Janet L. Herron v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 1992 explaining the injury-in-fact…

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-2120
JANET L. HERRON,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
MAYOR AND CITY COUNCIL, Annapolis Maryland,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge.
(CA-04-1977-WDQ)
Submitted: July 17, 2006 Decided: August 2, 2006
Before WIDENER, WILKINSON, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John R. Greiber, Jr., Phillip F. Scheibe, Millersville, Maryland,
for Appellant. Michael J. Winkelman, MCCARTHY & WINKELMAN, L.L.P.,
Bowie, Maryland, for Appellee.

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2
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).

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PER CURIAM:
Appellant Janet L. Herron is a residential property owner in
the city of Annapolis, Maryland (“the City”), which is in Anne
Arundel County (“the County”). The County Code imposes
“development impact fees” in connection with the issuance of
building permits and zoning certificates. The fees are intended to
account for the effect of new development on public school and
transportation facilities. Section 7-110 of Article 24 of the
County Code provides that if collected fees have not been properly
appropriated within six years, then the property owner may seek a
refund. The City also provides for the collection of school impact
fees via ordinance § 0-36-98, which authorizes the collection of
fees in connection with new or residential construction within the
City and directs that such fees be “spent within the Annapolis High
School Feeder System to reflect the needs of the City residents.”
In 2000, the City and the County entered into an agreement whereby
the City would serve as collection agent for the County in regards
to school impact fees and then periodically remit such fees to the
County.
On May 29, 2003, the developer of the property eventually
purchased by Herron paid the school impact fee. Herron brought
this action in state court against the Mayor and City Council of
Annapolis (collectively “the City”), claiming that the City
collected impact fees without implementing capital improvements for

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1Herron also named the County as a defendant; however, the
County has since been dismissed as a party pursuant to a
stipulation signed by Herron.
The complaint originally purported to assert a class action on
behalf of property owners who purchased property for which impact
fees had been collected. The district court, however, refused to
certify the class pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Herron does not challenge that ruling on appeal.
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the school system and that excess capacity made school improvements
unnecessary. Thus, Herron asserted that the collection of impact
fees amounted to an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth
Amendment as well as an unconstitutional deprivation of property
under Maryland’s Declaration of Rights. 1 Herron also asserted that
the City failed to disperse the fees collected for school
facilities as required by ordinance and therefore had been unjustly
enriched. Herron sought a refund and requested that the state
court impose a constructive trust upon the impact fees collected.
The defendants removed the action to federal court. After
completing discovery, the parties filed opposing dispositive
motions. The district court determined that Herron failed to
establish that she had suffered an injury-in-fact because she did
not pay the impact fee, and she offered no evidence to show that
the fees were included in the purchase price of her property.
Thus, the district court held that Herron lacked standing. See
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)
(explaining the injury-in-fact requirement for standing).

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Moreover, the district court concluded that even if Herron
enjoyed standing, her action was barred by the Tax Injunction Act
(“the Act”), which prohibits a federal court from “enjoin[ing],
suspend[ing], or restrict[ing] the assessment, levy or collection
of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy, and efficient
remedy may be had in the courts of such State.” 28 U.S.C. § 1341.
The district court concluded that the development impact fees
qualified as taxes for purposes of the Act in that the impact fees
were intended to “benefit[] the general public” by funding school
construction. See Valero Terrestial Corp. v. Caffrey, 205 F.3d
130, 134 (4th Cir. 2000). The district court further concluded
that a “plain, speedy, and efficient remedy” was available to
Herron under state law, which permitted her to challenge the impact
fees in Maryland Tax Court through either the County Code’s refund
provision or the statutory scheme for obtaining a tax refund , as
set forth in Article 24, § 9-710 of the Maryland Code.
Finally, the district court held that Herron could not show in
any event that the collection of the fees constituted an
unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment because there
existed a “rational nexus” or “reasonable relationship between the
required dedication and the impact of the proposed development.”
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 388 (1994).
On appeal, Herron argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
divested the district court of jurisdiction and bars this action.

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2The district court was not afforded an opportunity to address
the applicability of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine because Herron
first raised this issue on appeal.
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“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents the lower courts from
exercising jurisdiction over cases brought by ‘state-court losers’
challenging ‘state-court judgments rendered before the district
court proceedings commenced.’” Lance v. Dennis, 126 S. Ct. 1198,
1199 (2006) (per curiam) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). 2 Herron contends that the
district court in this case was asked to decided issues that had
already been decided by Maryland state courts in Cambridge Commons
v. Anne Arundel County, No. 1340 (Sept. 2001) (unpublished), where
property owners alleged that the County violated the code
provisions governing the collection of impact fees. The City,
however, was not a party to the Cambridge Commons action. The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply “where the party against
whom the doctrine is invoked was not a party to the underlying
state-court proceeding” and “was in no position to ask [the federal
court] to review the state court’s judgment and [does] not directly
attack[] it in the [federal] proceeding.” Lance, 126 S. Ct. at
1201-02 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, having
closely reviewed the state court decision upon which Herron relies,
we agree with the City that the state court addressed issues
clearly distinct from those decided by the district court below.
In no way can the City be viewed as attempting to appeal the

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decision of the state court by removing this action and asserting
its various legal positions. Accordingly, we reject Herron’s
challenge to the district court’s jurisdiction based on the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine.
Herron next contends that the district court erred in
concluding that she lacked standing for failure to demonstrate an
injury-in-fact. Herron claims that there was evidence to support
the conclusion that she had effectively payed the impact fee,
specifically a 1987 report of the County Impact Fee Study Committee
which recommended that the County provide refunds to property
owners “on the assumption that the impact fee was incorporated into
the value of the improved property.” As the district court pointed
out, this recommendation was incorporated into the Code, but it
does not establish that, for purposes of her claims in federal
court, Herron actually paid the fees at issue. Accordingly, we
agree with the district court that Herron lacks standing for
substantially the same reasons set forth in the district court’s
opinion.
We therefore affirm the decision of the district court. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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