Rovilma Diamond v.  Colonial Life & Accident Insurance Company

FILED: August 1, 2005
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-2093
(CA-02-1412-03-17BC)
ROVILMA DIAMOND,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
COLONIAL LIFE & ACCIDENT INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant - Appellee.
O R D E R
The Court amends its opinion filed July 25, 2005, as
follows:
In the second full paragraph on page 5, line 4, the word
“review” is deleted after the term “de novo” at the end of the
line.
For the Court - By Direction
/s/ Patricia S. Connor
Clerk

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PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
 ROVILMA DIAMOND,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 04-2093 
COLONIAL LIFE & ACCIDENT
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee. 
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Columbia.
Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., Chief District Judge.
(CA-02-1412-03-17BC)
Argued: May 24, 2005
Decided: July 25, 2005
Before WIDENER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and
HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Motz wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Widener and Senior Judge Hamilton joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Chalmers Carey Johnson, Charleston, South Carolina, for
Appellant. Katherine Dudley Helms, OGLETREE, DEAKINS,
NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C., Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: William L. Duda, OGLETREE, DEAKINS,
NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C., Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellee.

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OPINION
DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:
Rovilma Diamond sued her former employer, Colonial Life &
Accident Insurance Company, alleging race discrimination and retali-
ation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1981 (West 2003). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the order
of the district court granting Colonial summary judgment on both
claims.
I.
A.
Shortly after graduating from Hampton University in 1992 with a
degree in merchandising, Diamond, an African-American woman,
began working at Colonial as a customer service specialist. In 1995,
Colonial promoted Diamond to the position of disability claims spe-
cialist. While working at Colonial, and with help from its academic
assistance program, Diamond pursued a master’s degree in public
administration, which she earned in 1998. Subsequently, Colonial
promoted Diamond to the position of senior customer care specialist.
In that role she reported to Randy Stober, a white man, who reported
to Mike Glover, an African-American man and the assistant vice pres-
ident of the claims department.
In the summer of 2000, three claims specialists — two African-
American women (including Dee Goodman) and one white woman
— applied to telecommute, i.e., work from home. Stober refused
Goodman’s request to telecommute, but granted the white woman’s
request even though she, unlike Goodman, had been disciplined a few
months earlier. Following the denial of her request, Goodman "made
an internal report of discrimination . . . and listed Diamond as a sup-
porting witness." Brief of Appellant at 6.1
1Goodman ultimately resigned and sued Colonial for race discrimina-
tion and retaliation. The district court granted Colonial summary judg-
ment in that case.
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In August 2000, Glover posted an opening for a position as acci-
dent and health manager. Diamond and two white women asked to be
considered for the position. Due to budget concerns, however, Glover
did not fill the position at that time. In January 2001, Diamond began
searching for other employment.
In February 2001, Glover again posted the opening for accident
and health manager. Glover informed Debbie Hamrick, a white
woman and the director of accident and health and life claims, that
Diamond and the two white women who had previously expressed
interest in the position should be considered. In addition, Cindy Scott,
a white woman, and four white men applied for the position. The
stated qualifications for the position were: (1) "[p]rior management
experience preferred," (2) "[c]ollege degree preferred, but will con-
sider equivalent claims experience," and (3) "[u]nderstanding of Colo-
nial Products, Services, Markets, etc." In addition, Colonial generally
required an employee to have 18 months of work experience at Colo-
nial in order to be eligible for a promotion, although this requirement
could be waived if the employee was seeking a promotion within the
same department.
Hamrick and Blanche Chisholm, an African-American woman who
was an accident and health manager, interviewed six of the eight
applicants, including Diamond and Scott. Following each interview,
Hamrick and Chisholm rated the applicant on the basis of nine char-
acteristics, such as "operations knowledge, business sense, decision
making, communication skills, high degree of initiative, flexibili-
ty/openness, leadership skills, hands-on manager, and interpersonal
skills." Hamrick and Chisholm agreed that, based on their rating sys-
tem, Diamond ranked fourth among the applicants while Scott ranked
first. The contemporaneous notes of Hamrick and Chisholm indicate
that they believed Diamond had strong communication skills and
technical knowledge, but that she needed to develop "interpersonal
skills, initiative, coaching/counseling." Although Scott lacked a col-
lege degree and had not worked for Colonial for eighteen months,
Hamrick and Chisholm rated her higher than Diamond in all nine cat-
egories, noting her particular strength in "decision making, leadership,
interpersonal skills, communication." After the interviews, Hamrick
spoke with the managers of each of the top four applicants to discuss
the applicants’ ratings; none of the managers disagreed with the rank-
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ings. Hamrick also discussed the rankings with Glover, who agreed
with them. In March 2001, Colonial awarded the position to Scott.
