United States of America v. Alvania Boone, Jr.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4638
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ALVANIA BOONE, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. William L. Osteen,
Jr., District Judge. (1:11-cr-00302-WO-1)
Submitted: April 17, 2013 Decided: May 3, 2013
Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael E. Archenbronn, LAW OFFICE OF MICHAEL E. ARCHENBRONN,
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael A.
DeFranco, Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Alvania Boone, Jr., was convicted after a jury trial
of possession of ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2) (2006), and sentenced to
seventy-eight months’ imprisonment. Boone’s counsel has filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
stating that there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but
questioning whether the district court erred, under Fed. R.
Evid. 404(b), in admitting testimony that knives were recovered
during a search of Boone’s person incident to his arrest.
Boone has filed three pro se supplemental briefs. We affirm.
We review the district court’s admission or exclusion
of evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lighty,
616 F.3d 321, 351 (4th Cir. 2010). Rule 404(b) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence states that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or
other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in
order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character.” Such evidence, however, “may be
admissible for another purpose, such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).
To be admissible under Rule 404(b), the evidence at issue must
be “(1) relevant to an issue other than character;
(2) necessary; and (3) reliable.” United States v. Siegel,

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536 F.3d 306, 317 (4th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks
omitted). “Rule 404(b) is . . . an inclusive rule, admitting
all evidence of other crimes or acts except that which tends to
prove only criminal disposition,” United States v. Young,
248 F.3d 260, 271-72 (4th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks
omitted), and, “[a]s a rule of inclusion, the rule’s list is not
exhaustive.” United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d 991, 994-95
(4th Cir. 1997).
“Evidence sought to be admitted under Rule 404(b) must
also satisfy [Fed. R. Evid.] 403[.]” Siegel, 536 F.3d at 319.
“Rule 403 only requires suppression of evidence that results in
unfair prejudice — prejudice that damages an opponent for
reasons other than its probative value, for instance, an appeal
to emotion, and only when that unfair prejudice substantially
outweighs the probative value of the evidence.”
United States v. Mohr, 318 F.3d 613, 619-20 (4th Cir. 2003)
(internal quotation marks, emphasis, and alteration omitted).
After review of the record, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the
testimony regarding the recovery of the knives into evidence.
The testimony was relevant to issues other than Boone’s
character and necessary, see United States v. Aramony, 88 F.3d
1369, 1377 (4th Cir. 1996) (addressing standards for
admissibility under Rule 404(b)), and Boone does not challenge

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the reliability of the testimony. Further, the probative value
of the testimony was not substantially outweighed by confusion
or unfair prejudice. Although the information may have been
damaging to Boone, it did not “subordinate reason to emotion in
the factfinding process.” United States v. Gray, 405 F.3d 227,
239 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, in accordance with Anders, we have
reviewed Boone’s pro se supplemental briefs and the remainder of
the record and have found no meritorious issues for review.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
This court requires that counsel inform Boone, in writing, of
the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If Boone requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Boone.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED

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