United States of America v. Angel Acevedo, a/k/a Angel Rico, a/k/a Angel Acevedo Rico

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4612
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ANGEL ACEVEDO, a/k/a Angel Rico, a/k/a Angel Acevedo Rico,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(4:07-cr-01281-TLW-1)
Submitted: April 20, 2010 Decided: June 11, 2010
Before NIEMEYER, GREGORY, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Andrew Mackenzie, BARRETT-MACKENZIE, LLC, Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Alfred William Walker Bethea, Jr.,
Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Angel Acevedo timely appeals from the fifty-seven
month sentence imposed following his guilty plea to one count of
possession with intent to distribute, and distribution of, 500
grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1)
and (b)(1)(B) (2006). Acevedo’s appellate counsel filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting
that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal, but
questioning whether there is conclusive evidence that Acevedo
received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Acevedo has
filed two pro se supplemental briefs raising the same
ineffective assistance claims as counsel, as well as claims that
the district court failed to adequately advise him of the weapon
enhancement during the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11
hearing, improperly calculated his offense level and Guidelines
range, and violated his Sixth Amendment rights. Finding no
error, we affirm.
In the Anders brief, Acevedo contends that his
district court counsel: (1) did not adequately explain the
pending charges such that he could make a knowing and voluntary
decision to plead guilty; (2) forced and/or coerced him into
pleading guilty by telling him the Government would file
additional charges against him if he did not; and (3) did not
make any objections to the incorrect sentencing range in the

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Presentence Investigation Report. A defendant may raise a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel “on direct appeal if and
only if it conclusively appears from the record that his counsel
did not provide effective assistance.” United States v.
Martinez, 136 F.3d 972, 976 (4th Cir. 1998). To prove
ineffective assistance the defendant must show two things: (1)
“that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness” and (2) “that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). In the
context of a guilty plea, “the defendant must show that there is
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going
to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Our
review of the record reveals no conclusive evidence that
Acevedo’s counsel did not provide effective assistance.
Therefore, we decline to review Acevedo’s ineffective assistance
of counsel claims on direct appeal. We have also reviewed the
additional issues raised in Acevedo’s pro se supplemental briefs
and find them to be without merit.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
in this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal.
We therefore affirm Acevedo’s conviction and fifty-seven month

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sentence. This court requires that counsel inform Acevedo, in
writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the
United States for further review. If Acevedo requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Acevedo. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal conclusions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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