Joseph Mitchell Miller; Douglas A. Dye, Jr.; Kenneth G. Colby, Jr. v. Dogwood Valley Citizens Association, Incorporated

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-2091
JOSEPH MITCHELL MILLER; DOUGLAS A. DYE, JR.; KENNETH G.
COLBY, JR.,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
v.
DOGWOOD VALLEY CITIZENS ASSOCIATION, INCORPORATED; GARY E.
LOWE; MATTHEW P. BROWN; DEAN MUSSER; KEITH WYNN; JUDITH
FRANCES MCDAVID,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. Norman K. Moon,
District Judge. (3:06-cv-00020-nkm-bwc)
Submitted: August 18, 2009 Decided: October 8, 2009
Before NIEMEYER and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Joseph J. D’Erasmo, JOSEPH J. D’ERASMO & ASSOCIATES, LLC,
Rockville, Maryland, for Appellants. John Loehr,
Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Joseph Mitchell Miller, Douglas A. Dye, Jr., and
Kenneth G. Colby, Jr., appeal from the district court’s order
denying relief on their complaint against Dogwood Valley
Citizens Association, Inc., Gary E. Lowe, Matthew P. Brown, Dean
Musser, Keith Wynn, and Judith Frances McDavid. Finding no
error, we affirm.
The Appellants filed a complaint against the Appellees
seeking treble damages and costs and attorney’s fees for
violation of the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (“RICO”). RICO makes it unlawful for, among
other acts, any person to maintain an interest in an enterprise
that affects interstate commerce through a pattern of
racketeering, or for any person employed by or associated with
an enterprise that affects interstate commerce to participate in
the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of
racketeering. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b), (c) (2006); see also 18
U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2006) (pattern of racketeering activity
requires two acts of racketeering activity within ten years).
Here, the Appellants alleged that the Appellees engaged in
extortion, in violation of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951
(2006), mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006), and
conspiracy to injure others in reputation, trade, business, or
profession, in violation of Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-499 (2004).
2

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See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2006) (defining “racketeering
activity,” in part, as any act of extortion chargeable under
state law and punishable by more than a year, and any act
indictable under the Hobbs Act or § 1341). Under the Hobbs Act,
extortion is defined as “the obtaining of property from another,
with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or
threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official
right.” 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2).
Extortion can be based on the fear of economic harm in
which the “circumstances surrounding the alleged extortionate
conduct rendered that fear reasonable.” United States v.
Billups, 692 F.2d 320, 330 (4th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted);
see also United States v. Hairston, 46 F.3d 361, 365 (4th Cir.
1995). However, where the threat of economic harm is based on
legitimate economic threats to obtain property, a defendant
violates the statute only if he has no claim of right to that
property.* See, e.g., United States v. Sturm, 870 F.2d 769, 773
(1st Cir. 1989). In order to prove that a defendant did not
have a legitimate claim of right to the property, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that the defendant knew that he was not legally
entitled to the property. See id. at 774.
* The Appellants have not challenged the existence of the
claim of right defense in this court.
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4
After a bench trial, the district court found in favor
of the Appellees, concluding that the Appellees at all times
were acting under a bona fide claim of right, believing that
they were entitled to the property obtained. Appellants contend
that the district court erred in reaching this conclusion. We
have thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that the
district court did not err in finding that the Appellees
believed they had a bona fide claim of right to the property
obtained.
Appellees next argue that the district court’s legal
and factual findings are clearly erroneous because the district
court omitted facts from its written opinion. We have
thoroughly reviewed the record and conclude that the district
court’s factual and legal conclusions are not clearly erroneous
and were adequate to support its opinion.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment for the reasons
stated by the district court. See J.A. 415-28. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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