Anthony Savage v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources; Theresa Haught

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 12-2103
ANTHONY SAVAGE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
WEST VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN RESOURCES;
THERESA HAUGHT,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern
District of West Virginia, at Wheeling. John Preston Bailey,
Chief District Judge. (5:10-cv-00126-JPB)
Submitted: April 30, 2013 Decided: June 6, 2013
Before WILKINSON, DIAZ, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Paul T. Tucker, GROVE & DELK, PLLC, Wheeling, West Virginia, for
Appellant. David L. Wyant, Thomas E. Buck, Diane G. W.
Senakievich, BAILEY & WYANT, PLLC, Wheeling, West Virginia, for
Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Anthony Savage, an African-American, filed a complaint
in state court against his employer, the West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources, and Theresa Haught
(collectively, “Defendants”) alleging (1) racial discrimination
in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2006); (2) racial discrimination in
violation of the West Virginia Human Rights Act, W. Va. Code
§ 5-11-1 et seq. (1979), and (3) retaliatory conduct in
contravention of substantial public policies of the state of
West Virginia. Defendants subsequently removed the action to
federal court. Shortly thereafter, Savage abandoned his federal
claims for race discrimination under Title VII and sought remand
to the state court. The district court in its discretion denied
Savage’s motion to remand, exercised supplemental jurisdiction
over the state claims, and ultimately granted Defendants’ motion
for summary judgment. On appeal, Savage argues the district
court abused its discretion in denying his motion to remand to
state court and erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants
on his state law employment discrimination claims.* We affirm.
* Savage does not contest the district court’s grant of
summary judgment to Defendants on his disparate impact and
retaliation claims.

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Savage first claims that the district court erred in
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims
after he abandoned his federal claims in his amended complaint.
District courts have supplemental jurisdiction over state law
claims that “form part of the same case or controversy” as the
federal claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006). Once the district
court dismissed all the claims over which it had original
jurisdiction, the district court had “wide latitude in
determining whether or not to retain jurisdiction over [the]
state claims.” Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir.
1995); see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), (c)(3) (2006). In exercising
its discretion, the district court should consider “convenience
and fairness to the parties, the existence of any underlying
issues of federal policy, comity, and considerations of judicial
economy.” Shanaghan, 58 F.3d at 110 (citing Carnegie-Mellon
Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)). Upon review, we
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
retaining supplemental jurisdiction over Savage’s state law
claims.
Savage next contends the district court erred in
granting summary judgment to Defendants on his state law claim
that he was denied a promotion on account of his race. We
review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
viewing the facts and drawing reasonable inferences in the light

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most favorable to the non-moving party. PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead
Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 2011). Summary
judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Only
disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). To withstand a motion for summary judgment,
the non-moving party must produce competent evidence to reveal
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
See Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th
Cir. 2002) (“Conclusory or speculative allegations do not
suffice, nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of
[the non-moving party’s] case.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
Having reviewed the record and the parties’ arguments
on appeal, we conclude that the district court did not err in
its determination that, even assuming Savage could make out a
prima facie case of discrimination, Savage could not demonstrate
that his employer’s proffered non-discriminatory reasons for its
promotion decision was pretextual. To the extent Savage argues
that the interviewing panel deliberately violated mandatory

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state law by refusing to consider performance evaluations, we
conclude this argument is without merit.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED

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