Veta L. Rountree v. City of Portsmouth, a municipality

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-2301
VETA L. ROUNTREE,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
CITY OF PORTSMOUTH, a municipality and political
subdivision of the Commonwealth of Virginia,
Defendant – Appellee,
and
JANEY CULPEPPER, in her official capacity as Interim
Assessor for the City of Portsmouth, Virginia; MARIA
KATTMANN, in her official capacity as former Assessor City
of Portsmouth, Virginia; ALETHIA C BRYCE, in her official
capacity as former Assessor City of Portsmouth, Virginia,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Robert G. Doumar, Senior
District Judge. (2:11-cv-00106-RGD-DEM)
Submitted: June 29, 2012 Decided: July 6, 2012
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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Wayne Marcus Scriven, SCRIVEN LAW OFFICES, Virginia Beach,
Virginia, for Appellant. James A. Cales, III, Alan B. Rashkind,
FURNISS, DAVIS, RASHKIND & SAUNDERS, P.C., Norfolk, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Veta L. Rountree appeals the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to the City of Portsmouth, Virginia
(“the City”), in her civil action under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (West 2003 & Supp. 2012), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981, 1981a, 1983 (2006), the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, as amended, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 621-34 (West
2008 & Supp. 2012), the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
(“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-54 (West 2009 & Supp. 2012), and
Virginia law. On appeal, Rountree challenges the district
court’s grant of summary judgment to the City on her claims
under Title VII and § 1981 for discrimination on the basis of
race, claims under Title VII and the FMLA for retaliation, claim
under § 1983 for deprivation of a property interest, and claim
for breach of contract under Virginia law. Finding no
reversible error, we affirm.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, drawing reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. PBM Prods., LLC v. Mead
Johnson & Co., 639 F.3d 111, 119 (4th Cir. 2011). Summary
judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Only

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disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit
under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of
summary judgment.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 248 (1986). To withstand a motion for summary judgment,
the non-moving party must produce competent evidence to reveal
the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for
trial. See Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645,
649 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Conclusory or speculative allegations do
not suffice, nor does a mere scintilla of evidence in support of
[the non-moving party’s] case.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
After review of the record and the parties’ briefs, we
conclude that the district court did not err in granting summary
judgment to the City. With respect to her claims for
discrimination on the basis of race, Rountree does not directly
challenge in her briefs the district court’s determinations that
she failed to establish that derogatory comments regarding her
race and skin shading were pervasive, affected the terms of her
employment, or could be imputed to the City, and we reject as
wholly without merit Rountree’s appellate arguments challenging
the court’s disposition of these claims. We also reject as
wholly unsupported by the evidence of record Rountree’s
appellate challenge to the district court’s disposition of her
claim under Title VII for retaliation. Rountree’s claim under

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the FMLA for retaliation fails because she does not offer any
evidence from which a factfinder could conclude that there was a
connection between any FMLA-authorized leave she may have taken
and the termination of her employment or any harassment she
experienced at work. See Yashenko v. Harrah’s NC Casino Co.,
LLC, 446 F.3d 541, 550-51 (4th Cir. 2006) (listing the elements
of a prima facie case under the FMLA for retaliation).
We further reject as meritless Rountree’s appellate
challenge to the district court’s disposition of her § 1983
claim. Her challenge is unsupported by the evidence of record,
and she fails to present an appellate argument that she was
unconstitutionally deprived of any property interest in this
case. Rountree’s claim for breach of contract fails because no
evidence of record rebuts the presumption under Virginia law
that her employment relationship with the City was at-
will. Cnty. of Giles v. Wines, 546 S.E.2d 721, 723 (Va. 2001).
Finally, we reject as wholly without merit Rountree’s remaining
extraneous arguments for overturning the district court’s
judgment.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal

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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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