United States of America v. Jaquell Maurice Tysor

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 16-4073
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
JAQUELL MAURICE TYSOR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Catherine C. Eagles,
District Judge. (1:15-cr-00165-CCE-1)
Submitted: October 28, 2016 Decided: November 16, 2016
Before AGEE, KEENAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, John A. Duberstein,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, JoAnna G.
McFadden, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Jaquell Maurice Tysor pled guilty to possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon. The district court imposed a
sentence of 120 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Tysor argues
that the district court erred when it did not order his sentence
to run concurrent to an anticipated state sentence for relevant
conduct, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 5G1.3(c) (2014). For the following reasons, we affirm.
We review Tysor’s sentence for reasonableness “under a
deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” United States v.
McCoy, 804 F.3d 349, 351 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 41 (2007)). This review entails appellate
consideration of both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of the sentence. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We
presume that a sentence imposed within the properly calculated
Sentencing Guidelines range is reasonable. United States v.
Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th Cir. 2014).
Tysor alleges the district court committed procedural
error, specifically in failing to properly apply USSG § 5G1.3 in
determining Tysor’s sentence. We have reviewed the record and
conclude that the district court properly calculated the
Guidelines range, treated the Guidelines as advisory rather than
mandatory, gave the parties an opportunity to argue for an
appropriate sentence, considered the relevant sentencing factors

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specific to Tysor’s case, selected a sentence not based on
clearly erroneous facts, and sufficiently explained the
sentence. Because the court properly engaged in each of these
analytical steps and explained its reasoning supporting the
sentence, it did not commit procedural error.
As to Tysor’s particular argument, we conclude the district
court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered Tysor’s
federal sentence to run consecutively, in part, to his
anticipated state sentence for relevant conduct. Sentencing
judges “have discretion to select whether the sentences they
impose will run concurrently or consecutively with respect to
other sentences that they impose.” Setser v. United States, 132
S. Ct. 1463, 1468 (2012). Indeed, Setser specifically addressed
whether 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (2012) allows the imposition of a
federal sentence consecutive to an anticipated state sentence.
132 S. Ct. at 1470; United States v. Obey, 790 F.3d 545, 549
(4th Cir. 2015) (“Setser holds that a district court may run its
sentence consecutive to an anticipated state sentence.”).
Moreover, the Guidelines are advisory, thus the district
court was not obligated to impose concurrent sentences pursuant
to § 5G1.3. United States v. Nania, 724 F.3d 824, 830 (7th
Cir. 2013) (“[G]iven the advisory nature of the Sentencing
Guidelines, a district court has no obligation to impose a
concurrent sentence, even if § 5G1.3(b) applies.”). Rather, the

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district court is required to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2012) factors in determining whether to run the sentences
consecutively or concurrently. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b) (2012).
Thus, the district court was within its authority to run part of
Tysor’s federal sentence consecutive to the anticipated state
sentence, rather than concurrently, and we perceive no error in
its decision to do so.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the district court's
judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED

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