United States of America v. Terah Javan Shelton

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 08-4141
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TERAH JAVAN SHELTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (3:07-cr-00329-CMC-1)
Submitted: October 8, 2008 Decided: November 3, 2008
Before MOTZ, SHEDD, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Jan S. Strifling, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Mark
C. Moore, Assistant United States Attorney, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Terah Javan Shelton pled
guilty to possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or
more of cocaine base (“crack”), in violation of 21 U.S.C.A.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A) (West 1999 & Supp. 2008). The district
court sentenced Shelton to 262 months in prison. Shelton’s
counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), stating that, in his view, there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal. Counsel questions whether the
district court complied with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure in accepting Shelton’s guilty plea and
whether the district court abused its discretion in sentencing
Shelton. Shelton filed a pro se supplemental brief asserting
that the Government reneged on promises made to him.
Counsel raises as a potential issue the adequacy of
the plea hearing but concludes that there were no deficiencies
in the district court’s Rule 11 inquiries. Our careful review
of the record convinces us that the district court substantially
complied with the mandates of Rule 11 in accepting Shelton’s
guilty plea and ensured that Shelton entered his plea knowingly
and voluntarily and that the plea was supported by an
independent factual basis. See United States v. DeFusco, 949
F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991).
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Counsel next questions whether the district court
abused its discretion by denying Shelton’s motion for a downward
variance sentence. We review the sentence imposed by the
district court for an abuse of discretion. Gall v. United
States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). Our review of the record
leads us to conclude that the district court followed the
necessary procedural steps in sentencing Shelton, properly
calculating the guideline range and considering that
recommendation in conjunction with the factors set forth in 18
U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2008). See Gall, 128 S.
Ct. at 597. We also find that the district court meaningfully
articulated its refusal to vary from the guideline range and its
decision to sentence Shelton at the bottom of the range. See
id.; Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-69 (2007)
(upholding presumption of reasonableness for within-guideline
sentence). Thus, we conclude that the sentence is reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record for any meritorious issues and have found none.∗
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. This
court requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of
his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
∗ We have reviewed the claims in Shelton’s pro se
supplemental brief and find them to be without merit.
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further review. If the client requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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