Linda Matarese; Domenic Matarese v. Archstone Communities, LLC

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1973
LINDA MATARESE; DOMENIC MATARESE,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
ARCHSTONE COMMUNITIES, LLC; SMITH PROPERTY HOLDINGS PARC VISTA,
LLC; MALCOLM MCGREGOR; MITCHELL MANN; AMILCAR GARCIA,
Defendants – Appellants,
and
ARCHSTONE PENTAGON CITY, f/k/a Parc Vista; ARCHSTONE MULTIFAMILY
SERIES I TRUST; ARCHSTONE; DEEQA NUR; KATRINA WOOD,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Gerald Bruce Lee, District
Judge. (1:09-cv-00857-GBL-JFA)
Submitted: February 23, 2012 Decided: February 28, 2012
Before MOTZ, DUNCAN, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Michael P. DeGrandis, Stuart Alan Raphael, HUNTON & WILLIAMS,
LLP, McLean, Virginia, for Appellants. Linda & Domenic

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Matarese, Appellees Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Archstone Apartment building residents Linda and
Domenic Matarese, a married couple, brought a civil action
against the Archstone Apartment building owner and managers
(collectively, “Archstone”), alleging disability discrimination
in violation of the Fair Housing Act (“FHA”), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601 — 3631 (2006) and Virginia Fair Housing Law (“VFHL”),
Va. Code Ann. §§ 36-96.1 — 36-96.23 (2000). Mrs. Matarese
alleged that her chemical sensitivities qualify her as
handicapped under the FHA and VFHL.
After a partial grant of Archstone’s motion for
summary judgment, the court held a six-day bench trial
addressing the Matareses’ remaining claims. The district court
found that Mrs. Matarese did not have a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limited one or more of her major
life activities, but that because Archstone regarded her as
having such an impairment and discriminated against her on that
basis, the Matareses were entitled to damages. 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(f)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 3602(h). In addition to awarding
attorneys fees, costs, and compensatory damages to the
Matareses, the district court also awarded punitive damages as
well as equitable and injunctive relief.
On appeal, Archstone argues that the district court
erred in (1) finding that Archstone “regarded” Mrs. Matarese as

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suffering from a physical or mental impairment substantially
limiting one or more of her major life activities; (2) awarding
punitive damages; and (3) requiring Archstone to provide
reasonable accommodations, given that the district court found,
and neither party now disputes, that Mrs. Matarese is not
handicapped.1 Under the FHA, it is unlawful to discriminate in
the rental, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to
a renter because of a handicap of the renter. 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(f)(1). The FHA defines “handicap” as (1) a physical or
mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such
person’s major life activities; (2) a record of having such an
impairment; or (3) being regarded as having such an impairment.
42 U.S.C. § 3602(h).2 Because “handicap” is clearly defined to
include “being regarded as” suffering from a physical or mental
impairment substantially limiting one or more of her major life
activities, and because there is sufficient evidence in the
record supporting the finding that Archstone regarded Mrs.
Matarese as having such an impairment, we conclude that the
district court did not err in finding that Archstone regarded
1 On appeal, the Matareses do not dispute the district
court’s finding that Mrs. Matarese does not, in fact, suffer
from a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more of her major life activities.
2 The VFHL largely tracks the FHA; accordingly, the parallel
claims are analyzed under the same standards.

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Mrs. Matarese as having such an impairment, even though she
actually did not. We further determine that, given Archstone’s
treatment of the Matareses, the district court did not err in
awarding punitive damages.
However, because we hold that the district court’s
award of injunctive and equitable relief requires Archstone to
do nothing more than follow the law it is already required to
follow, we vacate that portion of the judgment. See United
States v. Grand Labs, Inc., 174 F.3d 960, 965 (8th Cir. 1999)
(“An injunction should not ordinarily issue simply because a law
has been violated.”). We deny the Matareses’ motion to dismiss
the appeal as untimely. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART;
VACATED IN PART

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