Catherine Angele Dankam v.  ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney General

PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
 CATHERINE ANGELE DANKAM,
Petitioner,
v. No. 06-1277 
ALBERTO R. GONZALES, Attorney
General,
Respondent. 
On Petition for Review of an Order
of the Board of Immigration Appeals.
(A96-092-718)
Argued: March 14, 2007
Decided: July 16, 2007
Before MOTZ, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Petition for review denied by published opinion. Judge Traxler wrote
the majority opinion, in which Judge Motz joined. Judge Shedd wrote
a concurring opinion.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Clement Anyeh Tatoh, IMMIGRATION ASSISTANCE
CENTER, Silver Spring, Maryland, for Petitioner. George Maralan
Kelley, III, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Norfolk, Virginia, for Respondent.
ON BRIEF: Bokwe G. Mofor, Silver Spring, Maryland, for Peti-
tioner. Chuck Rosenberg, United States Attorney, Alexandria, Vir-
ginia, for Respondent.

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OPINION
TRAXLER, Circuit Judge:
Catherine Angele Dankam is a native and citizen of the Republic
of Cameroon. She arrived in the United States in November 2002 as
a nonimmigrant visitor for pleasure with permission to remain in the
United States until April 23, 2003. Dankam overstayed her visa and
received a Notice to Appear charging her as removable on this basis.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). Dankam concedes removability. In
October 2003, eleven months after arriving in the United States,
Dankam applied for political asylum, withholding of removal, and
relief under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). The immigra-
tion judge denied all forms of relief sought by Dankam, and the Board
of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirmed without opinion under its
streamlined review process. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4). Dankam
now petitions this court for review of the decision of the BIA. For the
reasons that follow, we deny the petition for review.
I.
A.
Under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), the Attorney
General is vested with the discretion to grant asylum to aliens who
qualify as "refugees." See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42)(A), 1158(b)(1)(A);
INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 13 (2002) (per curiam). The INA defines
"refugee" as someone "who is unable or unwilling to return to" his
native country "because of persecution or a well-founded fear of per-
secution on account of . . . political opinion" or other protected
grounds. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(42)(A). An asylum applicant "may qualify
as a refugee either because he or she has suffered past persecution or
because he or she has a well-founded fear of future persecution." 8
C.F.R. § 1208.13(b). The burden of proof with respect to refugee sta-
tus rests with the applicant. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a); Gandziami-
Mickhou v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 351, 353 (4th Cir. 2006).
The applicant’s burden is even greater to qualify for withholding
of removal to a particular country under the INA, which requires the
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alien to demonstrate a "clear probability of persecution" on account
of a protected ground. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 430 (1984) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). The payoff in return for the more strin-
gent qualification standard is that withholding of removal is not a
discretionary form of relief; it is mandatory. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231(b)(3)(A); INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 420 (1999).
Finally, an alien seeking protection under the CAT must show "that
it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed
to the proposed country of removal." 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2). The
likelihood of torture, however, need not be tied to a protected ground
under the CAT. See Yang v. Gonzales, 478 F.3d 133, 141 (2nd Cir.
2007). "Withholding and deferral of removal under the CAT are man-
datory forms of relief that hinge on risk within the country to which
the Government is seeking expulsion. Instead of focusing on persecu-
tion and nexus to protected grounds, CAT relief requires the applicant
to show that he or she would more likely than not be tortured, and it
does not require a nexus to any ground." Id. (internal citation omit-
ted).
B.
In her application, Dankam claimed membership in the Union of
Cameroon Democratic Forces ("UCDF"), a political party opposed to
the Cameroonian government, and she asserted that on three occa-
sions she suffered persecution because of her political views. Accord-
ing to her application, in April 2000 Dankam attended a UCDF
demonstration against the killing of policemen who criticized govern-
ment corruption. Allegedly, Dankam was arrested, beaten, and placed
in detention at the Ndokotti Police Station for two days. Dankam
asserted that during her detention, she was beaten and warned that her
continued political activism would be punished harshly. Dankam indi-
cated that her husband bribed officials to secure her release.
