Monica L. Ball v. Stylecraft Homes, LLC

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 13-1946
MONICA L. BALL,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
STYLECRAFT HOMES, LLC; RICHARD KUHN; JOSHUA CREEL; JOHN
RICE; RESIDENTIAL WARRANTY COMPANY, LLC; HENRICO COUNTY;
GREGORY H. REVELS, Henrico County Building Official;
RICHARD MOORE, Henrico County Building Official; CHARLES
JONES, Henrico County Building Official; CARL RANSONE,
Henrico County Building Official; JOSEPH RANSONE, Henrico
County Building Official; GRAHAM HENDERSON; CHARLES TONEY;
JOHN DOE (INSPECTORS), in their Official and Individual
capacities jointly and severally,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, Senior
District Judge. (3:13-cv-00246-REP)
Submitted: March 26, 2014 Decided: April 3, 2014
Before MOTZ, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jerrod M. Smith, JERROD MYRON SMITH & ASSOCIATES, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellant. Charles A. Gavin, CAWTHORN, DESKEVICH
& GAVIN, P.C., Richmond, Virginia; Benjamin A. Thorp, Henrico,
Virginia; John Owen, HARMAN, CLAYTOR, CORRIGAN & WELLMAN,

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Richmond, Virginia; Edward J. Baines, Carolyn Due, SAUL EWING,
LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Monica Ball appeals the district court order denying
her motion to vacate an arbitration award pursuant to the
Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2012), and
dismissing her civil complaint. On appeal, Ball challenges the
district court’s dispositive conclusion that her pleadings
failed to establish a basis for exercising federal subject
matter jurisdiction. Finding no error, we affirm.
We review questions of subject matter jurisdiction de
novo. In re Kirkland, 600 F.3d 310, 314 (4th Cir. 2013).
Federal jurisdiction may lie either on the basis of diversity of
citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2012), or the existence of a
federal question, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012). A federal court may
exercise federal question jurisdiction over an action “arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”
Id. “Under the longstanding well-pleaded complaint rule, . . .
a suit arises under federal law only when the plaintiff’s
statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon
federal law.” Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 60 (2009)
(internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Thus, to
determine whether an action arises under the laws of the United
States, a court must examine the operative pleading to “discern
whether federal or state law creates the cause of action” and,
if the claim is not created by federal law, whether “the

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plaintiff’s right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of
a substantial question of federal law.” Pinney v. Nokia, Inc.,
402 F.3d 430, 442 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks
omitted). To support federal jurisdiction, the federal question
must be substantial, not frivolous or pretextual. Lovern v.
Edwards, 190 F.3d 648, 654-55 (4th Cir. 1999).
Under the FAA, a party to an arbitration may petition
the district court to vacate, modify, or correct the arbitration
award, regardless of whether an initial suit to compel
arbitration was brought in federal court. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10,
11 (2012). With regard to “jurisdiction over controversies
touching arbitration,” the FAA “is something of an anomaly,” as
“[i]t bestows no federal jurisdiction but rather requires for
access to a federal forum an independent jurisdictional basis
over the parties’ dispute.” Vaden, 556 U.S. at 59 (internal
quotation marks and alterations omitted). Where the action
otherwise satisfies a court’s jurisdictional requirements, the
FAA “makes contracts to arbitrate ‘valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable,’ so long as their subject involves ‘commerce.’
. . . whether enforcement be sought in state court or federal.”
Hall St. Assocs., L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 582
(2008) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012)). Thus, whether the dispute
demonstrates a nexus to commerce sufficient to fall within the
scope of the FAA is a separate inquiry from the existence of

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either diversity of citizenship or a federal question adequate
to confer federal subject matter jurisdiction.
On appeal, Ball does not challenge the district
court’s conclusion that she failed to establish federal
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship and has therefore
abandoned appellate review of this issue. See United States v.
Hudson, 673 F.3d 263, 268 (4th Cir. 2012) (noting that issues
not raised in opening brief are deemed abandoned). Moreover,
Ball’s own pleadings clearly establish that the parties are not
completely diverse, as required to confer diversity
jurisdiction.
Ball primarily argues that she has invoked federal
question jurisdiction based on the nexus between her allegations
and interstate commerce. Because Ball did not fairly raise this
argument in her responsive pleadings in the district court, it
is not properly before us. See Muth v. United States, 1 F.3d
246, 250 (4th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that issues raised for
first time on appeal generally will not be considered). In any
event, Ball’s attempt to establish a federal question based on a
vague connection to “interstate commerce” is entirely
unavailing. Ball conflates the requirement of a nexus with
commerce to invoke the FAA with the independent “federal
question” requirement necessary to establish subject matter
jurisdiction. Thus, the authority on which she relies is wholly

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inapposite to the existence of federal subject matter
jurisdiction in her case.
In her pleadings filed in the district court,1 Ball
made no attempt to assert a federal claim for relief. Nor did
she assert facts that would give rise to a substantive issue of
federal law. Review of Ball’s claims and challenge to the
arbitrator’s award would not require the district court to apply
or analyze the Commerce Clause. Simply put, Ball’s complaint
asserted only state-law claims for relief, notwithstanding any
vague connection the underlying fact pattern may have to federal
regulations or to interstate commerce.2 Therefore, the district
court correctly concluded that it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction and properly dismissed the action.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
1 As the district court noted, “[t]he FAA sets forth the
sole method to challenge an arbitration award—by serving a
motion to vacate . . . —and does not permit a party to initiate
a challenge to an arbitration award by filing a complaint.” ANR
Coal Co. v. Cogentrix of N.C., Inc., 173 F.3d 493, 496 n.1 (4th
Cir. 1999) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
2 Insofar as Ball attempts to raise a due process argument
on appeal, that argument was not raised in the district court
and is not properly before us. See Muth, 1 F.3d at 250.

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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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