Trustees of the Plumbers and Pipefitters National Pension Fund v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va., Inc., 115 F.3d 1201, 1210 4th Cir. 1997 . To…

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-1132
TRUSTEES OF THE PLUMBERS AND PIPEFITTERS
NATIONAL PENSION FUND,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
VIRGINIA ROSE SPRAGUE,
Defendant - Appellant,
and
BESSIE GENEVA SAXON,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Leonie M. Brinkema, District
Judge. (1:06-cv-00903-LMB)
Submitted: September 21, 2007 Decided: October 16, 2007
Before WILKINSON and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by unpublished per
curiam opinion.
Virginia Rose Sprague, Appellant Pro Se. John Robert Harney,
O’DONOGHUE & O’DONOGHUE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.

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Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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*The district court, in the alternative, ordered Sprague to
reimburse the Trustees’ expenses pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(g)(1)
(2000), which provides that in an action under the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, (“ERISA”), a “court in its
discretion may allow a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs of
action to either party.” This court has held that only a
prevailing party is entitled to consideration for attorney’s fees
in an ERISA action. Martin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Va.,
Inc., 115 F.3d 1201, 1210 (4th Cir. 1997).
To qualify as a “prevailing party,” a plaintiff must “receive
at least some relief on the merits of his claim before he can be
said to prevail . . . even an award of nominal damages suffices
under this test.” Griggs v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 385 F.3d
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PER CURIAM:
Virginia Rose Sprague appeals from the district court’s
order granting the motion for summary judgment filed by the Board
of Trustees of the Plumbers and Pipefitters National Pension Fund
(“Trustees”) in this interpleader action and requiring Sprague to
pay the Trustees’ fees and costs. We have reviewed the record and
find no reversible error in the district court’s finding that the
pension benefits at issue were properly paid to Bessie Saxon rather
than Virginia Sprague. Accordingly, we affirm that ruling for the
reasons stated by the district court. See Bd. of Trs. of the
Plumbers and Pipefitters Nat’l Pension Fund v. Saxon, No. 1:06-cv-
00903-LMB (E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2007). However, for the reasons stated
below, we vacate the district court’s order requiring Sprague to
reimburse the Trustees for their attorney’s fees and costs.
In awarding attorney’s fees, the district court relied
primarily on its discretionary authority to reimburse a plaintiff’s
fees and costs in an interpleader action. * Despite the lack of an

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440, 454 (4th Cir. 2004) (quotation and citation omitted). In this
case, the Trustees filed a complaint in interpleader, stating that
they were an innocent stakeholder with no claim to the benefits at
issue. Even though the district court granted the Trustees’ motion
for summary judgment, the only party that directly benefitted from
that decision was Bessie Saxon; the Trustees merely continued to
pay her monthly benefits as they had previously. Because the
Trustees received no relief or benefit as a result of the district
court’s ruling, they cannot be deemed a “prevailing party” and
therefore cannot recover their attorney’s fees and costs under
§ 1132(g)(1).
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express reference in the federal interpleader statute to costs or
attorney’s fees, federal courts have held that it is proper for an
interpleader plaintiff to be reimbursed for costs associated with
bringing the action forward. See First Trust Corp. v. Bryant, 410
F.3d 842, 856 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting that courts have relied on
federal interpleader statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2361, as a basis for fee
recovery); see also Trs. of Directors Guild of America - Producer
Pension Benefits Plans v. Tise, 234 F.3d 415, 426-27 (9th Cir.
2000); Rhoades v. Casey, 196 F.3d 592, 603 (5th Cir. 1999);
Septembertide Publ’g, B.V. v. Stein and Day, Inc., 884 F.2d 675,
683 (2d Cir. 1989); Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Boyd, 781
F.2d 1494, 1497-98 (11th Cir. 1986); Ferber Co. v. Ondrick, 310
F.2d 462, 467 (1st Cir. 1962).
While an interpleading plaintiff may be reimbursed for
its costs at the district court’s discretion, we find that the
award in this case was in error. Specifically, the district court
held Sprague liable for reimbursement of the Trustees’ attorney’s
fees and costs. While some courts have held that losing parties

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can be held responsible for the interpleading plaintiff’s fees and
costs, this option has been applied only “when their conduct
justifies it.” See Septembertide, 884 F.2d at 683 (citing Boyd,
781 F.2d at 1498). Even if we were to conclude that a losing party
could be held accountable for the interpleading plaintiff’s costs,
there would be insufficient grounds for imposing such liability in
this case. The district court held that Sprague “unnecessarily
forced” the Trustees to bring this interpleader action, and that
following her initial objection, she failed to take further action
to support her claims, outside of a “pro forma answer to the
interpleader action and an affidavit restating her initial
assertions.” However, we cannot conclude that Sprague’s conduct in
this matter constituted bad faith, fraud, or otherwise justified an
award of attorney’s fees. See Wheeler v. Dynamic Eng’g, Inc., 62
F.3d 634, 641 (4th Cir. 1995) (mere negligence or error does not
constitute bad faith in determining whether to award attorney’s
fees). Sprague filed an answer to the interpleader complaint, and
following the Trustees’ motion for summary judgment, filed an
affidavit that reiterated why she believed she was entitled to the
pension benefits. Additionally, in a letter to the parties
regarding their final decision on the benefits, the Trustees
recognized that a court could be persuaded by Sprague’s claim that
her 1984 divorce decree and property settlement agreement required
the pension fund to treat her as the pension beneficiary.

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Considering that the Trustees’ own ruling indicated to Sprague that
her claim might have merit, it does not appear that Sprague
“unnecessarily forced” the Trustees to bring an interpleader
action. Therefore, we hold that Sprague should not be held
responsible for the Trustees’ attorney’s fees or costs.
We note that fee awards are generally drawn from the
interpleaded fund itself, not from the losing party, see Bryant,
410 F.3d at 856; Tise, 234 F.3d at 427; Septembertide Publ’g, B.V.,
884 F.2d at 683; Boyd, 781 F.2d at 1498; Ferber Co., 310 F.2d at
467, and that, in this case, the Trustees’ motion for summary
judgment specifically requested that the fees be drawn from the
interpleaded funds, not from Sprague. We leave for the district
court on remand the question of whether the Trustees are entitled
to recover fees and costs from the interpleaded fund itself.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of
summary judgment upholding the Trustees’ award of benefits to
Saxon, vacate the order requiring Sprague to reimburse the Trustees
for their attorney’s fees and costs, and remand for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED

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