Johnny Dwayne Adams v. Southwest Virginia Regional Jail Authority; Dr. Ofought

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-8057
JOHNNY DWAYNE ADAMS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
SOUTHWEST VIRGINIA REGIONAL JAIL AUTHORITY; DR. OFOUGHT,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke. Norman K. Moon, Senior
District Judge. (7:12-cv-00462-NKM-RSB)
Submitted: April 29, 2013 Decided: May 13, 2013
Before DAVIS, KEENAN, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded by unpublished
per curiam opinion.
Johnny Dwayne Adams, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Johnny Dwayne Adams appeals from the district court’s
order dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) suit pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) (2006) for failure to state a claim.
Adams sued the Southwest Virginia Regional Jail Authority
(“SVRJ”) and Dr. Ofought, a doctor at the jail, raising a claim
of deliberate indifference to serious medical needs based upon
the Defendants’ treatment of his back and leg pain. We affirm
the dismissal as to SVRJ for the reasons stated by the district
court. See Adams v. Southwest Va. Reg’l, No. 7:12-cv-00462-NKM-
RSB (W.D. Va. Nov. 26, 2012). However, with regard to the
claims against Ofought, we vacate and remand for further
proceedings.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), which governs
proceedings in forma pauperis, a district court is directed to
dismiss a case “at any time” if the court finds that the case or
appeal is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim, or
seeks damages from someone who is immune from such relief. We
review de novo a district court’s dismissal for failure to state
a claim. Slade v. Hampton Rds. Reg’l Jail, 407 F.3d 243, 248
(4th Cir. 2005) (28 U.S.C. § 1915A dismissal). A complaint
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless
“after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff's
complaint as true and drawing all reasonable factual inferences

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from those facts in the plaintiff's favor, it appears certain
that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of
his claim entitling him to relief.” Id. (quoting Edwards v.
City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999)). While a
pro se litigant’s pleadings are liberally construed, Gordon v.
Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), a pro se complaint
must still contain sufficient facts “to raise a right to relief
above the speculative level” and “state a claim to relief that
is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555, 570 (2007).
Adams presents more facts in his informal brief than
he did in his complaint. Where no opportunity is given to amend
the complaint, the dismissal should generally be without
prejudice. See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 756 (7th Cir.
2011); see also Coleman v. Peyton, 340 F.2d 603, 604 (4th Cir.
1965) (per curiam) (holding that, if a pro se complaint contains
a potentially cognizable claim, the plaintiff should be given an
opportunity to particularize his allegations). Here, the
district court dismissed without giving Adams an opportunity to
clarify his claim and without specifying whether the dismissal
was with or without prejudice.
A prison official unnecessarily and wantonly inflicts
pain proscribed by the Eighth Amendment by acting with
deliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious medical

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needs. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). In order
for a prisoner to prevail on such a claim of medical
mistreatment under § 1983, he “must allege acts or omissions
sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to
serious medical needs.” Id. at 106. First, the prisoner must
show objectively that the deprivation suffered or the injury
inflicted was serious. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834
(1994). Second, the prisoner must satisfy the subjective
component of such a claim by a showing of deliberate
indifference by prison officials. This “entails something more
than mere negligence” but does not require actual purposeful
intent. Rish v. Johnson, 131 F.3d 1092, 1096 (4th Cir. 1997).
“It requires that a prison official actually know of and
disregard an objectively serious condition, medical need, or
risk of harm.” Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
837 (1994)).
Here, the district court did not address whether
Adams’ condition was a serious medical need. The district court
stated that Adams did not specify the part of his body that was
in pain; however, the medical records submitted by Adams with
his complaint show that he suffered from arthritis and
degenerative disc disease and that he had chronic pain in his
back, leg, pelvis and hip. We find that these records raise a
plausible claim that he had a serious medical

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condition. See Scott v. Ambani, 577 F.3d 642, 648 (6th Cir.
2009) (noting that failure to treat severe back and leg pain
might lead trier of fact to conclude that prison officials were
deliberately indifferent); Gutierrez v. Peters, 11 F.3d 1364,
1370-71 (7th Cir. 1997) (recognizing that the Supreme Court
in Estelle “never questioned that the inmate’s allegations of
severe pain from his back injury were sufficiently serious to
support his Eighth Amendment claim”).
Turning to the subjective prong and liberally
construing Adams’ complaint and supporting materials, Adams
alleged that Ofought refused to treat him because he was an
inmate and because he was requesting specific treatment, removed
him from the vast majority of his pain medication without
examining him after he complained, and told him that he did not
need to be able to walk or stand. We find that these
allegations, when liberally construed with all inferences in his
favor, state a potentially cognizable claim for deliberate
indifference to medical needs. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05
(noting that officials evince deliberate indifference by
completely failing to consider an inmate’s complaints).
Moreover, we need not decide whether these allegations
alone are sufficient, as consideration of the allegations in
Adams’ informal brief further strengthens his complaint. Had
Adams’ complaint been dismissed without prejudice, he would have

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been able to construct a new complaint with these facts, and
perhaps others. The additional allegations are as follows: (1)
Ofought was the doctor who denied him treatment (a fact that was
only inferred from Adams’ complaint), (2) Ofought failed to
conduct any examination whatsoever, and (3) instead, Ofought
drastically reduced Adams’ pain medication that he had been on
for fourteen years in the face of Adams’ assertions of
increasing pain. When liberally construed, the entirety of
Adams’ allegations adequately assert that Ofought was
deliberately indifferent by refusing treatment based upon Adams’
status and his complaints, rather than a medical judgment; by
failing to conduct any examination or investigation into Adams’
complaints of pain, which were supported by his medical records;
and by reducing Adams’ pain medication without a medical reason.
Based on the foregoing, we find the claim against
Ofought was improperly dismissed. We therefore vacate and
remand to permit amendments to the complaint and for further
proceedings. We affirm the dismissal of the claims against
SWRJ. We deny Adams’ motion for appointment of counsel. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED
AND REMANDED IN PART

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