United States of America v. Tonya Lynn Pressley

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-4080
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
TONYA LYNN PRESSLEY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Spartanburg. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (7:08-cr-00796-HMH-2)
Submitted: August 16, 2012 Decided: August 20, 2012
Before KING and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David W. Plowden, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greenville,
South Carolina, for Appellant. David Calhoun Stephens, Assistant
United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Tonya Lynn Pressley appeals from her twenty-four-month
sentence imposed upon revocation of her supervised release. On
appeal, counsel has filed an Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), brief stating that there are no meritorious issues, but
raising whether Pressley’s sentence was plainly unreasonable.
We affirm.
A district court has broad discretion to impose a
sentence upon revoking a defendant’s supervised release. United
States v. Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 547 (4th Cir. 2010). We will
affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of supervised release
if it is within the applicable statutory maximum and is not
“plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433,
439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). In determining whether a revocation
sentence is plainly unreasonable, we first assess the sentence
for reasonableness, “follow[ing] generally the procedural and
substantive considerations that we employ in our review of
original sentences.” Id. at 438. A supervised release
revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district
court considered the Sentencing Guidelines’ Chapter 7 advisory
policy statements and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) factors
that it is permitted to consider in a supervised release
revocation case. See Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439. Although the
court need not explain the reasons for imposing a revocation

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sentence in as much detail as when it imposes an original
sentence, “it still must provide a statement of reasons for the
sentence imposed.” Thompson, 595 F.3d at 547 (internal
quotation marks omitted). A revocation sentence is
substantively reasonable if the district court stated a proper
basis for concluding the defendant should receive the sentence
imposed, up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 440.
Only if a sentence is found procedurally or substantively
unreasonable will we “then decide whether the sentence is
plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 439.
After review of the record, we conclude that the
revocation sentence is not plainly unreasonable. The
twenty-four-month prison term does not exceed the applicable
maximum allowed by statute. The district court considered the
argument of Pressley’s counsel and allocution by Pressley and
her mother and son, the Guidelines advisory range, and addressed
on the record Pressley’s significant and continuing pattern of
theft and drug use, and her inability to comply with supervised
release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B)-(C); U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual Ch. 7, Pt. A, introductory cmt.
3(b) (2011). The district court adequately explained its
rationale for imposing sentence, and the reasons relied upon are
proper bases for the sentence imposed.

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Accordingly, we conclude that Pressley’s sentence was
reasonable. Pressley filed a pro se supplemental brief
requesting a lower sentence because the charges against her that
constituted Grade A violations were dismissed. In accordance
with Anders, we have reviewed the issues Pressley raises in her
informal brief and the record in this case and have found no
meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm Pressley’s
conviction and sentence. This court requires that counsel
inform Pressley, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If
Pressley requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes
that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation.
Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof was served on
Pressley.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED

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