United States v. Camp

United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
August 21, 2003
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
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02-30925
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ERNEST CAROL CAMP,
Defendant-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Louisiana
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Before KING, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and BARKSDALE, Circuit
Judges.
RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:
The United States appeals the FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b) dismissal
of Ernest Camp’s indictment for possession of a machine gun, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(o)(1) and 924(a)(2). At issue is
whether the term “trigger” as used in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (defining
“machine gun”) includes a switch that starts a motor, causing a
modified semiautomatic rifle to automatically fire more than one
shot. VACATED and REMANDED.
I.
Louisiana authorities executing a search warrant at Camp’s
home seized firearms, illegal drugs, and drug-manufacturing

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equipment. One firearm was a modified semiautomatic rifle; Camp
had added an electrically-operated trigger mechanism (device).
When an added switch behind the original trigger was pulled,
it supplied electrical power to a motor connected to the bottom of
a fishing reel that had been placed inside the weapon’s trigger
guard; the motor caused the reel to rotate; and that rotation
caused the original trigger to function in rapid succession. The
weapon would fire until either the shooter released the switch or
the loaded ammunition was expended.
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) tested the
weapon and found it “capable of firing more than one shot, without
manual reloading[,] by a single function of the trigger”. (This
finding corresponds with the definition of a machine gun found in
26 U.S.C. § 5845(b).) The ATF was able to cause the weapon to fire
two three-shot bursts. As a result, the ATF concluded that the
modified rifle was a “machine gun” for purposes of § 5845(b).
Camp was indicted for possession of a machine gun. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(o)(1) and 924(a)(2). He stipulated that he possessed
the firearm, but contended it was not a “machine gun” as defined by
§ 5845(b). The district court treated this contention as a Rule
12(b) motion to dismiss; held an evidentiary hearing; and dismissed
the indictment. It held: the “switch” was not a “trigger” for
purposes of § 5845(b); the weapon required multiple functions of

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the primary trigger; and, therefore, the weapon, as modified, was
not a § 5845(b) machine gun.
II.
The district court’s application of the statute is reviewed de
novo. United States v. Jennings, 195 F.3d 795, 797 (5th Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1245 (2000). Pursuant to § 5845(b),
a “machine gun” is
any weapon which shoots ... automatically more
than one shot, without manual reloading, by a
single function of the trigger. The term
shall also include the frame or receiver of
any such weapon, any part designed and
intended solely and exclusively, or
combination of parts designed and intended,
for use in converting a weapon into a
machinegun, and any combination of parts from
which a machinegun can be assembled if such
parts are in the possession or under the
control of a person.
26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (emphasis added).
A.
The term “trigger” is not defined by statute. United States
v. Jokel, 969 F.2d 132, 135 (5th Cir. 1992), defined a trigger, as
used in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(d)(shotguns), as any “mechanism ... used
to initiate the firing sequence”. See also United States v.
Fleischli, 305 F.3d 643, 655 (7th Cir. 2002) (concerning machine
gun, approving of Jokel’s definition), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct.
1923 (2003); United States v. Evans, 978 F.2d 1112, 1113 (9th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 821 (1993) (concerning machine gun,

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defining trigger as “anything that releases the bolt to cause ...
[the weapon] to fire” (internal quotation omitted; alteration in
original)).
In Jokel, the defendant contended his firearm lacked a
“trigger” because it required the insertion of a nail and spring in
order to fire, rather than, as is traditional, pulling a small
lever. Our court disagreed: “To construe ‘trigger’ to mean only
a small lever moved by a finger would be to impute to Congress the
intent to restrict the term to apply only to one kind of trigger,
albeit a very common kind. The language implies no intent to so
restrict the meaning....” 969 F.2d at 135 (emphasis added). It is
undisputed that the switch in Camp’s device “initiated the firing
sequence”.
Camp attempts to distinguish his firearm by noting there is
another “trigger” — the rifle’s original metal lever/trigger. He
contends that, for purposes of § 5845(b), this original trigger is
the operative one; and, because it functioned each time the rifle
was fired, the rifle, as modified, did not become a machine gun.
To accept this contention would allow transforming firearms into
machine guns, so long as the original trigger was not destroyed.
See Fleischli, 305 F.3d at 655 (dismissing as “puerile” defendant’s
contention that firearm was not machine gun because it used
electrical, rather than traditional, trigger); Evans, 978 F.2d 1113
n.2 (same).

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Camp also claims the switch is merely a legal “trigger
activator”. At the evidentiary hearing, an ATF Agent testified
that “trigger activators” involve using springs that “force the
trigger back to the forward position, meaning that you have to
separately pull the trigger each time you want to fire the gun, but
it gives the illusion of functioning as a machinegun”. (Emphasis
added.) According to the Agent, the ATF understands such trigger
activators to be legal, insofar as they do not transform legal
firearms into machine guns.
We reject Camp’s contention that the switch on his firearm was
a legal “trigger activator”. As discussed, those activators
described by the ATF Agent require a user to separately pull the
activator each time the weapon is fired. Camp’s weapon, however,
required only one action — pulling the switch he installed — to
fire multiple shots. This distinction is expressly contemplated by
§ 5845(b), which speaks of “shoot[ing] automatically more than one
shot ... by a single function of the trigger”. (Emphasis added.)
B.
Finally, Camp contends Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600
(1994), is relevant to whether his modified rifle was a machine
gun. Pursuant to Staples, the Government must prove a defendant
“knew the weapon he possessed had the characteristics that brought
it within the statutory definition of a machinegun”. Id. at 602

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(emphasis added). As the Government acknowledges, this is an issue
for the proceedings on remand.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, the dismissal of the indictment is
VACATED; this matter is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
VACATED; REMANDED

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