Caudle v. City of San Angelo

*Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
1 See Curtis v. M&S Petroleum, Inc., 174 F.3d 661, 668 (5th
Cir. 1999).
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 01-10019
Summary Calendar
SANDY CAUDLE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CITY OF SAN ANGELO,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Texas
(6:99-CV-105-C)
May 22, 2001
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Plaintiff-Appellant Caudle appeals from a grant of summary
judgment against her in the District Court. We have reviewed the
judgment of the District Court and the briefs of the parties, and
now AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.
We review the District Court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse
of discretion.1 The District Court did not abuse its discretion
when it held that the documents submitted by Caudle were

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2 See Duplantis v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 948 F.2d 187, 192
(5th Cir. 1991) (holding that documents submitted as summary
judgment evidence must be authenticated).
3 Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(1).
4 Fed. R. Evid. 902.
2
unauthenticated and therefore not competent summary judgment
evidence.2 Caudle makes three arguments on appeal, none of which
demonstrate an abuse of the District Court’s discretion.
First, Caudle argues that the documents’ authenticity was
sworn to. As the District Court correctly noted, the affidavit
submitted by Caudle’s counsel merely stated in a conclusory fashion
that the documents “are true and correct copies of the documents
they purport to be.” Rule 901 requires that a witness
authenticating documents have knowledge of their authenticity,3 and
the affidavit Caudle relies upon makes no effort to establish her
attorney’s personal knowledge.
Second, Caudle argues that the documents are self-
authenticating, as business records of her opponent. Yet business
records are not among the ten categories of self-authenticating
documents enumerated in Rule 902.4 Neither are documents produced
in response to discovery requests.
Lastly, Caudle argues that the District Court denied her an
opportunity to cure the deficiencies in her proof, by ruling on the
evidentiary motion at the same time that it ruled on the summary
judgment motion. The record, however, reflects that Defendant

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5 See Curtis, 174 F.3d at 668.
3
filed objections to Caudle’s evidence on July 17, 2000, and the
District Court did not grant summary judgment until December 8,
2000. Defendant’s motion put Caudle on notice of possible problems
with her summary judgment evidence, and she had almost six months
to decide whether to cure any possible defect.
Having determined that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion when it excluded Caudle’s evidence, we now review the
grant of summary judgment itself de novo.5 We agree with the
District Court that the record, as defined by the District Court’s
evidentiary rulings, supports the grant of summary judgment.
AFFIRMED

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