United States of America v. James Thomas Wallace

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4466
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JAMES THOMAS WALLACE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(CR-03-918)
Submitted: February 28, 2006 Decided: March 17, 2006
Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Milton M. Moore, Jr., Bennettsville, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Jonathan S. Gasser, United States Attorney, Columbia, South
Carolina; A. Bradley Parham, Assistant United States Attorney,
Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).

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PER CURIAM:
James Thomas Wallace pled guilty to one count of
possession of a firearm by a felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924(e) (2000), and was sentenced to imprisonment for
180 months. Finding no error, we affirm.
Wallace first contends on appeal that the district court
erred in its application of the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”)
because the court considered convictions that were neither admitted
to nor found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. When reviewing
a district court’s application of the sentencing guidelines, we
review legal determinations de novo. United States v. Blake, 81
F.3d 498, 503 (4th Cir. 1996). A district court may enhance a
sentence based on the “fact of a prior conviction” regardless of
whether or not it was admitted to by the defendant or found by a
jury. United States v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278, 282 (4th Cir.
2005). Therefore, a district court may determine if a defendant
has been convicted of the predicate offenses required by the ACCA
so long as the facts necessary to support the enhancement “inhere
in the fact of conviction” rather than being “extraneous to it.”
Id. at 283.
We have previously determined that the statutes
underlying Wallace’s convictions constitute “violent felonies” for
ACCA purposes. See Thompson, 421 F.3d at 284-85; United States v.
Pierce, 278 F.3d 282, 289 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Bowden,

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975 F.2d 1080, 1081-1085 (4th Cir. 1992). Furthermore, the
offenses occurred on different dates, in different geographical
locations, and involved different criminal objectives and victims.
See Thompson, 421 F.3d at 284-86; United States v. Williams, 187
F.3d 429, 431 (4th Cir. 1999). Therefore, we conclude the district
court properly enhanced Wallace’s sentence under the ACCA.
Wallace also contends that his sentence was unreasonable.
After the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005), a sentencing court is no longer bound by the range
prescribed by the sentencing guidelines. See United States v.
Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir. 2005). However, in determining
a sentence post-Booker, sentencing courts are still required to
calculate and consider the guideline range prescribed thereby as
well as the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000). Id.
If the sentence imposed is within the properly calculated guideline
range, it is presumptively reasonable. United States v. Green, __
F.3d __, 2006 WL 267217, at *5 (4th Cir. Feb. 6, 2006) (No.
05-4270). Because the district court appropriately treated the
guidelines as advisory, properly calculated and considered the
guideline range, and weighed the relevant § 3553(a) factors, we
find Wallace’s sentence reasonable.
Accordingly, we affirm Wallace’s sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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