Anatoli Stanchev Stanev v. ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-2532
ANATOLI STANCHEV STANEV,
Petitioner,
v.
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: June 13, 2014 Decided: June 30, 2014
Before KEENAN, WYNN, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied in part; dismissed in part by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
Ronald D. Richey, LAW OFFICE OF RONALD D. RICHEY, Rockville,
Maryland, for Petitioner. Stuart F. Delery, Assistant Attorney
General, Mary Jane Candaux, Assistant Director, Andrea N. Gevas,
Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Anatoli Stanchev Stanev, a native and citizen of
Bulgaria, petitions for review of an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“Board”) denying his motion to reopen. We
deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for review.
On May 11, 2012, the Board dismissed Stanev’s appeal
from the immigration judge’s order denying his motion to reopen.
On October 3, 2013, Stanev filed a motion to reopen with the
Board based on changed circumstances. The Board denied the
motion because it was untimely. The Board also declined to
exercise its sua sponte authority to reopen.
An alien may file one motion to reopen within ninety
days of the entry of a final order of removal. 8 U.S.C. §
1229a(c)(7)(A), (C) (2012); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2) (2013).
There is no time limit for filing a motion to reopen if the
basis is to apply for asylum based on changed country conditions
that occurred since the prior proceeding. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229a(c)(7)(C). However, a motion to reopen based on a change
in personal circumstances, such as a marriage and an approved I-
130 visa petition, is not the same as a change in country
conditions and does not excuse the time limitations for filing a
motion to reopen. See Ji Cheng Ni v. Holder, 715 F.3d 620, 624
(7th Cir. 2013); Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983, 991 (9th
Cir. 2010); Mei Ya Zhang v. Attorney Gen., 572 F.3d 1316, 1319

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(11th Cir. 2009); Larngar v. Holder, 562 F.3d 71, 77 (1st Cir.
2009). Accordingly, we deny the petition for review from that
part of the Board’s order denying Stanev’s untimely motion to
reopen.
We are without jurisdiction to review the Board’s
decision to decline to exercise its sua sponte authority to
reopen the case. In Mosere v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 397, 400-01
(4th Cir. 2009), we noted that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) “provides
that the [Board] ‘may’ reopen on its own motion, but it
‘provides no guidance as to the [Board]’s appropriate course of
action, sets forth no factors . . ., places no constraints on
the [Board]’s discretion, and specifies no standards for a court
to use to cabin the [Board]’s discretion.’” Id. at 401 (quoting
Tamenut v. Mukasey, 521 F.3d 1000, 1004 (8th Cir. 2008)).
“Because there are no meaningful standards by which to judge the
[Board]’s exercise of discretion,” we concluded that we lack
jurisdiction over the Board’s refusal to sua sponte reopen a
case. Mosere, 552 F.3d at 401; see also Peralta v. Holder, 567
F.3d 31, 34 (1st Cir. 2009) (“The [Board]’s discretion in this
regard is unfettered[.]”). Accordingly, we dismiss that part of
the petition for review from the Board’s order denying sua
sponte reopening.
We deny in part and dismiss in part the petition for
review. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and

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legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
PETITION DENIED IN PART;
DISMISSED IN PART

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