According to her application, the second incident occurred during
a UCDF protest of the Biya government’s treatment of inmates at the
New Bell prison where a number of prisoners allegedly died in
November 2001. After the police used water cannons, tear gas and
batons to disperse the protesters, Dankam was arrested and detained
for three days; the UCDF purportedly arranged for the release of a
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number of prisoners including Dankam. The application did not
include details of her treatment during this detention and failed to
specify when it occurred.
The final incident allegedly occurred on June 25, 2002, when
Dankam "was distributing tracts calling for the boycott of the June 30,
2002, elections because of the failure of the ruling party . . . to create
an Independent Election Commission." J.A. 61. Dankam claimed that
she was arrested and again held for three days. Dankam did not pro-
vide details regarding her treatment by officials during her third
detention, except to characterize the experience generally as "a living
hell." J.A. 61.
Dankam asserts eligibility for asylum based on past persecution
(the arrests and detentions) as well as a fear of future persecution by
government agents if she returned to Cameroon "because of [her] past
political activism and the persistent search by security forces after
[her] departure." J.A. 66. The mistreatment purportedly feared by
Dankam included "emotional distress due to intimidation and threats,
arbitrary arrests and detention, mistreatment in detention," J.A. 66,
and even torture "due to the fact that torture is commonly practiced
by the authorities on political opponents . . . and even ordinary citi-
zens detained for minor offenses." J.A. 67.
At the immigration hearing, Dankam testified about the three
arrests noted in her asylum application. Dankam reiterated that she
was arrested in April 2000 for distributing UCDF pamphlets and
detained for two days at a police station in Douala. Laurent Messi, an
attorney from Cameroon who enjoys political asylum in the United
States, appeared at the hearing to corroborate various aspects of
Dankam’s testimony, including the fact of her first detention. Messi
testified that he visited Dankam during the second day that she was
in detention, that Dankam’s release did not occur until "well after" his
visit and that she spent "considerably more than two days" in prison.
A.R. 124. Dankam submitted a purported medical certificate dated
April 20, 2000, indicating that she "was suffering from several swell-
ings and wounds on the left leg" as well as "trauma and lesions of the
left eye," but not explaining the cause of Dankam’s injuries. A.R.
373. The April 20, 2000, medical document indicated that Dankam
would be "[i]ncapacit[ated]" for forty days. A.R. 373. The record also
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includes an undated medical document stating that Dankam "showed
symptoms of rape with swellings on the thighs, as well as lesions on
the legs and knees." A.R. 371. At the hearing, however, Dankam testi-
fied that, despite her symptoms, she was not raped in prison.
Dankam confirmed the other two arrests listed in her application —
one during the protest of conditions at New Bell Prison and one in
June 2002. With respect to the New Bell Prison protest, Dankam’s
application did not provide a date; at the hearing, Dankam claimed
this arrest occurred in January 2002. As for her June 2002 arrest,
Dankam asserted new details about her subsequent three-day deten-
tion. According to Dankam, she was regularly beaten on the soles of
her feet and forced to sit naked on a cell floor covered in urine. She
testified that she was released due to the intervention of the UCDF,
at which point she went into hiding in a house located near Douala
and decided that she needed to leave Cameroon because her "life was
in danger." A.R. 81. Dankam acknowledged, however, that she con-
tinued to report to work until August 2002, albeit not regularly
because a doctor determined that she was sick and required 40 days
before returning to work. In support, Dankam offered the medical cer-
tificate dated April 20, 2000. The immigration judge discounted this
evidence because it clearly related to Dankam’s first, not last, arrest.
Dankam indicated that her husband obtained a passport and a
United States visa for her. The passport was in Dankam’s own name,
but she was allowed to leave Cameroon because airport authorities
did not recognize her as a person wanted by the government. Dankam
also testified that, although her husband and children were members
of the UCDF, they were not as active as she was, and therefore it was
not imperative that they flee Cameroon. Therefore, Dankam’s hus-
band and children remained behind in Cameroon when she departed
for the United States.
