Human Resource Certification Institute v. Human Resources Professional Association

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1205
HUMAN RESOURCE CERTIFICATION INSTITUTE,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
v.
HUMAN RESOURCES PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATION,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District
Judge. (1:10-cv-00822-LO-JFA)
Submitted: October 31, 2011 Decided: November 16, 2011
Before AGEE and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David J. Sensenig, GAVIN LAW OFFICES, PLC, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellant. H. Scott Johnson, Jr., Angela H. France, PCT LAW
GROUP, PLLC, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Human Resource Certification Institute (“HRCI”)
appeals the district court’s order granting Defendant’s motion
to dismiss its civil action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) for
lack of personal jurisdiction. On appeal, HRCI argues that the
district court erred in determining that it failed to make a
prima facie showing of specific personal jurisdiction over the
Defendant. HRCI also maintains that Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2)
provides an alternative basis for jurisdiction. For the reasons
that follow, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
When personal jurisdiction is challenged under Rule
12(b)(2), the jurisdictional question is resolved by the judge,
with the burden on the plaintiff ultimately to prove grounds for
jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. Mylan Labs.,
Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., 2 F.3d 56, 59-60 (4th Cir. 1993). When the
district court addresses the question of personal jurisdiction
on the basis of the motion papers, legal memoranda, allegations
in the complaint, and the jurisdictional discovery, the facts
are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
and we determine de novo whether the plaintiff made a prima
facie showing of personal jurisdiction. Mitrano v. Hawes, 377
F.3d 402, 406 (4th Cir. 2004); Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673,
676 (4th Cir. 1989).

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To establish personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant through a state long-arm statute, a court must first
determine that jurisdiction is authorized by state law; if so,
the court must next decide whether exercising personal
jurisdiction would be consistent with due process. Consulting
Eng’rs Corp. v. Geometric Ltd., 561 F.3d 273, 277 (4th Cir.
2009). Virginia’s long-arm statute extends personal
jurisdiction to the limits allowed by the Due Process Clause.
Id. Thus, our statutory inquiry merges with our constitutional
inquiry. Id. A court’s exercise of jurisdiction over a
non-resident defendant comports with due process if the
defendant has “minimum contacts” with the forum, such that to
require the defendant to defend its interests in that state
“does not offend traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310, 316 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted).
When a non-resident defendant’s contacts with the
forum state form the basis for the suit, they may establish
“specific jurisdiction” in the forum state. Carefirst of Md.,
Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 397
(4th Cir. 2003). In determining whether specific jurisdiction
exists, the court considers (1) the extent to which the
defendant has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities in the state; (2) whether the plaintiff’s

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claims arise out of those activities directed at the state; and
(3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be
constitutionally reasonable. Id. After review of the record,
we agree with the district court that HRCI failed to make the
requisite prima facie showing of specific personal jurisdiction.
We also conclude that HRCI fails to show that the
Defendant is subject to jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(k)(2). “Rule 4(k)(2) is in essence a federal long-arm
statute.” Saudi v. Northrop Grumman Corp., 427 F.3d 271, 275
(4th Cir. 2005). For jurisdiction to exist under the rule,
three requirements must be met: first, the suit must arise
under federal law; second, the defendant must not be subject to
personal jurisdiction in any state; and third, the defendant
must have contacts with the United States consistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States. Id. With respect
to the third prong, the relevant question is whether the
defendant’s “contacts with the United States as a whole support
the exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the Constitution
and laws of the United States.” Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v.
OJSC “Novokuznetsky Aluminum Factory”, 283 F.3d 208, 215
(4th Cir. 2002). In other words, the defendant must have
contacts with the United States as a whole sufficient to satisfy
the standards for either specific jurisdiction or general
jurisdiction. Saudi, 427 F.3d at 275-76. After reviewing the

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record as a whole, we conclude that HRCI cannot meet the third
prong of this test because the record does not support the
conclusion that the Defendant purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities in the United States.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED

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