United States of America v. Anthony Ranier Hutchinson

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-5093
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ANTHONY RANIER HUTCHINSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Rock Hill. Matthew J. Perry, Jr., Senior
District Judge. (CR-04-358)
Submitted: August 31, 2005 Decided: September 28, 2005
Before LUTTIG, KING, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James Shadd, III, JOHNSON, TOAL & BATTISTE, P.A., Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Jonathan S. Gasser, Acting United States
Attorney, Christopher Todd Hagins, Assistant United States
Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
See Local Rule 36(c).

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* A fifteen-year minimum sentence applies to armed career
criminals. 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(1). A person is an armed career
criminal if he had three previous convictions for a violent felony
or a serious drug offense or both, committed on occasions different
from one another. Id.
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PER CURIAM:
Anthony Ranier Hutchinson pled guilty to possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
(2000). Hutchinson argues on appeal that the district court erred
in sentencing him to 180 months imprisonment as an armed career
criminal,* 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2005), because
he did not have the requisite number of prior convictions for a
“violent felony.” In so asserting, he argues that his convictions
for common law robbery and breaking and entering under North
Carolina law were not violent felonies under § 924(e)(2), and that
his convictions for two counts each of robbery with a dangerous
weapon and kidnaping should be treated as only one predicate
offense. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
A “violent felony” is a “crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year . . . that (i) has as an element the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion,
involves the use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that
presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”
18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(2); see United States v. Letterlough, 63 F.3d
332 (4th Cir. 1995).

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Hutchinson first argues that his conviction of common law
robbery was not a violent felony. In determining whether a
conviction is for a violent felony, the courts look to the offense
of conviction and the statutory definition and not the underlying
conduct. United States v. Coleman, 158 F.3d 199, 201-02 (4th Cir.
1998). North Carolina defines common law robbery as the felonious
nonconsensual taking of personal property or money from the person
or presence of another by means of force or placing in fear. North
Carolina v. Delk, 604 S.E.2d 368 (N.C. App. 2004). Hutchinson
argues that, because the elements of the crime did not involve the
use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force, as
required under § 924(e)(2), this prior felony offense was not a
predicate violent felony conviction under the armed career criminal
provision. We have found that Virginia’s nearly-identical
definition of “robbery” qualifies as a violent felony. United
States v. Presley, 52 F.3d 64, 69 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that
conviction under the Virginia robbery statute constituted a violent
felony conviction under § 924(e)(2), even though definition did not
include “physical” as a qualifier to force or violence); see North
Carolina v. Herring, 370 S.E.2d 363, 368 (N.C. 1988) (“[C]ommon law
robbery plainly, ‘has as an element the use, attempted use or
threatened use of physical force against the person of another.’”)
(citations omitted); United States v. Bowden, 975 F.2d 1080, 1082
(4th Cir. 1992) (noting that parties stipulated that North Carolina

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conviction for common law robbery was a violent offense under
§ 924(e)). Accordingly, we agree that Hutchinson’s common law
robbery conviction qualifies as a violent felony under § 924(e)(1).
Hutchinson also argues that the district court erred in
finding that his North Carolina conviction for breaking and
entering qualified as generic burglary under § 924(e)(2), because
it allows for a conviction for breaking or entering a building. We
addressed this issue in Bowden and concluded that the argument was
unavailing. Bowden, 975 F.2d at 1084-85; see Taylor v. United
States, 495 U.S. 575, 598-99 (1990).
Hutchinson’s final argument is that his convictions for
two counts of kidnaping and two counts of robbery with a dangerous
weapon should count as only one, rather than two or more violent
felony convictions, because the offense conduct resulting in the
four convictions occurred on the same occasion. We need not
resolve this issue because, even assuming Hutchinson is correct, he
has the requisite three qualifying prior convictions for armed
career criminal status: (1) common law robbery, (2) breaking and
entering, and (3) kidnaping and robbery with a dangerous weapon.
Because Hutchinson had “three previous convictions . . .
for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed
on occasions different from one another,” he was properly found to
be an armed career criminal. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e)(1).
Accordingly, we affirm Hutchinson’s 180-month sentence. We

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dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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