Dankam testified that after arriving in the United States in Novem-
ber 2002, she continued her association with the UCDF, attending ral-
lies and demonstrations in front of the Cameroonian Embassy in
Washington, D.C., and New York. Dankam believes that her contin-
ued political activity in the United States is known to the ruling gov-
ernment in Cameroon through its agents located in this country.
Dankam called as a witness Jules Contchou, a political asylee and a
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member of the UCDF in Washington, D.C. Contchou confirmed
Dankam’s participation in UCDF rallies in the United States and
opined that her activities here were under surveillance by agents of
the government in Cameroon. Contchou, however, had no personal
knowledge of Dankam’s arrests in Cameroon, having arrived in the
United States in 1999.
In support of her claim, Dankam submitted, in addition to the
aforementioned documents, a letter purportedly drafted by her hus-
band that confirms a few major details of her story but creates a dis-
crepancy with Dankam’s testimony and written submissions
regarding the date of her third arrest. The letter, dated October 27,
2003, indicated the arrest occurred on July 25, 2002, rather than June
25, 2002, as Dankam claimed. Dankam then submitted a second let-
ter, purportedly written by her husband on October 26, 2004, one year
later and not long before her hearing, changing Dankam’s final arrest
date to June 25, 2002. When the discrepancy was pointed out during
cross-examination, Dankam claimed that her husband wrote the sec-
ond letter for the purpose of correcting the arrest date; however, the
letter did not explain or acknowledge the discrepancy in dates or even
refer to the first letter.
Additionally, Dankam submitted a letter from her mother confirm-
ing that Dankam was arrested three times. This letter specifically
mentioned the arrests occurring on June 25, 2002, and April 18, 2000,
but provided few details other than to note that Dankam was held for
48 hours in April 2000.1
1The translated version of the letter, which was originally in French,
indicates Dankam was detained on October 18, 2000, and held for two
days. The immigration judge noted that this was the only mention of an
October 2000 arrest — Dankam herself made no such allegation. Thus,
the judge found that this reference undercut the reliability of the docu-
ment. The October 18, 2000, date, however, is merely a mistranslation.
In the original french version, the date is "[l]e 18 Avril 2000," i.e., April
18, 2000, which is consistent with the date identified by Dankam. J.A.
83.
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C.
The immigration judge found Dankam credible as to her member-
ship in the UCDF and participation in UCDF activities after her
arrival in the United States; however, the immigration judge con-
cluded that Dankam’s testimony lacked credibility "with respect to
her claimed incidents of past persecution in Cameroon." J.A. 37-38.
Examining the totality of the evidence, the immigration judge specifi-
cally found a number of "significant problems with [Dankam’s] evi-
dentiary presentation that reflect adversely on her credibility
concerning past persecution." J.A. 38.
Accordingly, the immigration judge rejected Dankam’s claim for
asylum because he could not "credit [Dankam’s] testimony regarding
her arrests and mistreatment in Cameroon, and . . . [found] her corrob-
oration largely unreliable." J.A. 44. And, the immigration judge fur-
ther determined that, under Camara v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 361 (4th
Cir. 2004), there was no reliable independent evidence of Dankam’s
past persecution in Cameroon.
Likewise, the immigration judge determined that Dankam failed to
carry her burden of establishing a well-founded fear of future persecu-
tion based on Dankam’s "party membership and U.S. protest activi-
ties, and the Cameroonian government’s likely reaction." J.A. 44. The
judge explained that "[Dankam’s] threats, based on her U.S. activities,
are highly speculative" since "it is not clear that the government is
even well aware of [Dankam’s] U.S. protest activities," and
Dankam’s "family members, who are also party members, although
not as active as [Dankam], live undisturbed in Cameroon." J.A. 45.
The immigration judge opined that these factors, coupled with
Dankam’s testimony that she had no difficulty departing the country
under her own name, "suggest[ ] that the Cameroonian government is
not overly interested in her activities." J.A. 45.
