Praylor v. TX Dept Cr Justice, et al

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
November 15, 2005
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-50854
Summary Calendar
JOSHUA PRAYLOR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE; AHIA SHABAAZ; OWEN
MURRAY, Medical Director; JOSEPHINE SESSION; WILLIAM LESLIE
NORTHROP; VALENCIA POLLARD; WILLIAM GONZALES, DR.; UNIVERSITY
OF TEXAS MEDICAL BRANCH AT GALVESTON CORRECTIONAL MANAGED
CARE DIVISION; TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCE CENTER,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 6:04-CV-58
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Before BARKSDALE, STEWART, and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This court's opinion, 423 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2005), is hereby
withdrawn, and the following opinion is substituted:
Joshua Praylor, Texas prisoner # 1128305, appeals the denial
of his civil rights complaint against numerous officials of the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) and the University of
Texas and Texas Tech University health care systems (hereinafter,
TDCJ). See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Praylor argues that the
TDCJ’s denial of his request for hormone therapy to treat his
transsexualism constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the

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Eighth Amendment. Praylor seeks an injunction seeking to
instruct the TDCJ to provide him with hormone therapy and
brassieres. His motion is DENIED.
A dismissal for failure to state a claim under
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is reviewed under the same de novo standard
of review applicable to dismissals made pursuant to FED. R. CIV.
P. 12(b)(6). Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 156 (5th Cir.
1999). The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth
Amendment protects an inmate from improper medical care, but only
if the care is “sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 106 (1976).
This circuit has not addressed the issue of providing
hormone treatment to transsexual inmates. Other circuits that
have considered the issue have concluded that declining to
provide a transsexual with hormone treatment does not amount to
acting with deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.
See, e.g., White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1988)
(acknowledging that transsexualism is a serious medical
condition, but holding that declining to provide hormone therapy
did not constitute deliberate indifference to that medical need);
Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 413 (7th Cir. 1987)
(holding transsexual prisoner has no constitutional right to “any
particular type of treatment, such as estrogen therapy”); Supre
v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 963 (10th Cir. 1986) (concluding that

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No. 04-50854
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declining to provide hormone therapy did not constitute
deliberate indifference when prison officials offered alternate
treatment). Assuming, without deciding, that transsexualism does
present a serious medical need, we hold that, on this record, the
refusal to provide hormone therapy did not constitute the
requisite deliberate indifference.
In Praylor’s case, the record reflects that he did not
request any form of treatment other than hormone therapy.
Testimony from the medical director at the TDCJ revealed that the
TDCJ had a policy for treating transsexuals, but that Praylor did
not qualify for hormone therapy because of the length of his term
and the prison’s inability to perform a sex change operation, the
lack of medical necessity for the hormone, and the disruption to
the all-male prison. Cf. De’Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 635
(4th Cir. 2003). Moreover, the director testified that Praylor
had been evaluated on two occasions and denied eligibility for
hormone treatment and that the TDCJ did provide mental health
screening as part of its process for evaluating transsexuals.
See Supre, 792 F.2d at 963. Accordingly, based upon the instant
record and circumstances of Praylor’s complaint, the denial of
his specific request for hormone therapy does not constitute
deliberate indifference. See Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 413; Supre,
792 F.2d at 963.
AFFIRMED; MOTION FOR INJUNCTION DENIED.

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