Shortly thereafter, Diamond lodged internal complaints of race dis-
crimination and retaliation. In April 2001, unsatisfied with Colonial’s
response, she filed a charge of discrimination with the South Carolina
Human Affairs Commission. In response to that charge, Diamond
claims, she "began to experience negative changes at work," including
complaints about her work, being left unprepared for meetings, hav-
ing her phone calls monitored and certain emails deleted, heightened
surveillance, and negative performance reviews. Brief of Appellant at
10-12. On May 29, 2002, Diamond resigned from Colonial and
accepted a job with the South Carolina Budget and Control Board.
B.
On April 23, 2002, a month before resigning, Diamond filed a
complaint in state court alleging wrongful denial of a promotion and
retaliation in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981. Colonial
removed the case to federal court and moved for summary judgment.
On October 21, 2003, the magistrate judge issued a report and rec-
ommendation in which he recommended granting Colonial’s motion
for summary judgment on both the failure to promote and retaliation
claims. Diamond timely filed an objection to the magistrate judge’s
report, specifically objecting to his disposition of both claims. Dia-
mond also argued in her objection that the Supreme Court’s recent
decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003), rendered
the "shifting burden test . . . no longer . . . applicable" in Title VII
cases at the "[s]ummary [j]udgment stage."
The district court ordered the magistrate judge to "take a fresh
look" at Diamond’s suit "in light of Desert Palace." The court also
directed the magistrate to order further briefing and issue a "new"
report and recommendation. The magistrate promptly ordered the par-
ties to file supplemental briefs. In Diamond’s brief, she specifically
addressed the impact of Desert Palace on her race discrimination
claim. As to her retaliation claim, she stated that she "request[ed] de
novo consideration of the arguments set forth in the opposing memo-
randa and objection and response currently on file."
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On June 10, 2004, the magistrate judge issued his second report
and recommendation, in which he again recommended granting sum-
mary judgment to Colonial on Diamond’s failure to promote claim.
Regarding the retaliation claim, the magistrate judge erroneously said:
"Although Diamond asks that summary judgment be reconsidered for
both her claims (failure to promote and retaliation) in her objections
to the [report and recommendation], she argues only that her failure
to promote claim survive [sic] summary judgment in her most recent
memorandum." For this (incorrect) reason, the magistrate judge con-
cluded that "only Diamond’s failure to promote claim will be
addressed." Diamond timely objected to the magistrate’s recommen-
dation as to her failure to promote claim, but did not file an objection
to the report’s treatment of her retaliation claim.
The district court, after conducting a de novo review of Diamond’s
failure to promote claim, granted Colonial summary judgment on that
claim. The court also granted Colonial summary judgment on Dia-
mond’s retaliation claim, but did not review the claim de novo
because the court concluded that Diamond had not preserved an
objection to the magistrate judge’s resolution of that claim. The court
explained:
[I]n the June 10, 2004 [report and recommendation], the
Magistrate Judge observed that although Diamond asked in
her objections to the initial October 1, 2003 [report and rec-
ommendation] that summary judgment be reconsidered for
both the discrimination and retaliation claims, in her most
recent memorandum she argues only that her failure to pro-
mote claim survives summary judgment. This court notes
that Diamond did not dispute that Magistrate Judge’s obser-
vation in her response to the June 10, 2004 [report and rec-
ommendation] and thus this court adopts the reasoning
contained in the initial [report and recommendation] and
grants Colonial Life’s Motion for Summary Judgment on
the retaliation claim.
II.
Initially, Diamond argues that we should remand her case to the
district court so it can "reconsider" her retaliation claim. Brief of
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Appellant at 18. Because Diamond failed to object to the magistrate
judge’s disposition of her retaliation claim in his second report, the
district court had no obligation to conduct a de novo review of the
retaliation claim and Diamond waived her right to appellate review of
that claim. See Wells v. Shriners Hosp., 109 F.3d 198, 201 (4th Cir.
1997).
The Federal Magistrates Act requires a district court to "make a de
novo determination of those portions of the [magistrate judge’s]
report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made." 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1) (West 1993 & Supp.
2005) (emphasis added); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) ("The district
judge to whom the case is assigned shall make a de novo determina-
tion upon the record, or after additional evidence, of any portion of
the magistrate judge’s disposition to which specific written objection
has been made . . . .") (emphases added). By contrast, in the absence
of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo
review, but instead must "only satisfy itself that there is no clear error
on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation." Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note.
