United States of America v. James Marcus Lloyd, Iii

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4301
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JAMES MARCUS LLOYD, III,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District
Judge. (CR-04-769)
Submitted: August 12, 2005 Decided: October 25, 2005
Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Langdon D. Long, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Jonathan S. Gasser, Acting United States
Attorney, Stacey D. Haynes, Assistant United States Attorney,
Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).

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PER CURIAM:
James Marcus Lloyd, III, was convicted of one count of
being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), (e) (2000). On appeal, Lloyd contends the
district court erred by denying to suppress the gun found on his
person. Finding no error, we affirm.
We review factual findings underlying a district court’s
suppression determination for clear error and the district court’s
legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868,
873 (4th Cir. 1992). When a suppression motion has been denied,
this court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Government. United States v. Seidman, 156 F.3d 542, 547 (4th Cir.
1998).
“An officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment,
conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968). To conduct a Terry stop, there must be “at least a
minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.”
Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123. Reasonable suspicion requires more than
a hunch but less than probable cause and may be based on the
collective knowledge of officers involved in an investigation.
Id.; see also United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 232 (1985).

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Officers conducting a lawful Terry stop may take steps
reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety, check for
identification, and maintain the status quo. Hensley, 469 U.S. at
229, 235; see also United States v. Moore, 817 F.2d 1105, 1108 (4th
Cir. 1987) (brief but complete restriction of liberty is valid
under Terry).
Once a stop is conducted, “if the officer believes that
the person being stopped ‘may be armed and presently dangerous,’
the officer may frisk the person by patting his outer clothing ‘in
an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault [the
officer].’” United States v. Mayo, 361 F.3d 802, 805 (4th Cir.
2004) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30) (alteration in original).
We find the district court’s factual findings were not
clearly erroneous. We further find law enforcement authorities had
reasonable suspicion to stop the car in which Lloyd was a passenger
and to search Lloyd for a firearm after he refused to follow
instructions.
Accordingly, we affirm the conviction and sentence. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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