United States of America v. Randolph Lee McNeill

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4126
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
RANDOLPH LEE MCNEILL,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle,
District Judge. (5:09-cr-00080-BO-1)
Submitted: March 18, 2011 Decided: March 24, 2011
Before KING, GREGORY, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Seth A. Neyhart, STARK LAW GROUP, PLLC, Chapel Hill, North
Carolina, for Appellant. George E.B. Holding, United States
Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Randolph Lee McNeill appeals his conviction after a
jury trial for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924 (2006). On appeal,
McNeill asserts that the district court erred in failing to
instruct the jury on the affirmative defense of justification
and in denying his Fed. R. Crim. P. 29 motions for judgment of
acquittal. We affirm.
“A defendant is entitled to an instruction as to any
recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient
for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.” United States v.
Ricks, 573 F.3d 198, 200 (4th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation
marks and alteration omitted). “A district court’s refusal to
instruct the jury on such a defense presents a question of law
that we review de novo.” Id. This court has also recognized
that if “‘an affirmative defense consists of several elements
and testimony supporting one element is insufficient to sustain
it even if believed, the trial court and jury need not be
burdened with testimony supporting other elements of the
defense.’” United States v. Sarno, 24 F.3d 618, 621 (4th Cir.
1994) (quoting United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 416
(1980)). Our review of the record convinces us that the
district court correctly concluded that the evidence was
insufficient to merit instructing the jury on the justification

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defense. See United States v. Crittendon, 883 F.2d 326, 330
(4th Cir. 1989).
Additionally, we review de novo the district court’s
denial of a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal. United
States v. Reid, 523 F.3d 310, 317 (4th Cir. 2008). We will
uphold the jury’s verdict “if, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the government, it is supported by substantial
evidence.” Id. “Substantial evidence is evidence that a
reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and
sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
In reviewing for substantial evidence, this court considers both
circumstantial and direct evidence and allows the government all
reasonable inferences from the facts shown to those sought to be
established. United States v. Harvey, 532 F.3d 326, 333
(4th Cir. 2008).
To convict McNeill of violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1),
the Government was required to prove that (1) he was previously
convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment
exceeding one year; (2) he knowingly possessed, transported, or
received a firearm; and (3) the possession was in or affecting
commerce, because the firearm had traveled in interstate or
foreign commerce. See United States v. Langley, 62 F.3d 602,
606 (4th Cir. 1995) (en banc). At trial, McNeill stipulated

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that he previously had been convicted of a felony, and he does
not dispute on appeal that he knowingly possessed a Hi-Point
Model 995 nine-millimeter rifle. Further, our review of the
evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the Government
convinces us that substantial evidence supports the jury’s
finding that the rifle traveled in interstate commerce.
Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying McNeill’s
Rule 29 motions.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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