We have long held that "the [Federal Magistrates] Act can[not] be
interpreted to permit a party . . . to ignore his right to file objections
with the district court without imperiling his right to raise the objec-
tions in the circuit court of appeals." United States v. Schronce, 727
F.2d 91, 93-94 (4th Cir. 1984); see also Page v. Lee, 337 F.3d 411,
416 n.3 (4th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court has expressly upheld the
validity of such a waiver rule, explaining that "[t]he filing of objec-
tions to a magistrate’s report enables the district judge to focus atten-
tion on those issues — factual and legal — that are at the heart of the
parties’ dispute." Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985). Absent
such a rule, litigants would have little incentive to object in the dis-
trict court, Wells, 109 F.3d at 200, and "any issue before the magis-
trate would be a proper subject of judicial review," Thomas, 474 U.S.
at 148. The Magistrates Act does not contemplate such an obviously
inefficient use of judicial resources: "Congress would not have
wanted district judges to devote time to reviewing magistrate’s
reports except to the extent that such review is requested by the par-
ties or otherwise necessitated by Article III of the Constitution." Id.
at 153.
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Here, Diamond filed an objection to the magistrate judge’s disposi-
tion of her retaliation claim in his initial report and recommendation.
But, as she concedes, the district court then ordered the magistrate
judge to prepare a "new" report and recommendation and she failed
to file an objection to the magistrate judge’s recommended disposi-
tion of her retaliation claim in that "new" report. See Brief of Appel-
lant at 15. Notwithstanding these concessions, Diamond argues that
because the magistrate judge’s second report was to be "new," in
refusing to consider her retaliation claim afresh the magistrate judge
"did not do what [the district court] ordered him to do," and, thus,
"[t]here [was] nothing" for Diamond "to object to." Id. at 16-17. For
this reason, she maintains, her initial objection sufficed to trigger the
district court’s obligation to conduct a de novo review under the Mag-
istrates Act and to preserve her appellate rights.
We must reject this argument. Despite her initial objection, when
Diamond failed to lodge an objection to the magistrate judge’s sug-
gested disposition of her retaliation claim in his second report, she
failed to make the "specific written objection" required to invoke de
novo review by the district court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The fact
that the record shows that the magistrate judge inaccurately character-
ized Diamond’s brief as failing to address the retaliation claim does
not relieve Diamond of her obligation to object to that error. By not
objecting to the magistrate’s mischaracterization of her brief, Dia-
mond failed to put the district court on notice that she sought de novo
review of the retaliation claim. As a result, just as Rule 72 and the
Federal Magistrates Act contemplate, the district court did not "focus
attention on [that] issue[ ]." Thomas, 474 U.S. at 147. In the absence
of "specific written objection," the district court was free to adopt the
magistrate judge’s recommendation on the retaliation claim without
conducting a de novo review, and Diamond "waive[d] [her] right to
an appeal" on that claim. See Wells, 109 F.3d at 201.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment on Diamond’s retaliation claim.
III.
Diamond’s primary argument regarding her failure to promote
claim is that to survive summary judgment she only needed to make
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out a prima facie case of discrimination. She asserts that Desert Pal-
ace "makes it clear that . . . all Title VII cases are to be analyzed as
mixed motive cases" and that the "shifting burden" test first articu-
lated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), "is
actually an affirmative defense . . . and can not be used as a basis for
dismissal of a Title VII case." Brief of Appellant at 19, 22. She fur-
ther contends that in Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management,
Inc., 354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2004) (en banc), we recognized that as
a result of Desert Palace the "shifting burden" test no longer applies
at the summary judgment stage and a plaintiff can "avert" summary
judgment simply by establishing a "prima facie case" of discrimina-
tion. Brief of Appellant at 23-24.
Diamond also maintains, apparently in the alternative, that the dis-
trict court erred in granting Colonial’s motion for summary judgment
because she established a prima facie case and showed that Colonial’s
reasons for refusing to promote her were pretextual. See Brief of
Appellant at 28-30.
A.