Finally, the immigration judge also rejected Dankam’s claim for
withholding of removal under both the INA and the CAT. The immi-
gration judge concluded that "[b]ecause [Dankam] fails to meet the
lower standard of proof for asylum, she must also fail to satisfy the
higher standard for withholding of removal under Section 241(b)(3)
of the [INA]." J.A. 46. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). Regarding the
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claim for relief under the CAT, the judge determined that Dankam
failed to demonstrate "by credible evidence" that, were she to return
to Cameroon, it is more likely than not that she would be tortured.
J.A. 46.
II.
Because the BIA summarily affirmed under the streamlined review
process, the decision of the immigration judge "serves as the final
agency determination" and is subject to "review . . . as if it were the
BIA’s decision." Lin-Jian v. Gonzales, ___ F.3d ___, No. 05-1693,
2007 WL 1544791, at *3 (4th Cir. May 30, 2007); see 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(e)(4).
The scope of our review of a final order of removal denying asy-
lum is narrow. See Saldarriaga v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 461, 465 (4th
Cir. 2005). The INA requires this court to uphold the BIA’s final
order of removal so long as it is not "‘manifestly contrary to law,’"
regardless of whether the streamlined review process was used. See
Gandziama-Mickhou, 445 F.3d at 354 (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(C)). When the denial of asylum is based on the conclu-
sion that the applicant failed to meet his evidentiary burden for estab-
lishing eligibility, then we review for substantial evidence and must
affirm a determination of statutory ineligibility by the BIA unless the
"evidence presented was so compelling that no reasonable factfinder
could fail to find" eligibility for asylum. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502
U.S. 478, 483-84 (1992); see Rusu v. U.S. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325
n.14 (4th Cir. 2002). In fact, "[t]o reverse the BIA’s finding we must
find that the evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels
it." Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 n.1.
In conducting this review, we accord great deference to the agen-
cy’s underlying factual findings, which are "conclusive unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to find to the contrary."
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B). Agency findings with respect to an appli-
cant’s credibility are likewise entitled to judicial deference if such
findings are supported by substantial evidence. See Camara, 378 F.3d
at 367.
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III.
First, we pause briefly to address Dankam’s curious lead argument.
Dankam contends that the immigration judge failed to exercise his
discretion properly in denying her application for asylum. Specifi-
cally, Dankam claims that the immigration judge did not consider all
of the relevant factors supporting a favorable exercise of discretion.2
In support of this particular argument, Dankam cites assorted prece-
dents involving categories of decisions of the BIA committed solely
to its discretion. See, e.g., INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94 (1988) (review-
ing BIA decision denying motion to reopen deportation proceedings);
Zhao v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 265 F.3d 83, 85 (2d Cir. 2001)
(reviewing BIA decision denying motion to reconsider asylum peti-
tion).
Dankam’s argument appears to rest on a misapprehension of the
immigration judge’s basis for denying asylum. The immigration judge
clearly determined that Dankam failed to establish statutory eligibility
for asylum; it was not a discretionary denial of asylum to an eligible
applicant. Despite the fact that the ultimate decision to grant or deny
asylum is committed to the discretion of the Attorney General, not
every denial of asylum involves an unfavorable exercise of discretion.
It is fundamental that an alien seeking asylum in the United States
must demonstrate both that he is eligible under the INA for asylum
and that he merits a favorable exercise of discretion. See INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428 n.6 (1987) ("[T]here is no enti-
tlement to asylum; it is only granted to eligible refugees pursuant to
the Attorney General’s discretion.") (emphasis added); Yousefi v. U.S.
2The exercise of discretionary judgment with respect to a refugee’s
asylum claim should include the examination of "a totality of the circum-
stances" in view of the BIA’s policy that "[t]he danger of persecution
will outweigh all but the most egregious of adverse factors." Huang v.
INS, 436 F.3d 89, 98 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Considerations that are generally relevant to the exercise of discretion
include "general humanitarian reasons, independent of the circumstances
that led to the applicant’s refugee status, such as his or her age, health,
or family ties." In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 347 (BIA 1996) (en banc).
