Anderson v. Americredit

United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
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No. 25-50946
Summary Calendar
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In the Matter of Melissa Ann Anderson,

Debtor,

Melissa Ann Anderson,

Appellant,

versus

AmeriCredit Financial Services, Incorporated,

Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
USDC No. 5:25-CV-1166
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Before Smith, Southwick, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:
*

Melissa Anderson filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. After the meeting
of creditors on June 30, 2025, Anderson expressed an intent to reaffirm her
debt on a 2017 Cadillac Escalade, but neither party drafted a reaffirmation
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*
This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
August 18, 2026

Lyle W. Cayce
Clerk
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No. 25-50946
2
agreement. AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc., filed for relief from the
automatic stay with respect to the vehicle on July 15. The bankruptcy court
held a hearing on the motion on August 4 but reset it for August 25 to allow
Anderson to file a motion to redeem after she indicated that she wanted to
redeem rather than reaffirm.
Anderson filed a motion to redeem on August 8, the forty-fifth day
after the creditor meeting, but did not complete the underlying payments
necessary to redeem the vehicle. On August 25, the bankruptcy court found
that the automatic stay protecting the vehicle from repossession had termin-
ated on account of the failure to reaffirm or redeem within the maximum
permitted time; that mooted the motion to redeem. The district court af-
firmed the bankruptcy court and denied Anderson’s other issues as moot.
On appeal, Anderson, proceeding pro se, asserts that the bankruptcy
court (a) lacked authority to terminate the stay without “adjudicating the
statutory predicates under § 362(h)”; (b) violated Federal Rule of Bank-
ruptcy Procedure 9014(d) by refusing to conduct an evidentiary hearing;
(c) rendered redemption impossible by failing to determine value under
§ 506(a); and (d) improperly relied on unproven assertions to find cause, and
that these errors were not harmless and that this appeal is not moot.
I.
The same standards apply to this court’s review of bankruptcy court
decisions and the district court’s review of the same. Carnero G&P. L.L.C.
v. SN EF Maverick, L.L.C. (In re Sanchez Energy Corp.), 159 F.4th 309, 317
(5th Cir. 2025). “Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and conclu-
sions of law are reviewed de novo.” Id.
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II.
A.
As a prefatory matter, Anderson’s contentions concerning violations
of Rule 9014(d), § 506(a), and the bankruptcy court’s purported reliance on
unproven assertions are forfeited. Though she pursued her appeal both to
the district court and this court pro se, standard rules of forfeiture still apply.
1

Therefore, unless those claims were preserved in front of the bankruptcy
court, they are now forfeited.
2
Review of the record reveals no evidence that
any of these claims were made before the bankruptcy court, either during the
relevant time period or after the stay had automatically terminated.
Therefore, they are forfeited.
B.
Anderson’s brief cites little to no authority. Construing the brief liber-
ally, her argument concerning the failure to assess relevant statutory predi-
cates is similar to the position she took in the bankruptcy court that the court
did not have proper authority to terminate the stay.
3
The district court con-
cluded that the bankruptcy court did not reversibly err in finding that the stay
was automatically terminated by operation of law because “debtor fail[ed] to
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1
See Scroggins v. City of Shreveport, 155 F.4th 755, 756 (5th Cir. 2025) (applying
standard forfeiture rules to a pro se litigant); see also Gross v. Cox, No. 24-40468, 2025 WL
801363, at *1 (5th Cir. Mar. 13, 2025) (per curiam) (unpublished) (applying standard for-
feiture rules to a pro se litigant). Additionally, during all relevant periods in which she could
have prevented the automatic termination of the stay at the bankruptcy court, Anderson
was represented by counsel.
2
Spin Cap., L.L.C. v. Jet Oilfield Servs (In re Jet Oilfield Servs.), 160 F.4th 679,
682 n.2 (5th Cir. 2025) (finding that raising an argument for the first time in the bankruptcy
court is the relevant inquiry for forfeiture); see also Jinil Steel Co. v. ValuePart, Inc. (In re
ValuePart, Inc.), 802 F. App’x 143, 149 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding that party forfeited its
argument when it failed to raise it in front of the bankruptcy court).
3
Coleman v. United States, 912 F.3d 824, 828 (5th Cir. 2019) (“The filings of a pro
se litigant are to be liberally construed.” (citation modified)).
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No. 25-50946
4
successfully reaffirm or redeem within the allotted time frame.”
4

Though Anderson filed her motion to redeem on the forty-fifth day,
she did not successfully redeem her car on the forty-fifth day. Again, as the
district court found, Section 362(h) “demands compliance with the specified
action, not a good-faith attempt.” Id. For these reasons and the reasons
stated by the district court, the bankruptcy court did not reversibly err in
concluding that the stay automatically terminated.
Furthermore, because the stay automatically terminated and, per
§ 362(h)(1), the vehicle ceased to be a part of the estate irrespective of any
action taken by the bankruptcy court, Anderson lost the ability to redeem, so
her motion to redeem was moot. As the district court said, “the moment the
automatic stay protecting the vehicle terminated under § 362(h), she lost the
capacity to exempt or abandon her vehicle and therefore lost the technical
capacity to satisfy the statutory requirements to redeem her vehicle under
§ 722.” Because the vehicle was no longer a part of the estate, Anderson
could not redeem it or seek its abandonment. For these reasons and the rea-
sons cited by the district court in its thoughtful Opinion and Order of Decem-
ber 11, 2025, the bankruptcy court did not reversibly err in concluding that
Anderson’s motion to redeem was moot, as no relief could be afforded.
The judgment of the district court, affirming the bankruptcy court, is
AFFIRMED.
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4
Anderson v. AmeriCredit Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 5:25-CV-01166-MA, 2025 WL
3654261, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Dec. 11, 2025).
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