In 1991, after the Supreme Court had recognized that employment
decisions motivated by both legitimate and discriminatory reasons —
so-called "mixed-motive" decisions — are actionable under Title VII,
see Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989) (plurality
opinion), Congress amended the Civil Rights Act to provide explicitly
for liability in mixed-motive cases. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m)
(West 2003); Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 94. Pursuant to the 1991
amendments (also known as the Civil Rights Act of 1991), a plaintiff
succeeds on a mixed-motive claim if she "demonstrates that race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the
practice." 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m). Once such a showing has been
made, the employer cannot escape liability. However, through use of
a limited affirmative defense, if an employer can demonstrate that it
"would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissi-
ble motivating factor," it can restrict a plaintiff’s damages to injunc-
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tive and declaratory relief, and attorney’s fees and costs. 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).2
In the wake of Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Act, several courts
of appeals, including this one, required Title VII plaintiffs to present
direct evidence of discrimination to succeed on a mixed-motive the-
ory. See Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 95; Taylor v. Virginia Union
Univ., 193 F.3d 219, 232 (4th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In Desert Palace,
however, the Supreme Court abrogated these holdings, concluding on
the basis of the plain language of § 2000e-2(m) that "direct evidence
of discrimination is not required in mixed-motive cases." 539 U.S. at
101-02. As in criminal cases and other civil cases, the Court held, cir-
cumstantial evidence is sufficient. Id. at 99-100.
Diamond argues that the Desert Palace holding means that all
employment discrimination cases should be analyzed as mixed-
motive cases3 and that Title VII plaintiffs can survive summary judg-
ment simply by presenting a "prima facie case." She further argues
2Congress enacted § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) in part to reject the holding of
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (plurality opinion), that an employer
could avoid liability entirely by proving that it would have made the
same decision even if it had not taken the impermissible factor into
account. See H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(I), at 45-46 (1991), reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 583-84 (stating that, because of this holding, "[t]he
effectiveness of Title VII’s ban on discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex or national origin has been severely undercut").
3Diamond also contends that she pleaded a mixed-motive, and not a
single-motive, claim. But her complaint does not specify whether she
asserts that Colonial refused to promote her because of both legal and
discriminatory reasons or solely because of illegal discrimination.
Whether Diamond pled a mixed-motive claim is irrelevant, however,
because "a case need not be characterized or labeled at the outset. Rather,
the shape will often emerge after discovery or even at trial. Similarly, the
complaint itself need not contain more than the allegation that the
adverse employment action was taken because of a protected characteris-
tic." Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 856 n.7 (9th Cir. 2002)
(en banc) (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247 n.12 (plurality opin-
ion)), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). Moreover, as explained within, Colonial
was entitled to summary judgment regardless of whether Diamond
asserted a mixed-motive or single-motive claim.
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that our en banc decision in Hill recognized this dual effect of Desert
Palace. These arguments are meritless.
As we explained in Hill, a Title VII plaintiff may "avert summary
judgment . . . through two avenues of proof." 354 F.3d at 284 (empha-
sis added). A plaintiff can survive a motion for summary judgment by
presenting direct or circumstantial evidence that raises a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether an impermissible factor such as race
motivated the employer’s adverse employment decision. Id. Pursuant
to the 1991 Act, the impermissible factor need not have been the sole
factor. As long as it motivated the adverse action, the plaintiff can
establish an unlawful employment practice. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-
2(m). Alternatively, a plaintiff may "proceed under [the McDonnell
Douglas] ‘pretext’ framework, under which the employee, after estab-
lishing a prima facie case of discrimination, demonstrates that the
employer’s proffered permissible reason for taking an adverse
employment action is actually a pretext for discrimination." Hill, 354
F.3d at 285.
In establishing this pretext framework, the Supreme Court
explained that the "broad, overriding interest" of Title VII, "shared by
employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy
workmanship assured through fair and racially neutral employment
and personnel decisions." McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 801. The
pretext framework advances that interest by "compensat[ing] for the
fact that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come
by." Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 271 (O’Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment).4 The Supreme Court constructed the elements of the
prima facie case to give plaintiffs who lack direct evidence a method
for raising an inference of discrimination. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty.
4In the event that a plaintiff has direct evidence of discrimination or
simply prefers to proceed without the benefit of the burden-shifting
framework, she is under no obligation to make out a prima facie case.
See, e.g., Costa, 299 F.3d at 855. Indeed, the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work is of little value when direct evidence of discrimination is available.
See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 271 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment) (noting that the Supreme Court has suggested that the burden-
shifting framework is inapplicable where a plaintiff presents direct evi-
dence of discrimination).
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Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253-54 (1981); Costa, 299 F.3d at
855. But, once an employer rebuts the prima facie case with a legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action, "the
McDonnell Douglas framework — with its presumptions and burdens
— disappear[s], and the sole remaining issue [is] discrimination vel
non." Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142-
43 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thus, in
Title VII cases, the "prima facie case," a mechanism peculiar to the
pretext framework, is never by itself sufficient to permit a plaintiff to
escape an adverse summary judgment ruling except in the rare
instance when an "employer is silent in the face of the presumption"
it raises. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.5 Even then, of course, as in
every employment discrimination case alleging disparate treatment,
"[t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defen-
dant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all
times with the plaintiff." Id. at 253.
