United States of America v. James Irvin Weaks, a/k/a Little Weaks

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4832
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JAMES IRVIN WEAKS, a/k/a Little Weaks,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. N. Carlton Tilley,
Jr., Senior District Judge. (1:09-cr-00308-NCT-1)
Submitted: March 24, 2011 Decided: April 4, 2011
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, William S.
Trivette, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Randall Stuart Galyon, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
James Irvin Weaks appeals the 218-month sentence
imposed following his guilty plea to one count of possession
with intent to distribute cocaine base, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (2006) (“Count One”), and one
count of possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)
(2006) (“Count Three”). Counsel for Weaks filed a brief in this
court in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), certifying that there are no non-frivolous issues for
appeal, but questioning whether the district court imposed an
unreasonable sentence. Weaks filed a pro se supplemental brief
claiming that the district court imposed an unreasonable
sentence on Count One based upon the enhanced penalties made
available by 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) to defendants with prior
felony drug convictions. Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.
Because Weaks did not request a different sentence
than the one ultimately imposed, we review his sentence for
plain error. See United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 578-79
(4th Cir. 2010) (unpreserved sentencing errors reviewed only for
plain error). We begin by reviewing the sentence for
significant procedural error, including such errors as “failing
to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range,

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treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the
[18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [2006] factors, selecting a sentence based
on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the
chosen sentence including an explanation for any deviation from
the Guidelines.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
If there are no procedural errors, we then consider the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence, taking into account
the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Pauley, 511
F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007).
“When rendering a sentence, the district court ‘must
make an individualized assessment based on the facts
presented.’” United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th
Cir. 2009) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at 50). Accordingly, a
sentencing court must apply the relevant § 3553(a) factors to
the particular facts presented and must “state in open court”
the particular reasons that support its chosen sentence. Id.
The court’s explanation need not be exhaustive; it must be
“sufficient ‘to satisfy the appellate court that [the district
court] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned
basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.’”
United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 837 (4th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)).
We hold that the district court committed neither
procedural nor substantive error during sentencing. The

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district court used the correct advisory Guidelines range and
explained its reasoning, considering both parties’ arguments and
the § 3553(a) factors.
Weaks objects to the elevation of his statutory
minimum on Count One to ten years’ imprisonment on the basis of
his prior North Carolina drug conviction, arguing that it should
not have been classified as a felony drug conviction for
purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) because he was only subject
to an eight-month maximum sentence for the North Carolina
conviction. See 21 U.S.C. § 802(44) (2006) (defining “felony
drug offense” as “an offense punishable by imprisonment for more
than one year under any law of the United States or of a
State”). We hold that, regardless of whether Weaks’ prior
conviction qualifies as a felony drug offense under Carachur-
Rosendo v. Holder, 130 S. Ct. 2577 (2010), the district court’s
application of a ten-year statutory minimum on Count One was not
plain error. Weaks’ Guidelines range on Count One was higher
than and unaffected by the ten-year statutory minimum, and the
district court explicitly stated that it believed a sentence in
the middle of the Guidelines range was appropriate. Because
Weaks cannot show that any error in classifying his prior North
Carolina conviction was plain or affected his substantial
rights, Lynn, 592 U.S. at 577, we conclude that the district
court did not commit plain error.

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In accordance with Anders, we have examined the entire
record and find no other meritorious issues for appeal. We
therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Weaks, in writing, of the right to
petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If Weaks requests that a petition be filed, but counsel
believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel
may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on Weaks.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional
process.
AFFIRMED

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