Lynn M. Vincent v. Lucent Technologies, Incorporated; Lucent Retirement Income Plan

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 11-1048
LYNN M. VINCENT,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES, INCORPORATED; LUCENT RETIREMENT INCOME
PLAN,
Defendants - Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen,
Senior District Judge. (3:07-cv-00240-GCM)
Submitted: June 17, 2011 Decided: July 26, 2011
Before DAVIS and DIAZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John Houston Pope, EPSTEIN BECKER & GREEN, P.C., New York, New
York, for Appellants. Edward G. Connette, Norris Arden Adams,
II, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Defendants Lucent Technologies, Inc. and Lucent
Retirement Income Plan (collectively Lucent) appeal from the
district court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff
Lynn Vincent (Vincent) on her ERISA*
On appeal, Lucent argues the district court erred by
granting Vincent injunctive relief based upon certain language
in the Plan,
claim granting her
injunctive relief: (1) ordering Lucent to allow her to reenter
the Lucent Service Based Pension Program (SBPP) upon her
repaying her lump sum distribution and (2) to give her earned
service credit, in the SBPP, from September 1, 2001 forward.
The SBPP is part of the Lucent Retirement Income Plan (the
Plan).
i.e., Section 6.6, to which Vincent, during the
administrative review process, did not direct the attention of
either the Plan Administrator or the Lucent Employee Benefits
Committee, which committee performs the final review for claims
arising under the Plan. Next, Lucent argues that, assuming
arguendo
* See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974,
§ 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (empowering plan
participant or beneficiary “to recover benefits due to him under
the terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under the terms of
the plan, or to clarify his rights to future benefits under the
terms of the plan . . .”).
the district court properly considered the

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applicability of Section 6.6, the district court abused its
discretion by deciding an issue of plan interpretation de novo,
without remanding the issue to the Plan Administrator. Finally,
Lucent argues that, assuming arguendo
Having considered the parties’ briefs, the record, and
the applicable law, we find no reversible error. We affirm on
the reasoning of the district court as set forth in its
carefully crafted order.
the district court
properly considered the applicability of Section 6.6 and
properly engaged in its construction without deferring to the
Plan Administrator, the district court erred in its construction
of Section 6.6.
See Vincent v. Lucent Techs., Inc.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
,
733 F. Supp. 2d 729 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 24, 2010).
AFFIRMED

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