United States of America v. Lonnie Owens, Jr.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4243
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
LONNIE OWENS, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., Chief District Judge. (1:15-cr-00290-WO-1)
Submitted: October 18, 2016 Decided: November 3, 2016
Before NIEMEYER, DUNCAN, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, John A. Duberstein,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Clifton Thomas Barratt, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Lonnie Owens, Jr., pled guilty to being a felon in
possession of a firearm, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2)
(2012). The district court sentenced Owens to 105 months’
imprisonment, and he now appeals. Appellate counsel has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
questioning whether the district court erred in denying Owens a
reduction for acceptance of responsibility under U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 3E1.1(a) (2015).
To earn an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, the
defendant must prove to the district court by a preponderance of
the evidence “that he has clearly recognized and affirmatively
accepted personal responsibility for his criminal conduct.”
United States v. Nale, 101 F.3d 1000, 1005 (4th Cir. 1996).
This Court reviews the district court’s denial of the
acceptance-of-responsibility adjustment for clear error. United
States v. Dugger, 485 F.3d 236, 239 (4th Cir. 2007). “Great
deference” is given to the district court’s decision because
“the sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a
defendant’s acceptance of responsibility.” Id. (brackets and
internal quotation marks omitted).
A guilty plea alone does not automatically entitle a
defendant to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Id.
Indeed, district courts consider several factors in the USSG

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§ 3E1.1 analysis, including a defendant’s postarrest and
postplea criminal conduct. Id. at 240; United States v. Kidd,
12 F.3d 30, 34 (4th Cir. 1993); see USSG § 3E1.1. cmt. n.1
(listing factors to be considered by district court in
acceptance of responsibility analysis).
After hearing testimony from several witnesses at Owens’
sentencing hearing, the district court found that Owens had
committed criminal conduct after his arrest and his guilty plea
hearing. Evidence introduced at sentencing established that
Owens assaulted and robbed an elderly man of his prescription
medication while on pretrial release for this offense and again
possessed a firearm, which he discharged at a vehicle, ten days
after pleading guilty to this offense. Therefore, the district
court denied Owens an adjustment for acceptance of
responsibility. Having reviewed the record, we conclude that
the district court did not clearly err in determining that Owens
was not entitled to a reduction for acceptance of
responsibility.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Owens, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Owens requests that a petition be filed, but

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counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Owens.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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