“Such action may constitute a
breach of contract or violation of state law, but
(continued...)
6(...continued)
unless the conduct trespasses on federal
constitutional safeguards, there is no constitutional
deprivation.”); Richard A. Fallon, Daniel J.
Meltzer, & David L. Shapiro, eds., HART AND
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 559 (Foundation 4th ed. 1996)
(“[I]f the case does involve a ‘property’ or ‘liberty’
interest (whether rooted in state or federal law),
federal law governs the questions (i) whether there
has been a deprivation, and (ii) if so, whether due
process was afforded.”).

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9
U.S. at 545-46.7
The state need not hold a full evidentiary
hearing. Id.8 The hearing “need not
definitively resolve the propriety of the
discharge”; instead, it should serve as “an
initial check against mistaken decisions.” Id.
“The opportunity to present reasons, either in
person or in writing, why proposed action
should not be taken is a fundamental due
process requirement.” Id. at 546.
James does not contest that he had notice
of the city’s complaints against him. He also
had two opportunities to rebut the charges that
formed the basis for his discharge. Counsel
represented him at both meetings.
At the first meeting, James attempted to
explain his failure to disclose his ownership of
the property. At the second meeting, James
avers that he did not have an opportunity to
respond, but the city had already unveiled
most of its charges at the first meeting. After
his termination, the civil service commission
reviewed his claim for a full day and
considered both testimonial and documentary
evidence.9
James argues that he should not have been
forced to bear the burden of proof in front of
the civil service commission, but this
represented only one of several levels of
review. And not a single federal court of
appeals has held that shifting the burden of
proof in such a review proceeding violates the
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.10
Although we respect the decision of the
Texas Court of Appeals in Warren, we, like
7 “[I]n employment termination cases, the
minimum pretermination procedural protections
required by the Fourteenth Amendment are
(1) written notice of the reasons for the termination
and (2) an effective opportunity to rebut those
reasons.” Davis v. Mann, 882 F.2d 967, 974 (5th
Cir. 1989).
8 For example, the state need not provide an
opportunity for oral testimony at the pretermination
hearing. FDIC v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 247
(1988).
9 Post-termination procedures should be
(continued...)
9(...continued)
included in the Matthews balancing test. Louder-
mill, 470 U.S. at 546-57.
10 We recently avoided the question whether the
burden of proof could constitutionally be shifted in
an attorney disciplinary proceeding. Sealed
Appellant 1 v. Sealed Appellee 1, 211 F.3d 252,
255 (5th Cir. 2000). The other courts of appeals,
however, have upheld burden shifting in a variety
of public employment cases. Benavidez v.
Albuquerque, 101 F.3d 620, 626-27 (10th Cir.
1996) (holding that government could
constitutionally shift burden in post-termination
proceedings because formal pre-termination
proceedings existed); Chung v. Park, 514 F.2d
382, 386-87 (3d Cir. 1975) (finding hearing
adequate where employee bore the burden of
showing termination was “arbitrary, capricious or
discriminatory”); McTaggart v. Sec’y of the Air
Force, 458 F.2d 1320, 1323 n.4 (7th Cir. 1972)
(finding that United States could shift burden in
military disciplinary proceeding that determined
ultimate rank and pay upon retirement). See
Papapetropoulous v. Milwaukee Transp. Servs.,
Inc., 795 F.2d 591, 601 & n.15 (7th Cir. 1986)
(finding that arbitrator could use either clear and
convincing or preponderance standard when
reviewing employee’s claim); Boston v. Webb, 783
F.2d 1163, 1167 (4th Cir. 1986) (permitting shift
in burden of proof after finding that employee
lacked property interest in his job).

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10
the district court, conclude that the federal
courts have struck the correct balance. After
the civil service commission denied his claim,
James had a statutory right to seek review in
state court, which he exercised. Although the
district court declined to exercise jurisdiction
over this state law claim after dismissing the
federal claims, he may still seek a remedy in
state court. These multi-layered formal
procedures should sufficiently reduce the risk
of erroneous deprivation.
Finally, the city and state have an interest in
placing some limits on the procedures they
guarantee through internal, civil service
commission, and judicial review. The benefits
of additional procedures would appear
minimal, given the procedures already in place.
James failed to create a fact question about
whether his discharge conformed with due
process.
AFFIRMED.

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