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99-2125•In Re: FRANK HOWARD CLARK v. Clifford R. Bridgford
99-2125Court of Appeals for the Fourth CircuitMar 17, 2000
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
In Re: FRANK HOWARD CLARK,
Debtor.
FRANK HOWARD CLARK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 99-2125
CLIFFORD R. BRIDGFORD,
Defendant-Appellee,
and
UNITED STATES TRUSTEE,
Party in Interest.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Alexander Williams, Jr., District Judge.
(CA-99-735-AW, BK-98-1675-PM)
Submitted: February 29, 2000
Decided: March 17, 2000
Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges,
and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
_________________________________________________________________
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
_________________________________________________________________
COUNSEL
Paul Victor Jorgensen, Middletown, Maryland, for Appellant. Scott
C. Borison, LEGG LAW FIRM, L.L.C., Frederick, Maryland, for
Appellee.
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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).
_________________________________________________________________
OPINION
PER CURIAM:
Frank Howard Clark appeals from the district court's order affirm-
ing the bankruptcy court's order dismissing his complaint in which he
sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to enjoin Clifford
Bridgford from pursuing his lien against property that Clark had a
right to purchase under a settlement agreement approved by the bank-
ruptcy court. The bankruptcy court determined that Clark, the debtor,
was not a party to the dispute and that the Chapter 7 trustee had no
interest in the property. Also, Clark had been granted a discharge;
therefore, the automatic stay was not applicable and the bankruptcy
court had no jurisdiction over the matter. The district court affirmed
this disposition.
After a de novo review of the record, we agree that the automatic
stay was not in effect when Bridgford obtained his lien, see 11
U.S.C.A. § 362(c) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999), and that the subject
property was not property of Clark's bankruptcy estate. Further, we
find no abuse of discretion in the bankruptcy court's refusal to exer-
cise its authority under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (1994), when such action
would not affect the bankruptcy estate or the rehabilitation of the
debtor. See Indian Motorcycle Assocs. III Ltd. Partnership v. Massa-
chusetts Hous. Fin. Agency, 66 F.3d 1246, 1249 (1st Cir. 1995);
Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency
(Matter of Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co.), 805 F.2d 1175, 1188 (5th
Cir. 1986). Clark's right to purchase the property under the settlement
agreement was a postpetition right. Bridgford's levy on the property
was foreseeable at the time of the settlement and was not in contra-
vention of any order of the bankruptcy court. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court's order affirming the bankruptcy court's dismissal of
Clark's complaint. We dispense with oral argument because the facts
and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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