United States of America v. Mohammed Marga

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-4000
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MOHAMMED MARGA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(1:09-cr-00166-RDB-2)
Submitted: February 17, 2011 Decided: March 18, 2011
Before NIEMEYER, KING, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gary E. Proctor, LAW OFFICES OF GARY E. PROCTOR, LLC, Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Rachel M. Yasser, Assistant United States Attorney,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Following a jury trial, Mohammed Marga was convicted
of conspiracy to distribute, and possess with intent to
distribute, heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2006), and
possession with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21
U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (West 1999 & Supp. 2010). The
district court sentenced Marga to concurrent seventy-eight-month
terms of imprisonment. Marga timely appealed, challenging a
supplemental jury instruction given by the district court. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Marga’s co-conspirator, Edward Aboagye, pled guilty
pursuant to a plea agreement and subsequently agreed to testify
against Marga. The Government introduced Aboagye’s plea
agreement into evidence without objection. This plea agreement
contained stipulations of fact concerning the events that led to
Aboagye’s and Marga’s arrests.
After the jury began deliberations, it sent the court
a note asking how Aboagye’s plea agreement applied to Marga’s
case and whether the stipulations in Aboagye’s plea agreement
applied to Marga. The court answered:
[W]ith respect to the statement of facts in the plea
agreement, the plea agreement having been introduced
into evidence, that is just as to Mr. Aboagye’s
agreement of facts with the government. It is not in
any way binding upon the defendant, Mr. Marga. It is
what Mr. Aboagye says occurred and you can compare
that with whatever you recall his testimony to be as

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well. It is what he agrees are the facts of the
matter with the government. It is not binding upon
Mr. Marga and it is not a stipulation as to Mr. Marga
. . . . This is strictly just the agreement that
Aboagye reached with the government and what he agreed
with the government were the facts as far as he was
concerned and just as you judge his credibility in
terms of his testimony, you judge this for whatever
you desire it’s [sic] worth. But these facts here in
this plea agreement letter are not binding upon Mr.
Marga and are not agreed to by Mr. Marga.
The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court erred in
giving this instruction.
Because Marga did not object to this instruction in
the district court, it is reviewed for plain error. United
States v. Robinson, 627 F.3d 941, 953 (4th Cir. 2010). To
establish plain error, Marga must show that an error occurred,
the error was plain, and the error affected his substantial
rights. United States v. Olano
The necessity, extent, and character of supplemental
jury instructions are matters within the discretion of the
district court.
, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993).
United States v. Horton, 921 F.2d 540, 547 (4th
Cir. 1990). When evaluating the adequacy of supplemental jury
instructions, we consider “whether the court addressed the
jury’s inquiry fairly and accurately without creating
prejudice.” United States v. Martinez
Marga highlights the court’s statement that the
stipulations were “facts as far as [Aboagye] was concerned and
, 136 F.3d 972, 977 (4th
Cir. 1998).

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just as you judge his credibility in terms of his testimony, you
judge this for whatever you desire it’s [sic] worth,” and
contends that it erroneously invited the jury to draw an
inference from the stipulations that Marga was guilty. However,
“[l]anguage in jury instructions may not be viewed in
isolation.” United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 677 (4th Cir.
1996); Hardin v. Ski Venture, Inc.
At the close of evidence at the trial, the court
instructed the jury about Aboagye’s guilty plea, admonishing the
jurors not to draw conclusions or inferences about Marga’s guilt
from the fact that his co-defendant pled guilty. Additionally,
the court cautioned the jury that Aboagye’s agreement to testify
in exchange for favorable treatment from the Government might
impact his credibility, because such agreements give witnesses a
motive to testify falsely.
, 50 F.3d 1291, 1294 (4th Cir.
1995).
During deliberations, when the jury asked the court
how Aboagye’s plea agreement and the stipulations contained
therein applied to Marga’s case, the court explained that the
stipulations were Aboagye’s version of the events and emphasized
three times that they were not binding upon or agreed to by
Marga. In explaining this to the jury, the court said that the
stipulation was merely Aboagye’s version of the facts and “just
as you judge [Aboagye’s] credibility in terms of his testimony,

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you judge this [stipulation of facts] for whatever you desire
it’s [sic] worth.” We conclude that the district court’s
initial and supplemental instructions, read as a whole, properly
informed the jury that the plea agreement and stipulations were
relevant to the jury’s determination of Aboagye’s credibility;
the district court did not err, plainly or otherwise.
Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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