Rigoberto Teasley v. Manager Thomas Joyner; Sergeant Ragland

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-7939
RIGOBERTO TEASLEY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
MANAGER THOMAS JOYNER; SERGEANT RAGLAND,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
CORRECTIONAL OFFICER WIGGINS,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:11-ct-03057-BO)
Submitted: March 19, 2014 Decided: April 7, 2014
Before NIEMEYER, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Rigoberto Teasley, Appellant Pro Se. Peter Andrew Regulski,
Assistant Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Rigoberto Teasley seeks to appeal the district court’s
order granting summary judgment to Appellees. Appellees move to
dismiss the appeal as untimely filed. Because the district
court was without authority to excuse the lateness of Teasley’s
appeal, we grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.
Parties are accorded thirty days after the entry of
the district court’s final judgment or order to note an appeal,
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A), unless the district court extends
the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), or reopens the
appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). “[T]he timely
filing of a notice of appeal in a civil case is a jurisdictional
requirement.” Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214 (2007).
Further, a district court is without authority to alter or grant
a party leave from complying with the various statute-based
procedural rules governing a timely appeal. Id. at 213-15.
Here, under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), Teasley’s initial
thirty-day appeal period expired on October 4, 2013. See Fed.
R. App. P. 26(a)(1)(A). Teasley’s time for seeking an extension
of the appeal period under Rule 4(a)(5) expired thirty days
later on November 4, 2013. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5)(A)(i); Fed.
R. App. P. 26(a)(1)(C). Accordingly, Teasley’s motion to extend
the appeal period, filed at the earliest on November 5, 2013,

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was one day late.∗ Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988).
Because the district court was without authority to grant an
untimely Rule 4(a)(5) motion, we conclude that his notice of
appeal was untimely. See Bowles, 551 U.S. at 214 (stating that
courts have no authority to create equitable exceptions to
jurisdictional rules); see also Goode v. Winkler, 252 F.3d 242,
245-46 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that district court had no
authority to consider pro se Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) motion
filed over thirty days after expiration of initial appeal
period).
Because Teasley failed to file a timely notice of
appeal, we dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before this court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
DISMISSED
∗ We note that Teasley’s motion for an extension of the
appeal period could not have properly been considered as a
timely Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(a)(6) motion to reopen the time for
filing an appeal.

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