United States of America v. Stephanie Newton

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-4598
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
STEPHANIE NEWTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Big Stone Gap. James P. Jones,
District Judge. (2:10-cr-00016-JPJ-PMS-1)
Submitted: October 25, 2011 Decided: November 4, 2011
Before SHEDD, DUNCAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
A. Benton Chafin, Jr., CHAFIN LAW FIRM, P.C., Lebanon, Virginia,
for Appellant. Timothy J. Heaphy, United States Attorney,
Allessandra Stewart, Special Assistant United States Attorney,
Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Stephanie Newton (“Newton”) appeals the district
court’s judgment entered pursuant to a jury verdict convicting
her of four offenses: (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute and to distribute Xanax, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(b)(1)(c), 841(b)(1)(E)(i), and 846 (2006) (“Count One”);
(2) obstruction of an official proceeding, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1512(c) (2006); (3) conspiracy to obstruct an official
proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2006); and
(4) making a materially false statement to a government agency,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) (2006). Newton now
contends that the district court erred in denying her Rule 29
motion for judgment of acquittal because the evidence was
insufficient to sustain each of her convictions. We reject her
arguments and affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s decision to deny
a motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Hickman,
626 F.3d 756, 762-63 (4th Cir. 2010). Where such a motion
alleges insufficiency of the evidence, we must sustain the
jury’s verdict if, viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the government, “any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 367
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 271 (2010). In making this

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determination, we review the record to determine whether the
conviction is supported by “substantial evidence,” where
“substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable finder of
fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a
conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Hickman, 626 F.3d at 763. Because the credibility of witnesses
is properly assessed by the jury rather than by this court on
appeal, we cannot make our own credibility determinations but
must assume that the jury resolved all testimonial
contradictions in the government’s favor. United States v.
Penniegraft, 641 F.3d 566, 572 (4th Cir. 2011). Thus, a
defendant bringing a sufficiency challenge bears “a heavy
burden,” and reversal for insufficient evidence “is reserved for
the rare case where the prosecution’s failure is clear.” United
States v. Ashley, 606 F.3d 135, 138 (4th Cir.) (internal
quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 428 (2010).
I. Count One
Newton first asserts that there was insufficient
evidence to convict her on Count One. Newton’s counsel contends
that the evidence was insufficient only because the testimony of
Newton’s adoptive brother, Kenneth Newton (“Kenneth”), was
uncorroborated and inconsistent with his grand jury testimony.
This argument is without merit. The uncorroborated testimony of

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a single witness or accomplice may be sufficient to support a
guilty verdict. United States v. Wilson, 115 F.3d 1185, 1190
(4th Cir. 1997). Although Newton points to Kenneth’s
inconsistent statements and significant criminal history as
reasons to doubt his testimony, the credibility of his testimony
is a matter to be determined solely by the jury, not by this
court on appellate review. United States v. Lowe, 65 F.3d 1137,
1142 (4th Cir. 1995). Because we must assume that the jury
credited Kenneth’s testimony, we decline Newton’s request that
we independently reevaluate its weight. Penniegraft, 641 F.3d
at 572.
II. Conspiracy to Obstruct and Obstructing an Official
Proceeding
Newton next argues that the evidence adduced at trial
was insufficient to convict her for obstructing an official
proceeding for her role in informing her adoptive sister, Thelma
Newton (“Thelma”), that law enforcement officials were planning
to execute numerous arrest and search warrants on February 4,
2010. Newton claims that the record is devoid of evidence that
she knew about the raid prior to its occurrence. The pertinent
statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(2), criminalizes conduct that
“corruptly . . . obstructs, influences, or impedes any official
proceeding.” A defendant acts corruptly where she acts with the

