Ormand v. Morales, et al

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.
R. 47.5.4.
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-10960
Summary Calendar
ADAM LEE ORMAND,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
PAUL MORALES, Major;
ET AL.,
Defendants,
PAUL MORALES, Major; MICHAEL
PARMER; ESTANISLADO MORENO,
Defendants-Appellees.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
USDC No. 1:00-CV-183
--------------------
July 30, 2002
Before BARKSDALE, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Adam Lee Ormand, Texas prisoner number 604729, appeals the
judgment in favor of the defendants in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil
rights suit. Ormand argues that the magistrate judge should have
appointed counsel to represent him, but he has not shown that his

-- 1 of 3 --

No. 01-10960
-2-
is the exceptional civil case in which the appointment of counsel
is warranted. See Ulmer v. Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 212 (5th
Cir. 1982). He thus has not shown that the magistrate judge
abused her discretion in denying his repeated requests for the
appointment of counsel. See Jackson v. Dallas Police Dep’t, 811
F.2d 260, 261 (5th Cir. 1986).
Ormand contends that the magistrate judge should have
allowed him to amend his complaint to add more defendants to the
instant suit. However, he has not shown the magistrate judge’s
refusal to allow this amendment harmed him, as these individuals
were already defendants in another suit that Ormand had filed.
See Bazrowx v. Scott, 136 F.3d 1053, 1054-55 (5th Cir. 1998).
Ormand argues that the magistrate judge should have granted
his motion to stay the proceedings. Ormand has not shown how the
denial of this motion constitutes an abuse of the magistrate
judge’s discretion, as he has not shown that this ruling
inhibited his ability to present his case. See Murphy v. Uncle
Ben’s, Inc., 168 F.3d 734, 737 (5th Cir. 1999).
Ormand contends that the magistrate judge erred in not
sanctioning defense counsel for alleged discovery abuses and for
failure to comply with the magistrate judge’s scheduling order.
Ormand has not shown that the magistrate judge erred in not
sanctioning defense counsel. Ormond likewise has not shown that
the magistrate judge abused her discretion in refusing to let him
call certain witnesses to testify at trial, as he has not shown

-- 2 of 3 --

No. 01-10960
-3-
that these proposed witnesses have personal knowledge of the
events underlying this suit. See Wyvill v. United Companies Life
Insurance Co., 212 F.3d 296, 302 (5th Cir. 2000), cert. denied,
531 U.S. 1145 (2001); FED. R. EVID. 602.
Ormand’s argument that the magistrate judge erred in
granting defendant Moreno’s FED. R. CIV. P. 50 motion for judgment
as a matter of law is unavailing. Ormand has not shown that the
evidence he adduced at trial was legally sufficient for a jury to
return a verdict for him on his claims against Moreno. See Price
v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330, 333 (5th Cir. 1997).
Ormand’s final argument is that the evidence is legally
insufficient to uphold the jury’s verdict in favor of defendants
Parmer and Morales. Because there is some evidence to support
this verdict, we will uphold it. See United States ex rel.
Wallace v. Flintco, Inc., 143 F.3d 955, 963-64 (5th Cir. 1998);
Daigle v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 70 F.3d 394, 397 n.2 (1995).
The judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

-- 3 of 3 --