United States of America v. California, 386 U.S. 738 1967 , claiming there are no meritorious issues

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-5114
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JOSEPH LEVI PLUMBER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, Senior
District Judge. (1:04-cr-00024-WLO)
Submitted: July 25, 2007 Decided: August 15, 2007
Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen III, Federal Public Defender, Gregory Davis,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Winston-Salem, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Paul Alexander Weinman, Assistant United States
Attorney, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

-- 1 of 4 --

- 2 -
PER CURIAM:
Joseph Levi Plumber appeals a district court judgment
revoking his supervised release and sentencing him to twenty-one
months' imprisonment. On appeal, Plumber's attorney filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), claiming
there are no meritorious issues on appeal, but stating that Plumber
has directed him to raise the issue of whether the sentence imposed
was unreasonable and in violation of United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005). Plumber was given notice of his right to file a
pro se supplemental brief, but did not do so. Finding no error, we
affirm.
This Court reviews a district court’s revocation of
supervised release and a sentence imposed after a revocation of
supervised release for an abuse of discretion. United States v.
Davis, 53 F.3d 638, 642-43 (4th Cir. 1995). The district court
need only find a violation of a condition of supervised release by
a preponderance of the evidence. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(e)(3)
(2000); Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000). After
thoroughly reviewing the record, we find the district court did not
abuse its discretion by revoking Plumber’s supervised release.
This Court will affirm a sentence imposed after
revocation of supervised release if it is within the applicable
statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable. United States
v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 437, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied,

-- 2 of 4 --

- 3 -
127 S. Ct. 1813 (2007). Although the district court must consider
the Chapter 7 policy statements and the requirements of 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007), and 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583 (West
2000 & Supp. 2007), “the [district] court ultimately has broad
discretion to revoke its previous sentence and impose a term of
imprisonment up to the statutory maximum.” Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted); United States v.
Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating that district
court need not “robotically tick through § 3553(a)’s every
subsection” or “explicitly discuss every § 3553(a) factor on the
record”).
Here, the advisory guideline range for Plumber’s
violation was eight to fourteen months based upon his Grade B
violation. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 7B1.4. Because
Plumber was originally convicted of class C felonies, the statutory
maximum sentence that could be imposed upon revocation of
supervised release was twenty-four months. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
Here, the district court stated its reasoning, and imposed the
twenty-one month sentence that Plumber requested. See United
States v. Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 658 (4th Cir. 2007) (upholding
sentence above Chapter 7 range and stating that the Court “cannot,
and will not, hold that it is unreasonable for a sentencing court
to take account not only the severity of the violations, but also

-- 3 of 4 --

- 4 -
their number, in fashioning a revocation sentence”). We find the
sentence is not plainly unreasonable.
Pursuant to Anders, we have examined the entire record
and find no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s judgment. This court requires counsel to
inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If the client
requests a petition be filed, but counsel believes such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave
to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

-- 4 of 4 --