Our review of discretionary denials is for abuse of discretion. See Huang,
436 F.3d at 96.
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INS, 260 F.3d 318, 327 (4th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (explaining that
"once eligibility for relief was established, the Attorney General could
still refuse to grant asylum").
In other words, an asylum claim involves two steps: "[T]he appli-
cant has the burden to prove his or her statutory eligibility for asylum
by establishing" refugee status. Krastev v. INS, 292 F.3d 1268, 1270
(10th Cir. 2002). "Once an applicant has established his or her ‘refu-
gee’ status and thus eligibility for asylum, the Attorney General exer-
cises discretionary judgment in either granting or denying asylum."
Id. at 1271. The immigration judge clearly concluded that Dankam
was not statutorily eligible for asylum. Dankam’s claim failed to
advance beyond the first step and never required an exercise of dis-
cretionary judgment. Therefore, Dankam’s argument is misplaced to
the extent that she believes the immigration judge abused his discre-
tion in failing to consider various equitable factors.
IV.
We turn now to the immigration judge’s finding that Dankam
failed to demonstrate refugee status based on past persecution or a
well-founded fear of future persecution.
A.
An applicant who successfully demonstrates that she suffered past
persecution on account of a protected ground "is presumed to have
[the] well-founded fear of persecution" required for refugee status.
Ngarurih v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 182, 187 (4th Cir. 2004); see 8 C.F.R.
§ 1208.13(b)(1).3 The immigration judge’s conclusion that Dankam
failed to meet her burden of establishing past persecution rested pri-
3The government may rebut this presumption by establishing, through
a preponderance of evidence, that "[t]here has been a fundamental
change in circumstances such that the applicant no longer has a well-
founded fear of persecution" or that "[t]he applicant could avoid future
persecution by relocating to another part of the applicant’s country" if
relocation was reasonable. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A)-(B); see 8
C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(ii).
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marily on an adverse credibility determination as to Dankam’s testi-
mony.
We defer to administrative credibility findings that are supported
by substantial evidence, see Camara, 378 F.3d at 367, i.e., evidence
that is "reasonable, substantial, and probative . . . on the record con-
sidered as a whole." See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 481 (internal
quotation marks omitted). An immigration judge who rejects an appli-
cant’s testimony on credibility grounds is obliged to offer "specific,
cogent reason[s]" for doing so. Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 78 (4th
Cir. 1989); Camara, 378 F.3d at 367. "‘Inconsistent statements’" and
"‘contradictory evidence’" qualify as cogent reasons that could sup-
port an adverse credibility finding. See Tewabe v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d
533, 538 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting In re S-M-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 722,
729 (BIA 1997) (en banc)). We do not defer, however, to adverse
credibility findings that are founded on "speculation, conjecture, or
. . . unsupported personal opinion." Id. (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
The adverse credibility finding in this case was based largely on
the discrepancies between Dankam’s testimony and the corroborative
evidence she offered. First, the judge noted that Dankam submitted
two letters purportedly from her husband using inconsistent dates for
her final arrest, which was significant in the judge’s view "because of
[Dankam’s] claim that it was connected with the June election fraud.
A July 25, 2002, arrest would be outside of the election time frame."
J.A. 38-39. The immigration judge rejected Dankam’s explanation
that the date used in the first letter was merely a typographical error
which the second letter was offered to correct, observing that the sec-
ond letter did not refer to any mistake in the previous letter and that
Dankam did not address the discrepancy in dates until she was con-
fronted with the problem on cross-examination.
Second, the testimony of Dankam and Messi conflicted regarding
the length of her first detention in April 2000. Dankam claims that she
was detained for two days, but Messi testified that he visited her on
the second day of her detention and that she was not released until
"well after" that visit. A.R. 124. In fact, Messi claimed that Dankam
spent "considerably more than two days" in prison. A.R. 124. The
immigration judge concluded that "[t]his is a significant discrepancy
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that undermines Mr. Messi’s value as a corroborating witness, and
casts some doubt on [Dankam’s] credibility regarding her first arrest
and mistreatment." J.A. 40.
