Hsieh Lewis v. Life Insurance Company of North America

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1980
HSIEH LEWIS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA,
Defendant – Appellee,
and
KRATOS DEFENSE & SECURITY SOLUTIONS, INC.; CIGNA
CORPORATION,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, Senior
District Judge. (1:12-cv-01012-TSE-TCB)
Submitted: May 30, 2014 Decided: July 3, 2014
Before WILKINSON, KING, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Michael Hannon, HANNON LAW GROUP, Washington, D.C., for
Appellant. Walter L. Williams, WILSON, ELSER, MOSKOWITZ,
EDELMAN & DICKER LLP, McLean, Virginia, for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Hsieh Lewis appeals from the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to Life Insurance Company of North
America (“LICNA”) in her civil action alleging breach of
fiduciary duty under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”) based on LICNA’s denial of her claim for benefits
under her husband’s employer-sponsored life insurance policy.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, drawing reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Dulaney v. Packaging Corp.
of Am., 673 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2012). Summary judgment is
proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Only disputes over
facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the
governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986). To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the
non-moving party must produce competent evidence to reveal the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
See Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649
(4th Cir. 2002) (“Conclusory or speculative allegations do not
suffice, nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of

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[the non-moving party’s] case.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we
conclude that the district court did not reversibly err in
granting summary judgment to LICNA. Under the plain language of
the policy, see Wheeler v. Dynamic Eng’g, Inc., 62 F.3d 634, 638
(4th Cir. 1995), Lewis’ husband was not entitled to benefits.
We also reject as meritless and unsupported by the evidence
Lewis’ arguments that LICNA was bound by an eligibility
determination made by her husband’s employer and that the life
insurance policy was ambiguous and should have been construed in
her favor.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.*
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
* In view of our disposition, we need not address LICNA’s
alternative argument that Lewis’ claim for relief under the
ERISA was barred by her failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.

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