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09-6283•United States of America v. David Michael Woodward
09-6283Court of Appeals for the Fourth CircuitOct 1, 2009
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-6283
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
DAVID MICHAEL WOODWARD,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(4:02-cr-00673-TLW-1)
Submitted: August 27, 2009 Decided: October 1, 2009
Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David Michael Woodward, Appellant Pro Se. William E. Day, II,
Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina,
Winston David Holliday, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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2
PER CURIAM:
David Michael Woodward seeks to appeal the district
court’s order granting leave to amend his successive motion
under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 2009), or petition this
court for authorization to file a successive § 2255 motion.
This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28
U.S.C. § 1291 (2006), and certain interlocutory and collateral
orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v.
Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The order
Woodward seeks to appeal is neither a final order nor an
appealable interlocutory or collateral order. Accordingly, we
deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction.* We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
DISMISSED
* Although we express no opinion on the merits of the order
Woodward seeks to appeal, we note that a resentencing under Fed.
R. Crim. P. 35(b) does not restart the clock on the one-year
limitations period for motions under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255
(West Supp. 2009). United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 144
(4th Cir. 2001).
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