Third, the immigration judge found Dankam lacked credibility in
claiming that her fear of continued reprisals by the government forced
her into hiding after her third arrest. The judge rested this conclusion
on her admission that she continued to report for work during this
time, that she was able to obtain a passport and visa in her own name
during this time, and that she was able to use these documents to
depart from the main airport in Cameroon without difficulty. More-
over, the immigration judge noted that Dankam’s husband and oldest
son continued to work and attend school in Cameroon despite their
own party membership, which, in addition to Dankam’s continued
employment and use of travel documents bearing her name, "cast[ ]
doubt on [Dankam’s] claim that she was a wanted political dissident"
after her last arrest and release. J.A. 40.
Fourth, the immigration judge noted that Dankam’s testimony
about her continued work following the third and final arrest in June
2002 was not consistent with the corroborating medical document she
submitted. Dankam claimed that she continued working until August
2002 — in other words, she was working while she was supposedly
in hiding from the government. When asked on cross-examination to
explain this apparent contradiction, Dankam claimed she did not
report to work "regularly" but continued receiving pay "[b]ecause
[she] had document[ed] proof that [she] was sick." A.R. 97. Specifi-
cally, Dankam testified that she was medically excused from work for
40 days; however, the medical document Dankam provided the court
was dated April 2000, around the time of Dankam’s release from her
first detention.
Finally, the immigration judge noted that Dankam submitted an
undated medical certificate indicating that she showed "symptoms of
rape." A.R. 371. Dankam denied at the hearing that she was ever
raped, and speculated that she might have developed symptoms mim-
icking those of rape after sitting on a prison floor covered in human
waste. The immigration judge discounted the value of this document
therefore, observing that it seemed "unlikely that a doctor would have
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written a medical excuse referring to symptoms of rape in a situation
where the respondent had never claimed to be raped." J.A. 41.
Dankam argues that the adverse credibility determination is not
supported by substantial evidence because all of the inconsistencies
specifically identified by the immigration judge are minor and not
connected "to the heart" of her asylum claim. See Chen v. INS, 266
F.3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Adverse credibility determinations
based on minor discrepancies, inconsistencies, or omissions that do
not go to the heart of an applicant’s asylum claim cannot constitute
substantial evidence.").
On the contrary, most of the internal inconsistencies noted by the
immigration judge were neither trivial nor unconnected to the core of
Dankam’s asylum claim, which is premised on the three alleged
arrests and the subsequent detentions. Because the arrests are the key
events underlying Dankam’s claim for asylum, it follows that the
details surrounding these arrests and the dates on which they occurred
are more than minor or trivial details. Cf. Camara, 378 F.3d at 369
(explaining that "the misdating of Camara’s miscarriage . . . might
have been considered a minor detail if not for the fact that she cred-
ited it as having ‘renewed her will to fight against the Conte govern-
ment.’").
We conclude that the immigration judge offered clear and cogent
reasons for his adverse credibility finding. The conflicting dates for
Dankam’s third arrest used in the two letters purportedly from
Dankam’s husband were, as the immigration judge pointed out, sig-
nificant because of the alleged connection between Dankam’s partici-
pation in the June 2002 election and her subsequent arrest and
imprisonment. Although Dankam offered a perfectly plausible expla-
nation — that the date used in the first letter was a typographical error
and the second letter was offered to correct the error — the immigra-
tion judge was entitled to reject this explanation, particularly in view
of the fact that the second letter did not acknowledge an error or indi-
cate that its purpose was to supply the correct date and Dankam did
not address the issue until confronted during cross examination. Cf.