B.
Applying these governing principles to the case at hand, we must
affirm the grant of summary judgment to Colonial because whether
Diamond alleges that race was a motivating factor or the sole reason
for Colonial’s decision not to promote her, she has failed to raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to the ultimate question, i.e., whether
Colonial intentionally discriminated against her.
5Notwithstanding our clear recognition in Hill of these principles and
the continued vitality of the McDonnell Douglas framework, Diamond
insists that after Desert Palace that framework is "no longer a tool which
can be used to dismiss a Title VII case at the [s]ummary [j]udgment
stage." Her argument finds no support in the text of Desert Palace,
which does not even mention McDonnell Douglas. Moreover, since
deciding Desert Palace, the Supreme Court has continued to invoke the
burden-shifting framework in pretext cases. See Raytheon Co. v. Her-
nandez, 124 S. Ct. 513, 517 n.3, 518 (2003); see also Johnson v. Califor-
nia, 125 S. Ct. 2410, 2418 n.7 (2005). Our sister circuits have also
rejected the view that Desert Palace nullified the McDonnell Douglas
framework. See, e.g., Keelan v. Majesco Software, Inc., 407 F.3d 332,
340 (5th Cir. 2005); Strate v. Midwest Bankcentre, Inc., 398 F.3d 1011,
1018 (8th Cir. 2005); Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 n.17
(11th Cir. 2004).
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The magistrate judge and the district court disagreed as to whether
Diamond had established that she was qualified for the position and,
thus, whether she had made out a prima facie case of race discrimina-
tion.6 Diamond argues at length that she was qualified to be an acci-
dent and health manager, noting both that she had a college degree
and had been in her position for 18 months while other applicants had
not. For purposes of this appeal, we will assume that Diamond was
qualified and made out a prima facie case of race discrimination. Cf.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 ("The burden of establishing a prima facie
case . . . is not onerous."). But a prima facie case alone is not suffi-
cient to warrant reversal of the district court’s summary judgment rul-
ing because Colonial has asserted legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for not promoting Diamond, specifically, that based on a
multi-factored rating system, two managers — Hamrick, a white
woman, and Chisholm, an African-American woman — rated Scott
the best candidate, and Glover, the African-American assistant vice
president of the claims department, agreed with that assessment.
Diamond claims that Colonial’s failure to "recognize [her] prior
experience as management experience should be considered evidence
of discriminat[ory] intent," and that this evidence is sufficient to show
that Colonial’s stated reasons for not promoting her were a pretext for
discrimination. Brief of Appellant at 28. We disagree. Assuming
arguendo that Diamond had more management experience than Scott
and that Colonial failed to recognize the extent of Diamond’s experi-
ence, we are unable to conclude that Diamond has demonstrated pre-
text. According to the stated qualifications for the accident and health
manager position, some prior management experience was "pre-
ferred," but such experience was not regarded as essential. Thus,
while management experience was a factor to be considered in award-
ing the promotion, it clearly was not intended to be dispositive.
6To demonstrate a prima facie case of racial discrimination in a failure
to promote case, a plaintiff must show that: "(1) she is a member of a
protected group, (2) she applied for the position in question, (3) she was
qualified for that position, and (4) the defendants rejected her application
under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimi-
nation." Anderson v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.3d 248,
268 (4th Cir. 2005).
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Moreover, Diamond has failed to rebut the reasons documented in
contemporaneous notes as to why Colonial awarded the promotion to
Scott. Cf. EEOC v. Sears Roebuck and Co., 243 F.3d 846, 852-53 (4th
Cir. 2001). That is, she has failed to address the fact that on each of
the nine factors considered by Hamrick and Chisholm — "operations
knowledge, business sense, decision making, communication skills,
high degree of initiative, flexibility/openness, leadership skills, hands-
on manager, and interpersonal skills" — Scott scored higher than Dia-
mond, and each manager to review their applications, including two
African-Americans, agreed that Scott was the superior candidate.
Diamond does not suggest any flaw in the rating system or that
Hamrick and Chisholm failed to conduct fair evaluations. Nor does
she contest the results of those evaluations. Thus, even if we assume
that Diamond had more management experience than Scott, in the
face of Colonial’s nondiscriminatory — and unanswered — explana-
tion for not promoting her, we must conclude that Diamond has failed
to forecast sufficient evidence of pretext to "avert[ ] summary judg-
ment" in Colonial’s favor. Hill, 354 F.3d at 285.
IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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