United States of America v. Jerome Kinte Farmer

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4892
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff – Appellee,
v.
JEROME KINTE FARMER,
Defendant – Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard,
Senior District Judge. (5:02-cr-00312-H-1)
Submitted: July 10, 2009 Decided: July 20, 2009
Before WILKINSON, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne
M. Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States
Attorneys, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Jerome Kinte Farmer appeals his sentence to twenty-
four months in prison imposed in the district court’s judgment
revoking supervised release. On appeal, Farmer does not
challenge the district court’s finding that he violated the
conditions of his supervised release, but he contends that his
sentence is plainly unreasonable. We affirm.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory
range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v. Crudup,
461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). We first consider whether
the sentence is procedurally or substantively unreasonable. Id.
at 438. While a district court must consider the Chapter 7
policy statements, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual Ch. 7, Pt.
B (2007), and the statutory requirements and factors applicable
to revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a), 3583(e)
(2006), the district court ultimately has broad discretion to
revoke the previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment
up to the statutory maximum. Id. at 438-39. Only if we find
the sentence procedurally or substantively unreasonable, must we
decide whether it is “plainly” unreasonable. Id. at 439.
The district court properly determined that Farmer’s
Chapter 7 policy statement range was twenty-four months. See 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2006); USSG § 7B1.4. In imposing its
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sentence, the district court noted that it had considered the
policy statements in Chapter 7, and the court sentenced Farmer
to twenty-four months in prison. While Farmer acknowledges his
sentence “comported with the advisory guideline imprisonment,”
he contends it “contravenes the policy articulated in Chapter 7,
and the sentence is therefore plainly unreasonable.”
Specifically, Farmer argues his sentence runs afoul of
Chapter 7 commentary explaining a revocation sentence “should
sanction primarily the defendant’s breach of trust, while taking
into account, to a limited degree, the seriousness of the
underlying violation and the criminal history of the violator.”
See USSG ch. 7, pt. A, cmt. 3(b). We disagree. The same
commentary notes revocation policy statements provide “for three
broad grades of violations [that] permit proportionally longer
terms for more serious violations.” Id. It is undisputed that
Farmer’s most serious violation was Grade A, and with a criminal
history category IV and two-year statutory maximum, his Chapter
7 range was twenty-four months. We conclude Farmer’s sentence
comports with Chapter 7 and is not plainly unreasonable.
We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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