Camara, 378 F.3d at 369 (concluding that inconsistencies in the
applicant’s testimony and corroborative documents may support an
adverse credibility determination even where a plausible explanation
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for the discrepancies is offered). Likewise, the testimonies of Dankam
and Messi were inconsistent as to a significant issue — the length of
Dankam’s imprisonment. And, Dankam’s assertion that, following
her third politically-related arrest, she was forced to go into hiding
was not consistent with her continued employment at her regular
place of business. See Lin-Jian, ___ F.3d at ___, 2007 WL 1544791
*6 (concluding that applicant’s testimony lacked credibility where he
claimed to be in hiding but continued reporting to work).
Moreover, while the few remaining inconsistencies cited by the
immigration judge regarding the questions raised by the medical doc-
uments offered by Dankam as corroboration at first glance appear to
be tangential and minor, they add to and create a cumulative effect
that is sufficient to support a finding that Dankam’s claims are not
credible. See Lin v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 395, 402 (2d Cir. 2006)
("[E]ven where an IJ relies on discrepancies . . . that, if taken sepa-
rately, concern matters collateral or ancillary to the claim, the cumula-
tive effect may nevertheless be deemed consequential by the fact-
finder.") (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
In sum, we find that there was substantial evidence on which the
immigration judge could rest his adverse credibility finding, and we
conclude that Dankam has failed to show us evidence that "was so
compelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find" that she
had established eligibility for asylum. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at
483-84.
B.
Dankam also argues that there is independent evidence of past per-
secution that the immigration judge failed to credit or even consider.
See Camara, 378 F.3d at 370. Dankam fails to specify, however, the
evidence that the immigration judge supposedly overlooked. We find
to the contrary — the immigration judge thoroughly reviewed the
potentially corroborating evidence and determined that it was either
unreliable or lacked probative value. Even the April 20, 2000, medi-
cal certificate, which the judge described as "the most reliable of the
record documents on proof of mistreatment in Cameroon," failed to
qualify as reliable independent evidence of Dankam’s past persecu-
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tion claim because it "does not establish how [her] injuries were sus-
tained." J.A. 43.
C.
The "well-founded fear of persecution" standard contains subjec-
tive and objective components. The subjective component requires
the applicant to "present[ ] candid, credible, and sincere testimony
demonstrating a genuine fear of persecution." Chen v. U.S. INS, 195
F.3d 198, 201 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). To
satisfy the objective component, the applicant must present "specific,
concrete facts that [would cause] a reasonable person in like circum-
stances . . . [to] fear persecution." Id. at 202. An adverse credibility
determination is generally fatal to an asylum claim alleging a well-
founded fear of persecution because "the subjective element cannot
generally be proved other than through the applicant’s testimony."
Camara, 378 F.3d at 369.
As noted previously, the immigration judge did not credit
Dankam’s testimony that her fear of future persecution forced her to
go into hiding because she admitted that she continued to report to her
workplace during this time. The immigration judge also rejected
Dankam’s activities in the United States as a basis for finding a well-
founded fear of persecution. As the immigration judge pointed out,
there is nothing in the record showing that the government in Camer-
oon is keeping tabs on Dankam, and testimony to the contrary from
Dankam and Contchou amounted to nothing more than unsupported
speculation.
We conclude the immigration judge offered sufficiently cogent rea-
sons to support the adverse credibility determination. See Lin-Jian,
___ F.3d at ___, 2007 WL 1544791 at *6; see Chen v. United States
Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 336 n.16 (2d. Cir. 2006) (affirming
the rejection of asylum applicant’s claim that she continued reporting
to work while she was purportedly hiding from officials because
"[t]he purpose of going into . . . hiding is to avoid the officials, and
yet petitioner’s workplace was the very first place those officials
would have searched for petitioner other than her home") (internal
quotation marks omitted). Again, we see no evidence that is "so com-
pelling that no reasonable factfinder could fail to find" that Dankam
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has established eligibility for asylum. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at
483-84.
D.
Dankam seeks withholding of removal under the INA as an alterna-
tive to asylum. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). The "clear probability" of
persecution standard that applies to this form of relief is more strin-
gent than the eligibility standard for asylum. Thus, Dankam’s failure
to establish eligibility for asylum necessarily means she cannot dem-
onstrate eligibility for withholding of removal under the INA. See,
e.g., Ngarurih, 371 F.3d at 189 n.7. Accordingly, we also deny
Dankam’s petition for review of the decision of the immigration judge
as it pertains to the withholding of removal claim.
