Peter Kalos; Veron Lee Kalos v. Greenwich Insurance Company; Wisenbaker Holdings, LLC

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 10-1959
PETER KALOS; VERON LEE KALOS,
Plaintiffs – Appellants,
v.
GREENWICH INSURANCE COMPANY; WISENBAKER HOLDINGS, LLC,
Defendants – Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. James C. Cacheris, Senior
District Judge. (1:10-cv-00841-JCC-TRJ)
Submitted: November 22, 2010 Decided: December 14, 2010
Before GREGORY, SHEDD, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Peter and Veron Lee Kalos, Appellants Pro Se. Shannon Jacob
Posner, LAW OFFICES OF SHANNON J. POSNER, PA, Sparks, Maryland,
for Appellee Greenwich Insurance Company.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
In July 2010, Peter and Veron Lee Kalos filed this
action against Greenwich Insurance Company (“Greenwich”) and
Wisenbaker Holdings, LLC, (“Wisenbaker”) seeking emergency
injunctive relief, a declaratory judgment, and “other equitable
relief relating to a cloud on title to real property.” The
Kaloses simultaneously filed a motion for emergency injunctive
relief echoing the claims in their complaint and asking the
district court to “forestall a sale or further clouding of trust
property.”
The district court held a hearing on the Kaloses’
emergency motion for injunctive relief. At the conclusion of
the hearing, the district court denied the motion, explaining
that given the numerous rulings against them, the Kaloses could
not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. The
district court also dismissed the Kaloses’ complaint with
prejudice because the claims had previously been adjudicated by
other courts. We affirm.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes
relitigation of issues that are identical to issues actually
determined and necessarily decided in prior litigation in which
the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a
full and fair opportunity to litigate. McHan v. Comm’r, 558
F.3d 326, 331 (4th Cir. 2009). Res judicata precludes the

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assertion of a claim that has already been “litigated to a final
judgment by that party or such party’s privies and precludes the
assertion by such parties of any legal theory, cause of action,
or defense which could have been asserted in that action.” Ohio
Valley Envtl. Coalition v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177, 210
(4th Cir. 2009) (quoting 18 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore’s
Federal Practice § 131.10(1)(a) (3d ed. 2008)). Application of
these doctrines constitutes a legal question that we review de
novo. See Sartin v. Macik, 535 F.3d 284, 292 (4th Cir. 2008); Q
Int’l Courier Inc. v. Smoak, 441 F.3d 214, 216 (4th Cir. 2006).
Here, the record reveals that the Kaloses have filed
numerous actions against Greenwich and Wisenbaker in state
courts, all related to the foreclosure of the property at issue
in the instant case. These claims have been conclusively
adjudicated and may not be relitigated.
Turning to the Kaloses’ request for emergency
injunctive relief, we agree with the district court that they
did not make the requisite showing. In order to obtain a
preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish “[1] that he
is likely to succeed on the merits, [2] that he is likely to
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,
[3] that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and [4] that
an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374

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(2008); Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Federal Election Comm’n,
575 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2009). The district court concluded
that the Kaloses were not entitled to injunctive relief because
they could not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the
merits. In light of the numerous adverse state court judgments
and their preclusive effects, we agree with this determination.
Nothing in the other factors causes us to reach a different
result.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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