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purpose of wrongfully impeding the due administration of
justice. United States v. Matthews, 505 F.3d 698, 706 (7th Cir.
2007). See also United States v. Brooks, 111 F.3d 365, 373 (4th
Cir. 1997).
As the Government correctly points out, it had no
obligation to prove exactly how Newton learned that the warrants
were going to be executed on February 4. One of the targets of
the warrants, Creed Logsdon, testified at trial that Thelma
warned him about the pending raids on the basis of information
received from Newton. The homes and individuals targeted by the
warrants were also implicated in the larger drug conspiracies in
which Newton’s friends and family——including both Kenneth and
Thelma——were involved. Moreover, as a consequence of the
information relayed by Newton, the arrests of several of the
suspects, including Logsdon, were delayed, and Logsdon was able
to sweep his residence clean of evidence inculpating him in
criminal activity. In these circumstances, we conclude that the
evidence was sufficient to support Newton’s conviction under
§ 1512(c)(2) for obstructing an official proceeding.
With respect to her conviction of conspiracy to
obstruct an official proceeding, Newton argues that there is
simply no evidence that she agreed with Thelma or any other
person to warn the targets of the impending raids. Of course,
“[s]ustaining a conspiracy conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 371

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requires that the government prove: (1) an agreement between
two or more people to commit a crime, and (2) an overt act in
furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v. Ellis, 121
F.3d 908, 922 (4th Cir. 1997). The existence of a “tacit or
mutual understanding” between conspirators is sufficient
evidence of a conspiratorial agreement. United States v.
Chorman, 910 F.2d 102, 109 (4th Cir. 1990). “A conspiracy may
be inferred from circumstantial evidence that can reasonably be
interpreted as participation in the common plan.” Id.
“Circumstantial evidence sufficient to support a conspiracy
conviction need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence, provided the summation of the evidence permits a
conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Burgos, 94 F.3d
at 858.
Our review of the evidence in this case persuades us
that Newton’s claim must fail. Again, Logsdon testified that
Thelma had received her information from Newton. The evidence
at trial showed that Thelma and Newton were close relatives who
had both been illegally providing prescription drugs to their
brother or other persons who were targeted in the search
warrants. An unusually high percentage of the targets of the
February 4 warrants managed temporarily to evade the efforts of
law enforcement. Moreover, Newton never objected at trial to
the admission of Martha Jessup’s grand jury testimony, which

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indicated that Newton frequently tipped Thelma with advance
notice of planned law enforcement actions. In our view, this
array of circumstantial evidence suffices to demonstrate
Newton’s participation with Thelma in a common plan intended to
blunt the efficacy of law enforcement investigations into the
criminal activities of their compatriots. Chorman, 910 F.2d at
109.
III. Making a Materially False Statement to a Federal
Agency
Finally, Newton claims that insufficient evidence
supports her conviction for making a materially false statement
to a federal agency. A person is guilty of making false
statements to a government agency when the government proves:
(1) that the defendant made a false statement to a governmental
agency or concealed a fact from it or used a false document
knowing it to be false; (2) the defendant acted knowingly or
willfully; and (3) the false statement or concealed fact or
false document was material to a matter within the jurisdiction
of the agency. United States v. Sarihifard, 155 F.3d 301, 306
(4th Cir. 1998). In determining whether a statement is
material, it is irrelevant whether the false statement actually
influenced or affected the decision-making process of the agency
or fact finding body. Sarihifard, 155 F.3d at 307. Instead, a

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statement is material “if it has a natural tendency to
influence, or is capable of influencing, the decision-making
body to which it was addressed.” United States v. Littleton, 76
F.3d 614, 618 (4th Cir. 1996). A false statement’s capacity to
influence the fact finder must be measured at the point in time
that the statement was uttered. Sarihifard, 155 F.3d at 307.
Contrary to Newton’s assertions, we are convinced that
either of Newton’s statements to Special Agent Levesque suffices
to support her conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). The
evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that the statements were
false, and both of the false representations made by Newton had
the capacity to influence Levesque’s ongoing investigation.
Sarihifard, 155 F.3d at 307. As a result, sufficient evidence
supports her conviction under § 1001.
We therefore affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED

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