V.
Finally, Dankam requests relief under the CAT in the form of with-
holding of removal. In denying relief, the immigration judge indicated
that he was unable to "find that [Dankam] has shown, by credible evi-
dence, that she meets the higher standard showing that it is more
likely than not she will be tortured, for any reason, if returned to
Cameroon." J.A. 46. We review the denial of relief under the CAT for
substantial evidence. See Rashiah v. Ashcroft, 388 F.3d 1126, 1131
(7th Cir. 2004). Dankam failed in her brief and at oral argument to
identify any evidence that suggests she will "more likely than not" be
tortured if removed to Cameroon, and we have found no such evi-
dence in this record. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2). Accordingly, we
conclude that substantial evidence supports the decision of the immi-
gration judge denying CAT relief based on Dankam’s failure to carry
her burden of proof.
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, we deny Dankam’s petition for review.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED
SHEDD, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write separately
simply to address the analysis employed by the IJ in evaluating
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Dankam’s credibility with respect to past persecution. Part IV.A. of
the majority opinion accurately recounts the five reasons given by the
IJ in support of his determination that Dankam lacked credibility
regarding her alleged past persecution. Each of these five bases for
the adverse credibility determination was premised on some alleged
contradiction or inconsistency between Dankam’s testimony and
other evidence she offered. As a general rule, inconsistencies and con-
tradictions in an applicant’s testimony or documentary evidence
amount to cogent reasons sufficient to support an adverse credibility
determination. Tewabe v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir.
2006). However, in this case, two of the bases for the IJ’s adverse
credibility determination strike me as enhancing Dankam’s credibil-
ity, not undermining it.
Specifically, the IJ focused on inconsistencies between Dankam’s
testimony and the testimony given by Messi regarding the length of
her incarceration; i.e., Dankam claimed that her incarceration in 2000
lasted merely two days, while Messi asserted that she was incarcer-
ated for "considerably more than two days." J.A. 124. Also, the IJ
pointed out that Dankam claimed she had not been raped in prison,
despite her own medical documentation indicating that she had symp-
toms consistent with rape.* In each of these instances, Dankam’s tes-
timony is less sensational than the allegedly conflicting evidence: she
claims that she was imprisoned for only two days, not more; she
claims that she was subjected to inhumane conditions, not raped. In
short, rather than bolstering her asylum claim by embellishing her
story, Dankam’s testimony suggests a more plausible explanation by
resisting the urge to exaggerate, even at the cost of possibly contra-
dicting other evidence. Much like an out-of-court statement against
one’s own interest implies an intrinsic reliability sufficient to justify
its admission under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), Dankam’s
statements, which had potentially adverse implications for her asylum
claim, carry an inherent ring of truth. Thus, in my view, to the extent
these two statements by Dankam were inconsistent with other evi-
*I note that Dankam’s testimony, which stated she had not been raped,
did not actually contradict the medical document, which merely indicated
that she "showed symptoms of rape . . . ." J.A. 371 (emphasis added).
Thus, I believe that characterizing Dankam’s testimony as inconsistent
with the medical document is not necessarily accurate.
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dence offered at the hearing, they actually support her credibility
instead of detracting from it. In cases such as this, where inconsisten-
cies seem to militate in favor of an applicant’s credibility, the IJ
should explain why the inconsistencies render the applicant’s testi-
mony incredible.
Nevertheless, the additional grounds espoused by the IJ, as well as
the other evidence in the record, provide substantial evidentiary sup-
port for the adverse credibility determination with respect to past per-
secution. Moreover, my review of the record reveals no evidence that
would compel a result contrary to the one reached by the IJ and the
Board of Immigration Appeals. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S.
478, 481 n.1 (1992) ("To reverse the BIA finding we must find that
the evidence not only supports that conclusion, but compels it. . . .").
Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by the majority.
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