United States of America v. Ronald Wade Smith, Jr.

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4270
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
RONALD WADE SMITH, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 12-4271
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TERRANCE KEITH CUNNINGHAM,
Defendant - Appellant.
No. 12-4272
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.

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ANGELA ALLISON DUTY SMITH,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Abingdon. James P. Jones, District
Judge. (1:10-cr-00026-JPJ-PMS-1; 1:10-cr-00026-JPJ-PMS-2; 1:10-
cr-00026-JPJ-PMS-3)
Submitted: March 29, 2013 Decided: May 3, 2013
Before GREGORY, DUNCAN, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Rhonda Lee Overstreet, OVERSTREET SLOAN, PLLC, Bedford,
Virginia; Barry L. Proctor, Abingdon, Virginia; Joseph Wheeler
Rasnic, Jonesville, Virginia, for Appellants. Timothy J.
Heaphy, United States Attorney, Jennifer R. Bockhorst, Assistant
United States Attorney, Abingdon, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Ronald Wade Smith, Jr., Angela Allison Duty Smith, and
Terrance Keith Cunningham were convicted of conspiracy to commit
wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (2006), wire fraud,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2006), money laundering, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1957 (2006), and other related
offenses, and sentenced to 135, thirty-two, and eighty-four
months’ imprisonment, respectively. The charges stemmed from
their participation in a Ponzi scheme, involving an investment
club that offered impossibly high returns, purportedly generated
through trades on the foreign exchange market using a complex
computer program. In these consolidated appeals, Ronald Smith
appeals his sentence, Angela Smith her convictions, and Terrance
Cunningham his convictions and sentence.
I.
Ronald Smith challenges his sentence, contending that
the district court erred in applying a two-level obstruction
enhancement. In determining whether the district court has
properly applied the Guidelines, this court reviews its
interpretation of the Guidelines de novo and its factual
findings for clear error. United States v. Quinn, 359 F.3d 666,
679 (4th Cir. 2004). Guideline section 3C1.1 provides for a
two-level increase where the defendant willfully obstructs or
attempts to obstruct the investigation or prosecution of the

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offense of conviction. Section 3C1.1 covers conduct occurring
prior to the start of the investigation if such conduct “was
purposefully calculated, and likely, to thwart the investigation
or prosecution of the instant offense.” U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 3C1.1 cmt. n.1 (2010).
We conclude that the district court did not clearly
err in applying the obstruction enhancement. Despite his
contention to the contrary, ample evidence supports the
conclusion that Ronald Smith engaged in conduct that was both
purposefully calculated and likely to thwart the investigation.
He pled guilty to creating and disseminating to investors
fraudulent SEC documents, investors testified at trial that he
told them that this SEC investigation prevented the club from
making distributions, defense counsel conceded that his conduct
“was calculated—there’s no question about that—it was calculated
for Mr. Smith to try to gain a little bit of time,” and only one
out of nearly 100 investors reported the club to authorities.
II.
Angela Smith challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting her conspiracy, wire fraud, and money
laundering convictions. This court reviews de novo the district
court’s denial of a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal.
United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 367 (4th Cir. 2010). This
court reviews the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a

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conviction by determining whether, in the light most favorable
to the Government, there is substantial evidence in the record
to support the conviction. Id. “Substantial evidence” is
“evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as
adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted). Reversal on grounds of insufficient evidence is
appropriate only in cases where the Government’s failure to
present substantial evidence is clear. Id.
Angela Smith first challenges her conspiracy
conviction. To obtain the conviction, the Government was
required to prove: (1) the existence of an agreement between
two or more persons (that is, a conspiracy); (2) the defendant’s
knowledge of the conspiracy; and (3) that the defendant
knowingly and voluntarily became involved in the conspiracy.
United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 857 (4th Cir. 1996). A
defendant may be a knowing and voluntary member of a conspiracy
without knowing its full scope or taking part in the full range
of its activities. Id. Moreover, under the doctrine of willful
blindness, knowledge may be established where the defendant
deliberately avoided enlightenment. United States v. Campbell,
977 F.2d 854, 857 (4th Cir. 1992).
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the
conspiracy conviction. Angela Smith does not contest the

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existence of a conspiracy, instead she contends that the
Government failed to prove her direct knowledge of the
conspiracy’s existence and her participation. However, the
Government sufficiently proved her knowledge or at least willful
blindness, through evidence that she was the investment club’s
treasurer and secretary, that she signed checks misappropriating
investor funds, and that she promoted the club to prospective
investors.
Angela Smith next challenges her wire fraud and money
laundering convictions. To obtain the wire fraud convictions,
the Government was required to prove: (1) a scheme to defraud,
and (2) use of a wire communication in furtherance of the
scheme. United States v. Bollin, 264 F.3d 391, 407 (4th Cir.
2001). To obtain the money laundering convictions, the
Government was required to prove that the defendant knowingly
engaged in a monetary transaction in property of a value of over
$10,000 that was derived from specific unlawful activity.
Campbell, 977 F.2d at 859. A conspirator may be convicted of an
offense committed by her coconspirator if the offense was
committed during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy. United States v. Chorman, 910 F.2d 102, 110-11 (4th
Cir. 1990).
We conclude that substantial evidence supports the
wire fraud and money laundering convictions. Angela Smith

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contends that the Government did not establish the purpose of
each individual underlying transaction through testimony from
each individual transferor or transferee. However, even absent
such testimony, the Government sufficiently proved each
transaction’s purpose through alternative evidence, such as bank
records, investor files found in the Smith residence, and other
witness testimony. This evidence provided adequate support for
the jury’s determination that the various transactions
underlying the wire fraud and money laundering charges were in
furtherance of or derived from the fraudulent scheme.
III.
Cunningham challenges both the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting his convictions as well as his sentence.
Cunningham first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his wire fraud, money laundering, and witness
tampering convictions. His challenge to his wire fraud and
money laundering convictions, which mirrors Angela Smith’s,
fails for the same reasons. As for his challenge to his witness
tampering conviction, it too fails, in light of evidence that
Cunningham persuaded one of the investors to email the others,
advising: “DO NOT CALL THE CFTC!!!!,” “THIS WILL ONLY DELAY
THINGS.” See 18 U.S.C. § 1512(b) (2006) (a defendant is guilty
of witness tampering when he knowingly corruptly persuaded

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another person with intent to prevent any person from testifying
in an official proceeding).
Cunningham also challenges his sentence, alleging that
the district court erred in applying loss, victim number, and
sophisticated means enhancements. We conclude that the district
court did not clearly err in applying these enhancements. As
for the sixteen-level loss enhancement, Cunningham does not
contest that his offenses resulted in an over $1 million loss,
but rather contends that this loss was not reasonably
foreseeable to him. As for the four-level victim number
enhancement, Cunningham again argues not that this figure is
inaccurate but rather that the total number of victims was not
reasonably foreseeable. However, the district court properly
found that in light of Cunningham’s significant involvement in
the conspiracy, he either knew or reasonably should have known
that the over $1 million loss was a potential result. For the
same reason, the scheme’s total number of victims was also
reasonably foreseeable to him. Finally, we conclude without
difficulty that the district court acted well within its
discretion in determining that the sophisticated means
enhancement was applicable. USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.8 (defining
sophisticated means as especially complex or intricate offense
conduct); United States v. Weiss, 630 F.3d 1263, 1279 (10th Cir.

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2010) (an offense involves sophisticated means where the total
scheme was undoubtedly sophisticated).
Accordingly, we affirm Ronald Smith’s sentence, Angela
Smith’s convictions, and Terrance Cunningham’s convictions and
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid in the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED

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