United States of America v. Zarqurous Lequis Sanders, a/k/a Carwright

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 09-5088
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
ZARQUROUS LEQUIS SANDERS, a/k/a Carwright,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Henry E. Hudson, District
Judge. (3:08-cr-00332-HEH-3)
Submitted: January 25, 2011 Decided: February 11, 2011
Before KING, AGEE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Charles D. Lewis, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H.
MacBride, United States Attorney, Michael R. Gill, Assistant
United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Zarqurous Lequis Sanders appeals his 137-month prison
sentence after pleading guilty to conspiracy to obstruct, delay,
and affect commerce by robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951(a) (2006), and bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2, 2113(a) (2006). On appeal, Sanders contends that his
sentence is unreasonable because it is greater than necessary to
achieve the purposes of sentencing. We affirm.
We review a sentence imposed by the district court
under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard. See Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The first step in this
review requires us to ensure that the district court committed
no significant procedural error, such as improperly calculating
the guideline range, failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
(2006) factors, or failing to adequately explain the sentence.
United States v. Carter, 564 F.3d 325, 328 (4th Cir. 2009). We
then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence
imposed taking into account the totality of the circumstances,
including the extent of any variance, but giving due deference
to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) factors
justify the extent of the variance. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. When
we review a sentence outside the advisory guideline range —
whether as a product of a departure or a variance — we consider
whether the district court acted reasonably both with respect to

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its decision to impose such a sentence and with respect to the
extent of the divergence from the range. United States v.
Hernandez-Villanueva, 473 F.3d 118, 123 (4th Cir. 2007).
Sanders agreed to a stipulated statement of facts in
which he admitted that he committed eight bank robberies. Based
on the stipulated robberies, the probation officer determined
the combined offense level was twenty-eight by adding five
levels for more than five units pursuant to U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 3D1.4 (2008). With a three-level
reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Sanders’s total
offense level was twenty-five; and with his criminal history
category IV, his advisory guideline range was 84 to 105 months
in prison. Neither party objected to the presentence report,
and the district court adopted its findings and calculations.
The Government moved for an upward departure or
variance, contending that the advisory guideline range did not
adequately address Sanders’s conduct or criminal history, and
his criminal history category should be raised two levels from
IV to VI resulting in a sentencing range of 110 to 137 months.
Specifically, the Government asked for a one-level increase to
account for the uncounted robberies pursuant to USSG § 3D1.4
cmt. background, and another one-level increase under USSG
§ 4A1.3(a)(2) because three of Sanders’s six prior felonies were
not assigned criminal history points and his criminal history

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category substantially underrepresented the seriousness of his
criminal history and the likelihood that he would commit other
crimes. Sanders argued the Government was asking the district
court to second-guess the Sentencing Commission and the judge
who gave him a suspended sentence on four of his felonies.
The district court granted the Government’s motion and
sentenced Sanders at the top of the new range to 137 months in
prison. The court found that Sanders’s bank robbery spree
involved eight banks and $151,342, took place in five separate
states over a thirty-seven day period, and Sanders committed the
first robbery only six months after being released from prison.
The court noted commentary accompanying USSG § 3D1.4 provided
that a departure would be warranted in the unusual case where
additional offenses resulted in a total of significantly more
than five units, and the court found that the facts and
circumstances of this bank robbery spree were atypical.
Moreover, the district court found that the guidelines
as calculated did significantly underrepresent Sanders’s
criminal history and likelihood that he would commit other
crimes. He had six other prior felony convictions, five of
which were for offenses committed as recently as 2006, but he
received no criminal history points for three of them. When he
committed the bank robberies, he was on a suspended sentence,
and the court found his prior sentences had failed to promote

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respect for the law, provide for deterrence, or protect the
community. The court furthermore found the advisory guideline
range failed to serve the sentencing factors under § 3553(a).
Based on Sanders’s sustained history of criminal
activity, the number of convictions for which no criminal points
were assessed, his likelihood of continuing criminal activity,
failure of prior periods of incarceration, and the seriousness
and scope of the series of offenses before the court, the court
found the advisory guideline range failed to promote respect for
the law, provide for deterrence, and account for the nature and
circumstances of the underlying offense. In determining an
appropriate range and sentence, the court separately reviewed
the ranges for an offense level twenty-five and criminal history
category IV and V, and found each to be inadequate. The court
determined that a range of 110 to 137 months, and a sentence of
137 months, were each adequate but not longer than necessary to
achieve the sentencing objectives under § 3553(a).
After reviewing the record and giving due deference to
the district court’s decision, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion, and Sanders’s sentence is
both procedurally and substantively reasonable. The district
court acted reasonably both with respect to its decision to
sentence Sanders outside his advisory guideline range, and with
respect to the extent of its divergence from that range.

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We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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