Raoul D. Lee v. Lockheed Martin Operations Support, Incorporated

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-1959
RAOUL D. LEE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
LOCKHEED MARTIN OPERATIONS SUPPORT,
INCORPORATED,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION; LOCKHEED MARTIN
TECHNICAL SERVICES, INCORPORATED,
Defendants.
No. 05-1976
RAOUL D. LEE,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
LOCKHEED MARTIN OPERATIONS SUPPORT,
INCORPORATED,
Defendant - Appellant,
and

-- 1 of 6 --

- 2 -
LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION; LOCKHEED MARTIN
TECHNICAL SERVICES, INCORPORATED,
Defendants.
Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior
District Judge. (CA-03-742-BR)
Submitted: September 13, 2006 Decided: October 17, 2006
Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Raoul D. Lee, Appellant/Cross-Appellee Pro Se. Robert A. Sar, John
E. Branch, III, OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, PC,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).

-- 2 of 6 --

1Lee filed suit both in California (alleging the tort and
contract claims) and in North Carolina (alleging the discrimination
claims). The California action was transferred to the Eastern
District of North Carolina, and the cases were consolidated.
2A separate cause of action for violation of California public
policy did not survive summary judgment.
3The Title VII and ADEA claims are not raised in this appeal.
4The district court’s instructions focused on Lee’s
allegations in his complaint that LMOS promised a five-year term of
employment and agreed to an “in good faith” provision in its offer
- 3 -
PER CURIAM:
Raoul Lee, a former employee of Lockheed Martin
Operations Services, Inc. (“LMOS”), filed suit against LMOS,
alleging:1 (1) violation of Cal. Lab. Code Ann. § 970 (West 2003);2
(2) promissory fraud; (3) intentional concealment and omission of
known material facts; (4) negligent misrepresentation; (5) breach
of contract; (6) breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing; (7) violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000) (“Title
VII”); and (8) violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 to 634 (2000) (“ADEA”). The jury found for
LMOS on all claims. The district court denied Lee’s motion for new
trial, and Lee appeals, giving rise to No. 05-1959. 3 LMOS cross-
appeals, challenging the district court’s application of choice of
law principles, giving rise to No. 05-1976.
First, Lee asserts that the district court erred by
issuing narrower jury instructions than those requested by Lee.4

-- 3 of 6 --

letter that dictated the terms of Lee’s employment were not “at
will.” Lee claims the district court’s instructions gave short
shrift to evidence of alleged misrepresentations, omissions, and
false promises concerning the nature of the program for which he
was hired, which was subject to a contract between LMOS and the
Environmental Protection Agency.
5 Similarly, we conclude the district court did not abuse its
discretion by issuing instructions on at-will employment and
mitigation of damages.
6After hearing argument from counsel for both parties, the
district court decided to respond to the jury with the direction to
resolve its question “by consideration of all the instructions I
have previously given to you.” The district court reasoned that
because it could not discern the context of the jury’s question,
its response that the jury consider the instructions it had been
given was best calculated to minimize the possibility of confusing
the jury.
- 4 -
In diversity cases, the content of jury instructions is governed by
state law, while the form of the instructions is governed by
federal law. Hardin v. Ski Venture, Inc., 50 F.3d 1291, 1293 (4th
Cir. 1995). We review the jury instructions for abuse of
discretion. Chaudhry v. Gallerizzo, 174 F.3d 394, 408 (4th Cir.
1999). On review, jury instructions must be viewed as a whole, and
even where jury instructions are flawed, there can be no reversal
unless the error seriously prejudiced the plaintiff’s case.
Hardin, 50 F.3d at 1294, 1296. We have carefully reviewed the jury
instructions in this case in light of the evidence presented at
trial, and we find no reversible error. 5
Lee next challenges a clarifying instruction 6 given in
response to a question from the jury during deliberations. We
review a district court’s decision to respond to a jury’s question,

-- 4 of 6 --

7 Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Lee,
the non-moving party, we find meritless Lee’s contention that the
district court erred in granting LMOS’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b)
motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to the
availability of punitive damages on the California tort claims.
See Bryte ex rel. Bryte v. Am. Household, Inc., 429 F.3d 469,
479-80 (4th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2026 (2006); Cal.
- 5 -
and the form of that response, for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Smith, 62 F.3d 641, 646 (4th Cir. 1995). “[I]n responding
to a jury’s request for clarification on a charge, the district
court’s duty is simply to respond to the jury’s apparent source of
confusion fairly and accurately without creating prejudice.” Id.
An error requires reversal only if it is prejudicial in the context
of the record as a whole. See United States v. United Med. &
Surgical Supply Corp., 989 F.2d 1390, 1406-07 (4th Cir. 1993). We
conclude that the district court’s response in this case was fair
and accurate, and was certainly not prejudicial when judged on the
record as a whole.
Lee also challenges the district court’s denial of his
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a) motion for a new trial. “[T]he granting or
refusing of a new trial is a matter resting in the sound discretion
of the trial judge, and . . . his action thereon is not reviewable
upon appeal, save in the most exceptional circumstances.” Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Yeatts, 122 F.2d 350, 354 (4th Cir. 1941). Lee
has offered no exceptional circumstances that would warrant a
finding that the trial court abused its discretion. Thus, there
was no error in denying the motion for a new trial. 7

-- 5 of 6 --

Civ. Code Ann. § 3294 (West 2003) (explicating standard upon which
punitive damages may be attained).
- 6 -
We affirm the judgment of the district court. In light
of this decision, we have no occasion to address the claim
presented in LMOS’s cross-appeal. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

-- 6 of 6 --