Lorenda Moody; Clarence Weefur v. the Arc of Howard County, Incorporated; Debbie Wagner; Naomi Lyvers

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1720
LORENDA MOODY; CLARENCE WEEFUR,
Plaintiffs – Appellants,
JASON OSTENDORF,
Appellant,
v.
THE ARC OF HOWARD COUNTY, INCORPORATED; DEBBIE WAGNER;
NAOMI LYVERS,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. James K. Bredar, District Judge.
(1:09-cv-03228-JKB)
Submitted: March 29, 2012 Decided: April 10, 2012
Before KING and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jason Ostendorf, LAW OFFICE OF JASON OSTENDORF, LLC, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellants. Andrew S. Cabana, JACKSON LEWIS, LLP,
Reston, Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
The Arc of Howard County, Inc. (“The Arc”), provides
support, services, and advocacy for children and adults with
developmental disabilities. Lorenda Moody and Clarence Weefur
were employed by the Arc as program specialists on the Arc’s
Senior Day Program. They were at will employees. Following an
incident in which Moody and Weefur lost track, for several
hours, of a developmentally disabled senior citizen for whom
they were responsible, both Moody and Weefur were terminated.
Following their termination, Weefur and Moody filed a
complaint in the district court alleging that their employer
engaged in age discrimination in violation of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), as amended,
29 U.S.C. §§ 621 to 634 (2006). The complaint named as
defendants The Arc, Debbie Wagner, and Naomi Lyvers.
The district court granted summary judgment to the
Defendants, and after conducting a separate hearing, imposed
sanctions on Plaintiffs’ counsel in the amount of $5000.
Weefur, Moody and counsel timely appealed. We affirm.

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Appellants raise two claims: that the district court
erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Arc* and that
the district court erred in imposing sanctions on counsel.
We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment
de novo, drawing reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. United States v. Bergbauer,
602 F.3d 569, 574 (4th Cir. 2010). Summary judgment may be
granted only when “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The relevant inquiry on summary judgment is “whether
the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one
party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). An otherwise
“properly supported motion for summary judgment” will not be
defeated by the existence of merely any factual dispute, no
matter how minor; rather, “[o]nly disputes over facts that might
affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will
properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. at
247-48. To withstand a summary judgment motion, the non-moving
* Moody and Weefur have abandoned their claims against the
individual defendants on appeal.

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party must produce competent evidence sufficient to reveal the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial. See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1); Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co.,
312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002). Neither conclusory
allegations, speculative scaffolding of one inference upon
another, nor the production of a “mere scintilla of evidence” in
support of a nonmovant’s case suffices to forestall summary
judgment. Id.; Beale v. Hardy, 769 F.2d 213, 214 (4th Cir.
1985). Instead, this court will uphold the district court’s
grant of summary judgment unless it finds that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party on the evidence
presented. See EEOC v. Cent. Wholesalers, Inc., 573 F.3d 167,
174-75 (4th Cir. 2009).
Absent direct evidence of intentional discrimination,
Title VII and ADEA claims are analyzed under the burden-shifting
framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973) (disparate treatment claims under Title
VII); Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 333-35 (4th Cir. 2004)
(applying McDonnell-Douglas framework to ADEA claims). In order
to state a prima facie claim of discrimination, a plaintiff must
show that: he is a member of a protected class; he suffered an
adverse employment action; at the time of the action, he was
performing his job satisfactorily; and similarly situated
employees outside the protected class were treated more

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favorably. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Hill v. Lockheed
Martin Logistics Mgmt., Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 285 (4th Cir. 2004).
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the
district court correctly determined that Weefur and Moody failed
to make a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas
framework. Under any assessment of the facts, they simply
failed to demonstrate that they were performing their jobs
satisfactorily, that similarly situated employees outside the
protected class were treated more favorably, or that their age
had any nexus whatsoever to their termination.
This court reviews a district court’s decision
regarding the imposition of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 sanctions for
abuse of discretion. Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 410
(4th Cir. 1999). The primary purpose of Rule 11 is to punish
violators and deter parties and their counsel from pursuing
unnecessary or unmeritorious litigation. Cf. Cabell v. Petty,
810 F.2d 463, 467 (4th Cir. 1987) (requiring the district court
to impose sanctions on remand “that will serve the essential
goal of education and deterence underlying Rule 11”). The
sanction must be sufficient but not more than necessary to deter
similar, future conduct and may include monetary penalties.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c); In re Kunstler, 914 F.2d 505, 524 (4th
Cir. 1990). Our review of the record indicates that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing

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sanctions; counsel, despite adequate warning of the possibility
of sanctions, repeatedly pursued frivolous claims in violation
of Rule 11.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the
district court. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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